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Introduction
Evaluating Religious and Interreligious Peacebuilding: Meeting
the Challenge
1 Introduction
Religious and interreligious peacebuilding are emerging fields of practice and
studies. A core component of interreligious peacebuilding is intra- and interreli-
gious dialogue. As emerging fields of practice, religious peacebuilding, interreli-
gious peacebuilding in general, and interreligious dialogue, have been slowly
shifting from fields in which practitioners mainly relied on their faith and beliefs
in the usefulness of dialogue and peace into fields with more professional com-
munities that seek to systematically illustrate effectiveness¹. Although these
fields have come a long way in the last several years, they are still far from reach-
ing maturity, namely the stage of professional and reflective culture of practice
that entails detailed processes of programme development and integrated mon-
itoring and evaluation frameworks.
The development of ethical and theoretical evaluation frameworks and pro-
cedures for religious and interreligious peacebuilding is not only an important
step towards strengthening programmes and projects in the field, but also nec-
essary for scholarly and professional recognition, as well as, communicating and
engaging with policy-making circles and other agencies who influence the proc-
ess of social change. Why evaluate interreligious peacebuilding? In general,
monitoring and evaluation processes are typically invoked for two reasons: ac-
countability and learning how to be more effective in achieving change. While
often the focus on evaluation stems from the ‘pressure’ from donors, accounta-
bility is not limited to ensuring that the donors’ financial contributions are well
utilized. Rather accountability also refers to the accountability – or responsibil-
ity – to the stakeholders and actors directly affected by peacebuilding processes
(Abu-Nimer, Section 1, 25–52). It is important to both monitor and evaluate proj-
 The term interreligious peacebuilding is used as an umbrella term that includes other forms of
intervention aiming to build closer relationships among different sides within and between faith
communities, such as dialogue, nonviolent communication, peace education, conflict resolution
processes, etc. (Gerrard & Abu-Nimer 2018, 6–7).
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ects and programmes to ensure that needs are met, projects are adjusted to ad-
dress alterations in needs in the rapidly changing conditions in fragile contexts,
and that peacebuilders adhere to the ‘do no harm’ principle. The second aim of
evaluations is learning. Learning should, ideally, take place throughout the du-
ration of any given project cycle – ‘monitoring’ – requiring indicators to be de-
veloped for different stages in a project and data collection to take place more
frequently than at the culmination of the project (Rothman 2007). By monitoring,
peacebuilders and beneficiaries (stakeholders) can learn from their efforts as
they work and analyse the situation at different points in the project, allowing
for managing risks and making adjustments. The final evaluation is not only val-
uable for the peacebuilders involved in measuring their success and learning
how to improve future projects, but also for others in the field. It is important
to also share failures and limitations, not just successes with others in these
fields. Although it might be challenging to share limitations and obstacles that
are faced both by programmers and evaluators of interreligious peacebuilding,
this step is critical for the future development of this field.
There are a number of recent studies and reports that have focused on cap-
turing the major developments of interreligious peacebuilding field.² It is impor-
tant to recognize that the foundation for the growing interest in this area is un-
fortunately based on a wider attention to the role of religion in violent conflicts.
The increasing manipulation of religious identity by both certain politicians and
religious agencies since the end of the Cold War, has brought faith and its follow-
ers to open public debates and ideological conflicts on the role of religion in
peace and violence.
The policies related to the events of 9/11 in USA, invasion of Iraq, civil wars
in Middle East region, and massive refugee and immigrant waves into European
countries, have led to a clear recognition among governments, donors, and sec-
ular peacemakers that religious and faith agencies have to be engaged in the
processes of resolving these violent conflicts and their consequences.
However, the extent, scope, and level of such recognition varies based on re-
gion, nature of governmental agencies, and type of religious agencies involved.
Some policy makers are less hesitant to engage with religious actors while others
remain cautious observers. Nevertheless, today it is not strange to see policy
makers calling for further engagement with religious leaders to confront and
solve social and political problems.
 For examples of these see Garred and Abu-Nimer (2018), whose introductory chapter briefly
outlines four key areas in which these advancements have taken place: Engaging one’s own
faith, engaging with the ‘other’, engaging policy, and confronting injustice and trauma.
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It is in this context that evaluation of religious and interreligious peacebuild-
ing is highly relevant. Policy makers and religious agencies often speak different
languages and have in some ways opposing operational frameworks to assess
their contribution to solving problems.
Policy makers tend to rely on written results that are evidence-driven and ac-
tion-oriented while the subculture of religious and interreligious peacebuilding
tends to be oral, anecdotal, and relationship-oriented. Thus, religious commun-
ities and institutions, as well as faith-based organizations (FBOs) and interreli-
gious peacebuilding organizations face a serious challenge in communicating
their message and importance of their work to policy makers. Additionally,
with the lack of monitoring and evaluation culture in these different religious en-
vironments, the policy makers’ language of evidence and tangible results is often
misunderstood and dismissed as an obstruction to their work and a refusal to
cooperate.
The importance of measuring the outcomes and impact of religious and in-
terreligious peacebuilding goes even beyond influencing policy makers or do-
nors, but it is an effective way to persuade the public that religious identity is
not a source of violence and exclusion. Furthermore, evaluation can provide
clear proof that religious identity and actors can be influential keys in unlocking
societal stalemates and in promoting social cohesion in divided societies.
In this global context in which religious institutions are under attack and
major questioning of their role, evaluation of interreligious peacebuilding is
no longer a secondary priority in the process of intervention, but it is an essential
step in the process of effectively communicating the message of the religious
agencies to the public.
Nevertheless, there are many questions that the interreligious field has to ad-
dress in order to be able to present a coherent evaluation framework to be uti-
lized by practitioners and donors too, some of these questions include:
1. What are the current methods of evaluation being utilized by the practition-
ers?
2. What are the challenges that face an evaluator in this field of religious and
interreligious peacebuilding? Are they different from other fields?
3. What are the most effective tools and criteria that can be used by evaluators
and practitioners to both monitor and evaluate interreligious interventions?
4. Do evaluators need new – unique – methodologies and frameworks in car-
rying out their design in the context of religious and interreligious peace-
building?
5. What are the main research themes and gaps in the field that need to be ad-
dressed in order to further advance the monitoring and evaluation in this
area?
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In the overall spirit of sharing evaluative practices and their challenges, this vol-
ume is an attempt to respond to the above questions and it aims to contribute to
the on-going learning for practitioners in the fields of religious and interreligious
peacebuilding and interreligious dialogue.
2 Engaging with Religion: Not if but how
As mentioned above, it is no longer news that it is necessary to engage with re-
ligion and religious actors in programmes and projects across a variety of sec-
tors – from development and environment to peacebuilding³. In the last couple
of decades, the recognition of the importance of religion and the value of consid-
ering the views and advice of religious actors, as well as direct engagement with
religious actors when working with local communities is increasingly prevalent
in programmatic approaches of states, multilaterals and non-governmental or-
ganizations (Garred and Abu-Nimer 2018). With a significant percentage –
more than 80% (Pew 2017) – of the world’s population adhering to a faith
and the fact that concepts of diversity, peace, justice, forgiveness and reconcili-
ation are aspects of all religions, engaging religion is no longer a topic relegated
to religious communities, institutions and faith-based organizations (FBOs). As
members in networks or through other partnerships, national and international
peacebuilding and development agencies have found benefits to working with
religious agencies whether they be FBOs, religious leaders, institutions or com-
munities to improve their work.
There is now indisputable and solid evidence that religions and religious actors can suc-
cessfully be invited into, and contribute to global development, which is also a trend
that emanated from most of the literature surveyed (see among others Dan mission
2016b; Karam, 2017; Mandaville, P. & Nozell, M. 2017; Orton, A., 2016; UK Aid 2012; Swedish
Mission Council 2016; Tomalin, E. et al. 2018). Thus, there is a clear consensus that religious
actors should be recognized and legitimized as important players in achieving the SDGs
and other sustainability objectives (Udenrigsministeriet 2019, 6).
The growing partner work with a variety of religious institutions and FBOs is
amply evident with the creation and rapid growth of joint networks of FBOs, gov-
ernments and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) working on different as-
pects of common themes in development and peacebuilding. Examples of
 For a list of organizations working on Religion and Conflict internationally see Frazer and
Owen 2018, 125.
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such networks include: the Joint Learning Initiative (JLI)⁴ founded in 2012 for in-
creased knowledge exchange and evidence building; the Network for Religious
and Traditional Peacemakers⁵ initiated in 2013 was founded based upon a report
by former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, which revealed that religious ac-
tors play a key role in conflict mediation processes; the International Partnership
on Religion and Sustainable Development (PaRD)⁶ was launched in 2016 by the
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit towards the achievement of the
2030 SDGs and focuses on SDG 3 (health), 5 (gender), 16 (peacebuilding) and 6,
13, 14 and 15 (water, environment and climate action); and the United Nations
Interagency Task Force on Religion and Development chaired by UNFPA
launched the UN Faith-Based Advisory Council⁷ with the heads of the top com-
mon UN faith-based and faith-inspired partner organizations – 28 organizations
at the launch and more than 45 at the time of writing. Collaboration also is oc-
curring among religious organizations, institutions, and FBOs, intergovernmen-
tal organizations, and governments through less formal partnerships on consor-
tia and steering committees, such as the Steering Committee for the
Implementation of the Plan of Action⁸ led by the UN Office for the Prevention
of Genocide or the Moral Imperative Steering Committee led by the World
Bank; and movements, such as “Faith Action for Children on the Move”⁹. In ad-
dition, KAICIID, the International Dialogue Centre, as an intergovernmental en-
tity¹⁰ has established five major interreligious networks in Nigeria, CAR, Myan-
mar, Arab Region, and Europe. These platforms are all engaged in different
partnerships with local, national, or regional religious institutions and FBOs,
too.
This rapid growth in partnerships, collaboration on platforms and networks
linking faith-based organizations and secular entities has been advancing a sys-
tematic linking of religion and religious actors to peacebuilding and develop-
ment processes, thus pushing interreligious dialogue, religious and interreli-
 See Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities (ND)
 See The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers (ND)
 See PaRD International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development (ND)
 Although there is no official website for the Advisory Council, its launch is mentioned in
Annex 4 of the 2019 annual report of the Executive Director of UNFPA (UNFPA 2019)
 The Plan of Action was developed by the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and
the Responsibility to Protect in partnership with KAICIID, The Network for Religious and Tradi-
tional Peacemakers, and the World Council of Churches (UNOGPRtP et. al. ND)
 More information can be found about Faith Action for Children on the Move in World Vision’s
Global Partner’s Forum Report (2019).
 The four founding governments include Austria, Saudi Arabia and Spain the Holy See as
founding observer.
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gious peacebuilding more front and centre on the policy makers’ and public
agenda than ever before. This gradual shift also comes with a greater under-
standing of the need to address challenges of interreligious peacebuilding.
One of the key challenges is how to monitor, measure and evaluate interreligious
peacebuilding projects and programmes. As highlighted in 2016 when discussing
interreligious peacebuilding as an emerging field, “[t]here are few studies on the
mechanism and tools (design, processes, and evaluation of success) of interreli-
gious peacebuilding, which will allow policy makers to engage religious leaders
and their institutions in a systematic process of mediation, negotiation, or prob-
lem solving to respond to a concrete social or political problem” (Abu-Nimer
2016). Although a few years have passed since this observation was published
on Oxford Group’s website, monitoring and evaluation of the field remains in
its initial phase of professionalization and unfortunately with few frameworks
or tools to offer. Those tools that do exist or are being developed are not neces-
sarily widely recognized or disseminated. The need to advance this area is only
exacerbated by the rapidity with which increasingly more actors are engaging in
interreligious peacebuilding.
This volume aims to 1) examine and address several challenges associated
with developing monitoring and evaluation tools and practices for interreligious
peacebuilding, and 2) provide an assemblage of examples of tools and practices
that have developed and are being used on the field. The hope of the authors and
editors of this volume is that this collection may serve a first step towards a col-
lection of existing approaches, wider dissemination and thereby greater applica-
tion of monitoring and evaluation practices in interreligious peacebuilding.
3 Interreligious and Religious Peacebuilding
What do we mean by interreligious or religious peacebuilding and how is it dif-
ferent from standard peacebuilding processes? It is firstly valuable to outline
peacebuilding itself before looking at religious or interreligious peacebuilding.
Peacebuilding “refers to activities intended to bring people together and address
a conflict’s underlying structural causes, regardless of the stage or dynamics of
such conflict” (Garred and Abu-Nimer 2018, 6) Why do we do peacebuilding?
“Peacebuilding aims to create conditions for lasting peace and the prevention
of future conflicts through the positive transformation of the cultures, structures,
systems, and other root causes that generate and sustain the conflicts into ones
that promote peaceful coexistence among feuding groups” (Abu-Nimer, Section 1,
25–52).
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While there is not one stand-alone definition of interreligious peacebuilding
or religious peacebuilding, there are some key components that are inherent to
both religious and interreligious peacebuilding. Firstly, both interreligious and
religious peacebuilding draw on the spiritual values of the participants to
work towards “individual transformation and healing, as well as to build greater
social cohesion within groups” (Catholic Relief Services 2019). Religious and in-
terreligious peacebuilding engage religious actors and communities in peace-
building processes and often utilize religious scriptures and traditions in their
peacebuilding work. These similarities are clearly illustrated by the definitions
of religious and interreligious peacebuilding put forth in this volume. Neufeldt
defines religious peacebuilding as “actions taken by individuals motivated by
their religion or representing religious institutions to constructively and non-vi-
olently prevent, reduce or transform inter-group conflict”; and interreligious
peacebuilding as “peacebuilding undertaken by people motivated by religion
or representing a religious institution or confessional community and working
between and across faith traditions to prevent, reduce or transform inter-
group conflict” (Section 1, 55). Abu-Nimer describes religious and interreligious
peacebuilding as drawing “its inspiration and motivation from the beliefs, val-
ues, practices, and rituals derived from the scriptures of one or more faith tradi-
tions; uses the institutional platforms, networks, and resources; or leverages the
moral voice and authority of religious actors (including the clergy and lay per-
sons and organizations working in the name of the faith) to facilitate the creation
of the conditions for peace and the prevention of violent conflicts in divided so-
cieties” (Section 1, 28).
Steele and Wilson-Grau (Section 2, 137) break down two different roles in
which religion can play in faith-based peacebuilding: interveners motivated by
religion or faith; and “local actors whom the interveners wish to influence can
be religiously motivated”.
The processes used to achieve the transformation of participant and commu-
nity attitudes and behaviours include but are not limited to interreligious, intra-
religious and intercultural dialogue (horizontal engagement), mutual problem
solving, joint community projects, mediation, and dialogue with policymakers
(vertical engagement) (Catholic Relief Services 2019). At first glance many of
the processes used in interreligious peacebuilding do not differ from standard
peacebuilding practices. The critical differences lie in the fact that religious
and interreligious peacebuilding draw on spiritual values and place a greater
emphasis on dialogue processes and the role of religion in transformative change
It is also important to highlight that it is not sufficient to have religious di-
versity among the participants to classify or distinguish the programme as inter-
faith or interreligious. Unfortunately, there are many organizations who design
Introduction 7
intervention programmes (capacity building and crisis intervention initiatives)
and classify or label such activities as interreligious or interfaith, despite the
fact that such designs avoid any intentional spiritual or faith-based processes
or content.
4 The Linkage of Dialogue to Religious and
Interreligious Peacebuilding
While one may at first envision the relevance of dialogue tied to conflicts –
whether violent or otherwise – with a division along faith lines. Yet interfaith
and intra-faith dialogue in religious and interreligious peacebuilding is neither
limited to, nor only useful in such conflicts; “Interfaith dialogue can be of
great value in promoting peacebuilding and advancing reconciliation even
when religion is not the central cause of a conflict” (Uysal 2016, 265). Beyond
active violent conflict and post violent conflict settings dialogue and interreli-
gious and religious peacebuilding play a key role within the broader peacebuild-
ing spectrum – including conflict prevention, education, dealing with root caus-
es of conflict, ongoing tensions or latent conflict due to environment, lack of
resources, etc. (Abu-Nimer 2007. Interfaith Dialogue in Middle East- USIP) The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark lists among several reasons for engaging
in interreligious dialogue: 1) “many people in the Global South have more trust
in religious institutions than in governmental institutions”; 2) “religious actors
can contribute to reducing tensions in communities, which enables more trust,
safe zones for addressing other development challenges”; and 3) the challenges
of sustainability, as outlined in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, will make
religious actors increasingly interdependent and entwined, thus making the
need for enhanced dialogue necessary” (Udenrigsministeriet 2019, 5–6). Intra-
faith and interfaith dialogue are also typically tied together with mutual problem
solving and joint community projects. This link between dialogue and action fol-
low in line with concepts such as the 3H or head, hand, heart approach used in
training interreligious peacebuilders (Abu-Nimer 1999) or the 3Bs – Binding,
Bonding and Bridging featured by the Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies’ Contending Modernities’ education and research initiative¹¹. Both ap-
proaches aim to achieve attitudinal then behavioural change and are described
in brief as follows:
 See Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2021); and University of Notre Dame and
Keough School of Global Affairs (2021).
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[This approach engages] all three dimensions of the attitudinal-change triangle: head, heart
and hand (3H), which correspond to cognition, emotion and behaviour. Interveners are suc-
cessful when they can influence the parties’ thinking, engage them in a positive emotional
experience, and show them ways to apply their new learning through hands on experience
or chances for action (Abu-Nimer 2001, 689).
The 3B method, comprised of Binding, Bonding, and Bridging activities, sets the stage for
reconciliation by addressing personal barriers to peace, fostering communal understanding
and voice, and generating pathways to constructively encounter the “other.” This method
pays heed to deeply held divisive narratives kept alive in hearts and practice, and better
equips communities to develop local, pragmatic, and mutually agreed-upon conflict reso-
lution mechanisms (Fitzgerald 2016).
As illustrated by several chapters in this volume, there is a critical linkage be-
tween the use of dialogue – interfaith or intra-faith – and achieving transforma-
tive change within interreligious or religious peacebuilding processes. Capturing
these processes via evaluation is a common challenge that faces religious and
interreligious peacebuilding, and peacebuilding in general.
5 Challenges
5.1 Speed of the Process
Dialogue and interreligious peacebuilding are not rapid processes. Since interre-
ligious peacebuilding primarily relies on attitudinal and behavioural changes, its
contribution to changes at the macro level – societal change – will take years to
achieve or be observed. The nebulousness of success might best be exemplified
in the following statement: “‘[…] the quality of the dialogue [is] enhanced so that
it improves mutual understanding and learning from difference, whilst also de-
creasing prejudice, promoting social cohesion and developing a common sense
of belonging between those involved […]’” (Orton et al. 2016).While there are in-
deed ways to measure various factors outlined, certainly no project owner apply-
ing standard indicators would have the realistic expectation of decreasing soci-
etal prejudice, increasing social cohesion and a common sense of belonging
within the typical 3–5-year project cycle. The long term nature of the desired out-
comes are demonstrated in a report by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
“Relying on the methodological framework of “Outcome harvesting”, which as-
sesses dimensions such as “output”, “outcome” and “impact”, a successful ID
(Interreligious Dialogue) has achieved measurable results on an “outcome”
and “impact” level, which would entail measurable long-term changes in behav-
iours, relationships and policies among involved drivers of change” (Udenrigsmi-
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nisteriet 2019, 8).¹² Yet, most donors – and therefore most faith-based organiza-
tions as recipients of donor funds – have high expectations but seek visible or
tangible results – as aspects that would make anyone aiming for SMART and
FRU indicators shutter.¹³
This poses multiple obstacles, for example 1) being able to show results to
donors in often short-term project or grant cycles; 2) managing donor expecta-
tions; 3) developing an evaluation process that not only maps change but also
had clear enough indicators that provide enough information for the implement-
ers themselves to learn from their work and make adjustments when necessary;
and 4) not overlooking the need for data collection over the duration to also aim
to evaluate the long-term change. Developing monitoring and evaluation proc-
esses need to take into account micro – individual or community level (micro)
and macro level changes, but also how the changes link to one another in the
short and long term. The delineation of what can be achieved in the short versus
long term need to be made clear to donors as well to prevent the expectation of
miracles.
5.2 Scepticism on Evaluation Need
Scepticism on the need of evaluations, as well as the evaluators involved may
hinder the development of monitoring and evaluation processes and limit data
collection. There is at times a scepticism or even lack of interest by religious
or interreligious peacebuilders in applying monitoring and evaluation techni-
ques. There are several reasons for this. In some instances, religious or interreli-
gious peacebuilders see peacebuilding as a good in and of itself (Neufeldt, Sec-
tion 1, 53–76). While there may be an acknowledgement of the need for
accountability and to evaluate success, success in religious peacebuilding may
not be tied to predefined results (Steele and Wilson-Grau, Section 2, 137– 168).
Even when there is an acknowledgment of the need for standard evaluation
there might be a hesitancy to exclusively involve secular evaluators unfamiliar
with interreligious peacebuilding in evaluation processes. Peacebuilding itself
is already complex enough particularly given the existing challenges when work-
 See also Abu-Nimer 2019, and Neufeldt & Lederach 2007
 Indicators should both be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time
Bound) and FRU (Feasible: the data can be collected at a reasonable cost with a reasonable
level of training, Reliable: No matter who collects the data, the same findings will be collected,
and Useful: The information should help you make informed choices about your programme and
contribute to learning) (Roberts and Khattri 2012, 33).
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ing in conflict or post-conflict areas, but as expressed by understanding the nu-
ances necessary to develop a useful yet respectful evaluative approach that takes
into consideration the principles and values based upon the religious tradition(s)
involved adds to this complexity (Garred, Herrington, and Hume, Section 2, 169–
196; Steele and Wilson-Grau, Section 2, 137–168). Furthermore, the realization
for the need of the evaluation may be seen as something more aimed at pleasing
the donor. This can result in monitoring and evaluation being applied post-facto,
hindering proper planning and data collection that would benefit improvement
during the duration on the project, as well as overall learning for the peacebuild-
ers themselves – let alone allowing for future learning by others.
5.3 Squaring the Circle
Evaluation practices used for traditional peacebuilding projects and programmes
are not always a good fit for interreligious peacebuilding projects. This does not
mean it is necessary to reinvent the wheel, yet it is also neither advisable nor
seemingly effective to “cut and paste” standard evaluation criteria such as “out-
come harvesting”, “logical frameworks” or simple application of the OECD criteria
onto interreligious or religious peacebuilding projects without modifications. This
would ignore the transcendental or faith aspect of religious and interreligious
peacebuilding and dialogue. “The evaluation methodology for ID (Interreligious
Dialogue) seems to be in need of a boost, perhaps by innovating evaluation de-
signs and developing new approaches” (Udenrigsministeriet 2019, 9). This is
true of overall religious and interreligious peacebuilding processes.
5.4 Instrumentalizing or Downplaying Religion
There is a risk of instrumentalization religion as well as downplaying the impor-
tance of religion. The pattern of instrumentalization of religion to justify both
war and peace by policy makers and religious agencies has been an integral
part of the human civilization. This is not a new phenomenon, nevertheless in
recent decades religious peacebuilding has been introduced as a means for
countering violent extremism, too (Abu-Nimer 2018). Thus, there are “concerns
about instrumentalizing religion, taking a reductionist approach and using reli-
gion as the means to a peacebuilder’s end” (Neufeldt, Section 1, 54), as well as
the risk of wrongly attributing successes or failures when the monitoring and
evaluation processes are not well-developed. Recognizing the need to engage
with religion should also influence the need to adhere to a nuances and respect-
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ful approaches in engaging with religion. There is a risk of token engagement,
compartmentalizing religious peacebuilding to a certain sphere of peacebuilding
separate from greater peacebuilding processes, or engaging well-known yet not
necessarily legitimate and relevant religious actors (Abu-Nimer, Section 1, 25–52;
Garred & Abu-Nimer 2018, 15). Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and governmental agencies organize activities under the labelling of interreli-
gious dialogue or interreligious peacebuilding, however often these programmes
have no relation to interreligious peacebuilding or to religion and religious tra-
ditions. Indeed, the participants might be from different religious backgrounds,
yet the programmes, the design and processes tend to completely be devoid from
faith or spirituality. Alternatively, there is the possibility of involving interreli-
gious peacebuilders for only a specific aspect of peacebuilding processes for ex-
ample engagement on limited interreligious dialogue rather than a holistic ap-
proach that requires action (the 3B or 3H methods as mentioned above).
5.5 Too Much Emphasis on Religion: Losing Sight on Root
Causes
There is the risk of overemphasizing religion and losing focus on addressing the
root causes of conflict. This challenge stands in stark contrast with the last one
and strongly shows the difficulty in achieving a balance in clearly understanding
the role of religion in peacebuilding in order to be able to effectively evaluate the
peacebuilding processes. As illustrated by Hippolyt Pul in Section 1, 77– 100 the
religious identities of conflict actors and peacebuilders can mask the real issues
of the conflict. If there is too much emphasis on the role of religion in any or all
of the parties, there is a risk of not only derailing the peacebuilding processes
from looking at conflict drivers such as power, politics, environment, ethnic
and socio-economic dynamics, resources, etc. (Abu-Nimer 2018), but also over-
emphasizing the importance or misattributing/simplifying the role of religion
in evaluations of conflicts and peacebuilding processes hinders the understand-
ing of successes/failure and prevents learning from the evaluative process. In es-
sence, it not only reinforces the media portrayal and overwhelming public per-
ception that religion is typically the cause for most violent conflicts, when in
fact the opposite is true. Most violent conflicts have a number of non-religious
based root causes, yet due to the manipulation of religious identity many are ex-
acerbated and deepened along religious divides. (Appleby 2000)
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5.6 Gaps in the Literature
There is a significant lack of literature regarding monitoring and evaluation prac-
tices of religious and interreligious peacebuilding and dialogue (Neufeldt 2011;
Abu-Nimer 2016, Orton 2016, Udenrigsministeriet 2019). In response to this
lack of literature, in 2015 KAICIID initiated a special seminar for evaluators to
examine the state of the field of interreligious peacebuilding evaluation confer-
ence.¹⁴ The proceedings of this seminar pointed out very clearly for the need to
hold further discussions and explore the challenges and possibilities for profes-
sionalizing this area of practice. The need for such an initiative emerged from
five years of intensive work with religious institutions and leaders from the
five major religion of Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.
Throughout these activities, participants voiced their frustration and expressed
their deep wish to gain skills and methods to help them articulate their success
and effective work (KAICIID 2015. Project Report).
The lack of research does not necessarily mean that practitioners of interre-
ligious peacebuilding are not evaluating their own work. However, it poses a
challenge for information sharing of what is being done and as a result leaves
out one of the critical aspects of monitoring and evaluation for a wider audi-
ence – learning. It is not only important to learn lessons from one’s own
work, but also from each other. With an extremely limited amount of literature
dealing with the topic of evaluation and religious/interreligious peacebuilding
and dialogue, it is near impossible to learn about existing methods, challenges,
and how others deal with obstacles and risks. One such example of a means to
fill this gap has been an ongoing process in the development of the Evaluating
Interreligious Peacebuilding and Dialogue (EIAP) framework and its revised ver-
sion (EIAP II), discussed by Garred, Hume and Herrington in this volume.
5.7 Recognition within the Field of Evaluation
The general field of evaluation is expansive in its diversity and coverage. The
professional development and training of evaluators in social science methods
and thematic specialization such as development, health, education, etc. are
crucial for recognition by policy makers, donors and the public in general. In
this context, the wider field of peacebuilding is still struggling in gaining such
recognition and credibility within the field of evaluation. Evaluators have only
 Section 2, 197–220, by Cohen, is built upon her initial presentation at this seminar.
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in the past two decades begun paying greater attention to the evaluation of
peacebuilding (see the various national, regional, and international associations
of evaluation and the trend of neglecting peacebuilding in their conferences and
memberships).¹⁵ This difficulty is reflected even more in the subfield of religious
and interreligious peacebuilding evaluation. In fact, it is hard to find any aca-
demic or professional development programme that offers any capacity building
or certification of evaluators in this field.
6 Opportunities
While the current amount of available literature is limited to date, there are at-
tempts to systematize analysis and monitoring and evaluation of religious and
interreligious peacebuilding, and there are tools being developed. For example
in 2018, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) published an analysis for re-
ligion and conflict and peacebuilding. The guide is part of a four-part series of
analysis and action guides developed by USIP in collaboration with the Network
for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers and the Salam Institute for Peace and
Justice. They “are intended to have practical value, providing theory only to the
extent that it helps with the assessment, design, planning, implementation, and
evaluation of concrete interventions” (Frazer and Owen 2018, 6). The guide is
particularly useful for practitioners in analysing what role religion plays in the
society, the state and the conflict.
Some international entities such as the Network for Religious and Tradition-
al Peacemakers and the KAICIID Dialogue Centre have been working with reli-
gious actors for the last several years in conflict afflicted societies and have
been developing monitoring and evaluation systems for their own work. In the
case of KAICIID, the systems have been adopted from the development setting
and modified to take into account the far less tangible nature of peacebuilding
and dialogue. Furthermore, as pointed out by Garred, Herrington and Hume
(Section 2, 169– 196), even when not directly following monitoring and evalua-
tion practices, interreligious peacebuilders have often looked at ways to learn
from their projects to improve their work, which allows for the possibility of col-
lecting case studies to be used as best practices. For example, KAICIID has begun
 Major organizations working in development such as UNDP and EU have focused more ex-
clusively on the evaluation of develop and paid limited attention to peacebuilding evaluation.
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such a process of best practices harvesting through its “Promising Practices”
project as part of the Dialogue Knowledge Hub¹⁶.
7 Lessons Learned
In addition to the above common thematic areas, this compilation, while only
representing a small contribution towards addressing the overall need for the
professionalization of monitoring and evaluation in interreligious and religious
peacebuilding, still provides us with a number of lessons.
1. Despite the progress made in recent years, we have a long way to go towards
the institutionalization of monitoring and evaluation in interreligious peace-
building. The greater interest in engaging with religion has rapidly expanded
the field, yet there is still the need to tackle even basic challenges such as
developing base line studies, increasing investment on long-term pro-
gramme designs and thereby evaluations, the need to incorporate evaluation
from the beginning stages – during the development of the programme de-
sign – rather than simply to placate donors.
2. The literature that examines religious and interreligious peacebuilding
work, particularly that of inter and intra-religious dialogue, remains ex-
tremely limited. More analytical studies are needed and therefore more
“case study harvesting” will also be necessary. There has also been the ex-
perience of some advocates of monitoring and evaluation of religious peace-
building¹⁷ that some faith-based peacebuilders express a lack of willingness
to share reports with negative results. Negative results shouldn’t be seen as a
failure of the peacebuilders, but rather as an opportunity for learning. The
need for a shared resource repository for religious and interreligious peace-
building evaluation is essential for the professional development of this
field. Practitioners and evaluators can have access to hundreds of evalua-
tions and can produce macro evaluation studies that help in advancing
the tools and frameworks of evaluation¹⁸.
3. The role and inclusion of women and gender analysis in the interreligious
peacebuilding field is not addressed in the evaluation frameworks provided
 See Promising Practices on the KAICIID Dialogue Knowledge Hub Website (KAICIID ND)
 As expressed in courses teaching the data collection, surveying and monitoring and evalu-
ation design methods proposed by the EIAP II guide.
 Mohammed Abu-Nimer conducted in 2012 a mega evaluation study that examined 16 peace-
building evaluations reports (Sponsored by Center for Peacebuilding and Development, Ameri-
can University Washington DC).
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in this volume. However, access to women in many faith groups is more chal-
lenging and thus needs to not only be recognized in programme design, but
also in evaluation procedures. The lack of gender lenses in religious and in-
terreligious peacebuilding is often explained by the nature of the formal re-
ligious institutions and their dominant male representation.While this is in-
deed an institutional and structural limitation, nevertheless there are
alternative ways to compensate and provide limited remedies while engag-
ing such formal institutions in religious and interreligious peacebuilding.
4. While developmental and secular peacebuilding frameworks have some
relevance in capturing the spirit of interreligious peacebuilding work,
there remains the difficulty of capturing the faith motivation behind reli-
gious peacebuilding and nuances associated with its application¹⁹. While
this volume both presents some new models, it also emphasizes the need
for the development of a greater number of innovative models and frame-
works.
The current international, regional, and national interreligious platforms have
the duty to advocate for the further development of their evaluation practices
and agenda. Building their internal capacities is an essential step towards the
advancement of their field. Through partnerships with academic institutes and
graduate programmes in peacebuilding and conflict resolution that train the
next generation of professionals, the field of religious and interreligious peace-
building and its evaluation can greatly be enhanced. Such partnerships will sup-
port the processes of professionalization of both the field of peacebuilding and
the subfield of interreligious peacebuilding.
8 In this Volume
This volume aims to contribute to this small and emerging body of literature by
collecting a series of essays that look into the challenges and possibilities of
monitoring and evaluating religious and interreligious peacebuilding and dia-
logue. The book’s chapters comprise two sections. Section 1 looks at the com-
plexities of religious and interreligious peacebuilding and emphasizes the link-
age of interreligious dialogue to these peacebuilding processes. This section
further identifies several current challenges and implications in monitoring
 As aptly pointed out in Neufeldt’s chapter (Section 1, 53–76). A similar conclusion was also
drawn by Garred and Abu-Nimer (2018).
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and evaluating religious and interreligious peacebuilding. Section 2 offers a
practical set of examples of unique tools that have been developed specifically
for monitoring and evaluating religious and interreligious peacebuilding; and
highlights the application of specific monitoring and evaluation models in differ-
ent contexts in the broader field of peacebuilding.
8.1 Section 1: Evaluating Religious and Interreligious
Peacebuilding and Dialogue: Challenges, and
Implications
Abu-Nimer opens the section in Challenges in “Peacebuilding Evaluation: Voices
from the Field” with an overview of the challenges faced in peacebuilding eval-
uation in general. He looks at examples from the field, taking into account issues
that arise both from peacebuilders themselves and from the side of donors. The
issues range from the amount of evaluator experience, to practical dilemmas
faced in conflict zone realities.
In “Vying for Good: Ethical Challenges in Evaluating Interreligious Peace-
building”, Reina Neufeldt delves into the nuanced yet complex nature of reli-
gious and interreligious peacebuilding. Focusing on different models of interre-
ligious dialogue, she examines why the criteria monitoring and evaluating
religious and interreligious peacebuilding needs to be and how they can be dif-
ferent from traditional secular peace building monitoring and evaluation criteria
and the implications monitoring and evaluation have on the role of “awesome
agency”.
Using examples from his experience of interreligious peacebuilding in Afri-
ca, Hippolyt Pul illustrates the disconnect between actual evaluations and their
intentions – accountability and learning. In his chapter, “My Peace is not your
Peace – Role of Culture and Religion in What Counts for Peace”, he details sev-
eral of the numerous challenges that are faced in evaluating interreligious peace-
building.
In “Values, Principles and Assumptions: Recognizing Power Dynamics of Re-
ligious Leaders”, Khaled Ehsan picks up on recent focus of international NGOs
on the role of power as an analytical tool in monitoring and evaluation and ap-
plies this lens to the power held by religious leaders and its implications on in-
terreligious dialogue and peacebuilding processes. His theoretical framework
provides practical questions and indicators that could be incorporated in mon-
itoring and evaluation processes.
Introduction 17
8.2 Section 2: New Models and Tools in Evaluating Religious
and Interreligious Peacebuilding
After examining the implications of the spiritual motivations – being faithful, re-
ligious traditions and their values – have on designing evaluation tools, select-
ing approaches and defining success in their chapter on “Transcendence and the
Evaluation of Faith-based Peacebuilding”, David Steele and Ricardo Wilson-
Grau introduce a possible methodology for developing an evaluation of faith-
based peacebuilding.
Michelle Garred, Elizabeth Hume and Rebecca Herrington present the Effec-
tive Interreligious Action in Peacebuilding framework as a collaborative effort to
provide an evaluative design framework for both practitioners and evaluators.
Their chapter, “Evaluating Interreligious Peacebuilding and Dialogue: Methods
and Frameworks”, presents the project and the learning processes that have en-
sued since its inception.
In her chapter, “Assessing the Impact of Interfaith Initiatives”, Shana Cohen
delves into the field of interfaith dialogue and interfaith relations. Citing the lack
of innovation in dialogical methods and project designs, she presents a model
for evaluating interreligious dialogue and applies the model to analyse current
state of the field and the challenges it faces in the United Kingdom.
9 The Way Forward
As an attempt to contribute to the evolutionarily process of professionalizing the
field of interreligious peacebuilding, this volume remains a modest attempt, only
just barely scratching the surface. However, the editors of this volume hope that
this attempt serves as an inspiration and opens a number of questions for others
to build on these contributions, as well as to address a number of areas not
touched upon in this volume. In closing, we would like to outline some future
possibly areas of research.
A number of challenges to evaluating religious and interreligious peace-
building are discussed, and examples of a few unique methods and frameworks
are presented in this volume. However, not much is presented regarding what
faith-based organizations themselves are doing or could be doing. More research
is needed to examine what evaluative practices are being used by faith-based or-
ganizations, their merits and lessons learned. Furthermore, more could be ex-
plored regarding opportunities and ways for faith-based organizations and reli-
gious institutions involved in religious and interreligious peacebuilding to build
and improve evaluation processes.
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This volume is more geared towards religious and interreligious peacebuild-
ers, or other practitioners using aspects of interreligious peacebuilding, such as
interreligious dialogue. This is evident in the way several chapters in this volume
examine the need and compatibility of monitoring and evaluation with religious
and interreligious peacebuilding. However, the peacebuilders themselves are
only one building block in the structure. Pul’s chapter brings to light the discon-
nection between interreligious peacebuilding itself and the expectation of eval-
uators. Thus, future endeavours might look to examine how policy makers and
donors can be more sensitive or be sensitized regarding the nature of evaluation
in interreligious peacebuilding and the challenges facing the practitioners work-
ing in this area.
The roles of other members of society are only touched upon in this volume.
For example, Ehsan details the implications of the power or religious leaders and
how this could be taken into account in the development of monitoring and eval-
uation frameworks. The opens the reader’s imagination to question the roles and
implications of other members of society involved in peacebuilding processes.
Yet, the volume does not address the roles of gender, youth and children and
how evaluative processes could be adapted to take into account these voices,
which tend less visible in religious and interreligious peacebuilding.
Lastly, there is greater attention, interest and recognition of religious and in-
terreligious peacebuilding and dialogue. The sector is overlapping and being in-
tegrated more and more with the programmes of secular organizations and do-
nors. This has implications for these programmes themselves as the interests of
these donors are incorporated in religious and interreligious peacebuilding proc-
esses. This includes the often-strong focus of states and intergovernmental or-
ganizations in countering and preventing violent extremism (CVE & PVE), as
well as freedom of religion and belief (FORB). It will therefore be necessary to
examine the implications for evaluating religious and interreligious peacebuild-
ing in the context of CVE, PVE and FORB.
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Challenges in Peacebuilding Evaluation
Voices from the Field
1 Introduction
Due to the nature of the implementing organizations, the capacity of the pro-
grammers, and how peace work has been traditionally perceived (and many
other factors), many peacebuilding programmes do not have a rigorous monitor-
ing and evaluation mechanisms. It is only recently that the field began focusing
on the need to be more systematic; such focus has been triggered by both donors
and policy makers who began investing more resources in the peacebuilding
programmes, especially in post conflict areas. However, efforts in systematizing
and evaluating peacebuilding programmes have been subject to numerous chal-
lenges. This article examines some of the core obstacles for evaluators to be
aware of in developing and conducting evaluations of peacebuilding pro-
grammes and projects. The challenges in this article were described in detail
by 32 international evaluators that were interviewed for a wider study conducted
by the Salam Institute (see www.salaminstitute.org) between 2008 and 2012
(Abu-Nimer, Nasser and Ouboulhcen 2016). The article begins by examining
some of the fundamental obstacles faced by evaluators in developing an evalu-
ation including those challenges that lie with the donors or peacebuilding pro-
grammers themselves, and then moves to more structural challenges faced in
conducting evaluations. While the list of challenges discussed is far from com-
prehensive, the article aims to bring to light and emphasize the importance
and need for further research on peacebuilding evaluation.
Many peacebuilders in general often see peace work as morally superior to
other forms of interaction or intervention in a conflict. In fact, often most outsid-
ers to the conflict (also some people from within the conflict) express a sense of
admiration and recognition of the need to work for peace. However, working
from a moral advantage cannot compensate for the fact that the majority of
peacebuilding implementers stumble and fall short in their attempt to produce
Note: This chapter also appeared in Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. (2020). “Challenges in Peacebuild-
ing Evaluation: Voices from the Field.” In New Directions in Peacebuilding Evaluation, edited by
Estree, Tamra. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
OpenAccess. © 2021 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110624625-002
evidence to convince the average person, donors, or policy makers that any given
intervention has the potential to change the conflict dynamics in a country. As
Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church lamented in the early 1990s when meeting with
policy makers in Northern Ireland to convince them to shift more of their resour-
ces to peace work: “where is the stuff that I can pound on the table and say, and
here’s why we know this stuff works better than more guns on the street”
(Church and Shouldice 2003). Instead, peace workers have often characterized
their efforts as “planting seeds” for future peace, often noting that they do not
necessarily expect to view or see the full results of these seeds in their lifetime.
The pressure to produce tangible results has been set by the rapidly advanc-
ing technologies, which have dramatically increased the ability of peacebuilding
organizations and donors to collect and share data, in turn generating greater
demand to demonstrate the impact and the effectiveness of their projects with
quantifiable data. In addition, the greater awareness of civil society work and
its potential capacity to advance social cohesion increases the demand for
peacebuilding programmes to produce concrete results (Stern 2012). This is par-
ticularly visible in the emphasis placed on empirical evidence by both donors
and policymakers; “donors are under a great deal of pressure by their policy
makers to justify their foreign assistance budgets, and the trend towards big
data has increased their desire for empirical evidence to support their requested
levels of funding, prioritizing support for tangible results over peacebuilding
needs. Yet, a very needs-oriented approach dominates the development field.
“We know we all need peace and we easily want freedom, but that’s not a tan-
gible” (Riak 2009).
The need to develop more systematic and widely used monitoring and eval-
uation of peacebuilding programmes is evident. However, the path towards cre-
ating strong evaluation systems faces a number of challenges ranging from dif-
ficulty in defining peacebuilding programmes, lack of evaluator experience on
evaluating peacebuilding projects and programmes, and donor and programmer
behaviour, to the very real obstacles faced by evaluators in conflict zones. Often
these challenges are interlinked.
When evaluating peacebuilding programmes, one must examine a wider
scale of influences on the success and impact of peacebuilding programmes.
Evaluators of peacebuilding programmes have to explore linkages with other
sectors, rather than just focus on their small and confined efforts of reducing di-
rect forms of violence and advancing peacebuilding. The lack of clear definitions
of both peace and peacebuilding on the one hand can make it difficult for peace-
building programmers to create clear indicators of success and on the other for
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evaluators to structure evaluations.¹ Pressure from donors to show quick tangi-
ble results clashes considerably with the aforementioned attribution of peace
work as towards a moral higher cause and can heighten peacebuilders’ resis-
tance to evaluations.
A further dilemma is that peacebuilding work is often subject to two-year
programme cycles that are dependent on donor funding. These issues are not
made any easier by the fact the majority of the peacebuilding programmes are
implemented by local partners but designed by international organizations
(United Nations, European Union, African Union, OSCE, etc.) or donors (World
Bank, USAID, DFID, etc.) a feature that adds to the complexity of carrying out
an evaluation that is relevant to the local partners (Brown et al. 2015). This
might also be true of most international development programmes as well,
thus it might not just be a challenge specific to peacebuilding but international
programming writ large. Nevertheless, the evaluator must take into considera-
tion the meaning and impact of such factors in design and implementation on
the hope for peace and commitment of local communities to peace when pre-
sented by such outside organizations.
Even when evaluators are able to navigate these obstacles and develop an
evaluation methodology and tools for a particular peacebuilding programme
or project, the challenges do not stop there. Often evaluators themselves lack ex-
pertise in peacebuilding which not only can pose an issue in evaluation devel-
opment but also in conducting the evaluation in the field.
Furthermore, conflict zone realities produce certain conditions on the
ground which affect people’s behaviour and responses to everything around
them. The proximity of the conflict and its consequences for communities and
individuals produce an environment that affects any evaluation design and cre-
ates challenges and obstacles for evaluation teams. Identifying and devising
strategies on how to handle these possible obstacles is crucial to the success
of an evaluation.
 Definitions of peace (ceasefire, disarmament, new government elections, return to commun-
ities) and peacebuilding (government sector reform, security sector reform, establishment of
clear state boundaries, transitional justice, reconciliation, dialogue and education, etc.) range
from narrow to broad. Debates and varied usages of these terms exist in both academic and pol-
icy circles. This lack of clear definitions creates a challenge when developing evaluations. It
therefore becomes important to clearly define these terms when developing an evaluation. In
this article the term peacebuilding is used as an umbrella term that covers all types of interven-
tion that aims to repair or respond to conflict issues in a peaceful method, such as: conflict res-
olution, post conflict stabilization programs, peace education, nonviolent direct action, diplo-
macy and negotiation, etc.
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2 Challenges in developing peacebuilding
evaluations
2.1 Lack of Consistent Definitions
When evaluating peacebuilding programmes, one must examine a wider scale of
influence than the immediate effect on individuals, institutions, or communities.
Evaluators of peacebuilding programmes have to explore linkages with other
sectors. The need for broader perspective stems from the fact that peacebuilding
occurs in volatile areas with complex situations with numerous factors that can
affect the level of impact that any given peacebuilding programme can have. For
example, without taking into consideration an external factor that leads to a fur-
ther outbreak in violence, an evaluation could falsely interpret the effectiveness
of the programme design or the reasons for delays in implementation. This has
prompted some evaluators to work to expand the definitions of the field of
peacebuilding and of peacebuilders. Michael Lund, for example, argues that it
is a mistake to assume that operating in any level of Lederach’s pyramid of in-
tervention – bottom up, top down, or middle out– makes someone a peacebuild-
er and thus requires that this person has special criteria to be able to execute
their specific part of the operation; conversely, being far from a narrow field,
peacebuilding often requires the work of individuals in the process who are
not peacebuilders (Lederach 1997). Projects targeting civil society groups, secur-
ity organizations and military services for providing secure environments in a
conflict also have peacebuilding impact and ought to be included in a definition
of peacebuilding interventions. The lack of an agreed upon definition of what it
means to work for peace or peacebuilding is a primary challenge in both design-
ing and implementing as well as evaluating peacebuilding intervention.
The attempts at opening a wider definition presents further difficulties as to
whether or not the project in question is solely a peacebuilding programme or if
peacebuilding programming is integrated across all of the organization’s proj-
ects. For example, according to World Vision or Catholic Relief Services, peace-
building input and design is expected to be a component of all their develop-
ment projects, in addition to their direct peacebuilding programming. An
additional challenge is defining sub-groups of peacebuilding, such as interreli-
gious or religious peacebuilding which draws its inspiration and motivation from
the beliefs, values, practices, and rituals derived from the scriptures of one or
more faith traditions; uses the institutional platforms, networks, and resources;
or leverages the moral voice and authority of religious actors (including the cler-
gy and lay persons and organizations working in the name of the faith) to facil-
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itate the creation of the conditions for peace and the prevention of violent con-
flicts in divided societies. Evaluating these different types of programmes re-
quires different strategies. Furthermore, when peacebuilding is integrated into
development projects, it tends to be carried out by programmers who are not
necessarily trained in in peacebuilding frameworks and therefore have limited
awareness of definition, meaning, and strategies of peace.
In addition to the difficulty in defining what constitutes a peacebuilding pro-
gramme, the lack of a clear definition of “peace” in most peacebuilding pro-
grammes is a major challenge for evaluators. Of the evaluators interviewed for
the study, 30% mentioned that, conceptually, there is an inconsistent definition
of “what builds peace” or conceptualization of what a good peacebuilding pro-
gramme would look like in the field. Without a precise definition of how a par-
ticular intervention relates to accomplishing peace on a macro level, it is difficult
for evaluators to link the programme’s outcomes with the way that people, do-
nors, and organizers in the conflict context understand peace. Thus, evaluators
can be torn between various conceptual approaches of “what constitutes
peace?” As Mary Anderson states:
We don’t really know what constitutes a good peace programme, we don’t know what
makes peace happen in any definitive way. Most assume, if one does peace, then you
bring peace. We don’t have clear set of benchmarks and that makes it really hard. It’s an
imperfect field, and it’s hard to know.You have to make a good argument for this particular
programme at this time as having some significant positive impact, or significant negative
impact, or no significant impact at all in relation to an unknown state of being,which is the
issue then of peace (Anderson 2009).
The above statements reflect the need to further clarify the links between how
donors define peace work and its outcomes versus how practitioners and policy
makers view the meaning and functions of peace work. The further the gap be-
tween these three stakeholders in defining “what constitutes peace?”, the more
challenging it becomes to both measure and capture the impact of peace inter-
vention programmes.
2.2 Programme/Project Design Lacking Clear and Specific
Objectives: “Good Things Happened” Syndrome
Another major challenge for peacebuilding evaluation can occur when the pro-
gramme itself is not designed or planned with any clear or systematic view of
change. In this study, 40% of evaluators interviewed indicated that the pro-
grammes they evaluated lacked well thought out, participatory programme de-
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sign, goals, and indicators based upon conflict resolution and peacebuilding as-
sumptions and principles. Because of financial or contractual constraints and/or
lack of professional knowledge and experience, peacebuilders do not always ar-
ticulate their theory of change and rationale behind their programme activities.
Another issue is often that the urgent and critical need to respond to the conflict
is the primary driving force behind peace worker’s intervention. Thus, in many
cases, very little effort is invested in a project’s design. As stated by an interna-
tional evaluator (who worked for international donors such as USAID, DFID, and
others) in fact, “a lot of cases the programme design process was very sloppy,
goals were not clear, and no analysis was done². Team members don’t have
the same shared theory of change, no clear change was ever articulated for
the programme, and things have evolved” (Kupperstein 2010).
Many peacebuilding programmes tend to lack specific and concrete mea-
sures of progress and impact and instead focus on the lofty aim of achieving
peace in places. A scholar-practitioner notes, “The problem was not that peace-
building cannot be evaluated. The problem was that we were not designing
peacebuilding programmes that were responsive to theories of change” (Schar-
batke-Church 2010). This is only compounded when the evaluator is expected
to deliver the judgment or the measurement of programmes that operated for
years without much strategy of peacebuilding.
Practitioners and evaluators such as Jay Rothman, Marc Ross, and others
have argued that practitioners, prior to the start of implementation, need to de-
velop clear and specific definitions of the programme’s goals as well as a plan
for how to adjust such goals due to shifting conflict dynamics. This strategy
would:
1. Help donors avoid imposing externally developed evaluation criteria and
goals on programmers and beneficiaries.
2. Allow programmers to have ownership of the goals and reduce the level of
alienation and resistance among the staff and beneficiaries when dealing
with evaluation.
3. Assist in capturing the changes and monitoring the progress in a more effec-
tive way through action evaluation.
In most programmes, the evaluation is usually scheduled solely at the end of the
project or with one additional mid-term internal evaluation. Limiting the evalu-
ation to the middle and/or end of the project rather than already in the develop-
ment of the programme/project design constitutes a major challenge for evalua-
 Such conclusion was also confirmed by Blum, Andrew, and Melanie Kawano-Chiu, 2012.
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tors in carrying out a useful process that will directly benefit the programmers or
the organization. When evaluators only participate at the very end of a peace-
building project, they miss the opportunity to proactively help the project in clar-
ifying their goals and be more thoughtful and conscious about what they plan
(Church and Rogers 2006; Van Brabant, Koenraad 2010). As stated by D’Estree:
“This ‘formative evaluation’ process and mechanisms can be inserted explicitly
in the design phase which will help programme managers better plan the design
towards achieving their goals. The second objective of being involved early is to
simply be able to collect data and form some baseline for comparison, instead of
speculating or using proxy measures at the end of the project to capture how
things were in the beginning of the project” (2010).
3 Capturing the Impact of Peacebuilding
Programmes on Macro Peace
How does an encounter programme for Israeli Palestinian youth that has been
taking place since 1993 affect the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
success of failure of peace negotiation? The above is a classic question that is
often posed by the average person in the street, policy maker, donor, and even
some peace workers. Seeking to link any peace programme with the macro
peace processes is one of the most frustrating and challenging tasks that face
peace practitioners. Responding to this question requires many considerations.
Capturing the impact of the peacebuilding programmes on macro peace
processes is complicated and challenging. As an emerging field, its practitioners
are still stuck focusing on the outcome, results, and monitoring. The peacebuild-
ing approaches, processes and outcomes do not fit neatly into the logical frame-
work approach in monitoring and evaluation, whose use is influenced by devel-
opment and other fields. The high-level of complexity in peacebuilding
programmes prevents practitioners from being able to measure tangible out-
comes. Peacebuilding evaluators have to consider broadening the range of
their impact evaluation in order to be able to maybe capture the potential con-
tribution of peacebuilding programmes on the macro peace level.³ Seeking tan-
gible and causal linkages between peace intervention and macro conflict dynam-
ics is too narrow a lens to identify the contribution of many peace programmes.
Not broadening the range of the impact evaluation has a further consequence in
 Beyond broadening evaluation there is also a need to broaden the design and methods to cap-
ture macro impact, as displayed by studies conducted by Stern et al. (2012).
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addition to the prospect of mismeasurement; evaluations may simply be unable
to identify and measure impact. The inability of projects to identify their impact
is
a problem because we are funding peacebuilding programmes, and we cannot measure
them, or at least, we have a very difficult time measuring them. So, I am worried that peace-
building is going to start getting a very bad reputation for being too amorphous, too grey,
and too fuzzy around the edges and that does not have rigor because it is so multidiscipli-
nary. They are not going to be able to come up with the rigor {design} to actually measure
impact that is unique to that multidisciplinary approach (Wood 2010).
3.1 Identifying Success
A further difficulty in peacebuilding evaluation is how to identify success.While
it is logical that donors or international organizations desire macro-level change,
but successes (and failures) occur at different levels and require different time-
frames.When describing the differences between measuring the successes of de-
velopment programmes and peacebuilding programmes, Abi Riak, an interna-
tional development and peacebuilding expert, stated:
Success [in peacebuilding] is not just [the] vision of people reconciling or hugging in the
streets. It’s much subtler. Part of the [goal of] evaluation is to understand how to define
success and to learn how to talk about success, so people understand what success is in
peacebuilding. Maybe some people reconciled [because of the project], but macro changes
are not taking place (Riak 2009).
While it does not mean that macro-level change goals and measurements should
be set aside, it is valid to question whether it is realistic to expect macro changes
in beliefs as a result of individual peacebuilding programmes. In addition to the
constantly shifting context, there is a delayed effect with peacebuilding interven-
tions, especially for training workshop programmes. The example that often sug-
gested by peace practitioners in the Israeli -Palestinian context is the difficulty of
relying on attitudinal changes that are measured immediately after three days
encounter versus measures conducted after 6 months, five years, or even 20
years later.
Attitudes, beliefs, behaviours, convictions and societal structures are ex-
tremely difficult to measure and the evaluation tools resorted to for measuring
behavioural change are often inadequate for truly demonstrating macro societal
impact. In this study, 30% of the evaluators interviewed mentioned that the
peacebuilding field lacks relevant tools to measure the aforementioned human
processes and structures. Furthermore, the change in attitudes and belief is
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hard to maintain and sustain over a longer period. It is also hard to change the
ideological foundation of a person. A person may walk out of a workshop, dia-
logue intervention or other peacebuilding intervention with a change of conflict
outlook, however:
if beliefs can be changed in a five-day workshop, they can be as easily changed back. They
can be irradiated, done away with, by the contextual forces. Look my grandson returns
from a dialogue. He comes to a home, which is a peace-loving home, but then he goes
to the classroom in school, and he encounters an environment where he is called a ‘traitor.’
The same is true of his peers, the Palestinian peers, who represent their classroom, or our
own neighbourhoods and face an entirely different social context which negates what he
has acquired in the wonderful peacebuilding workshop. In terms of collective narratives,
he (the participant) brings for them (his peers) an entirely new fresh baby narrative. But,
when he returns to his natural environment, with the media, politicians, etc., he faces a
bold, very strong veteran collective narrative, and his baby narrative, the one he just re-
quired during peace work, stands a very slim chance of surviving in the face of the old, con-
sensually collective narrative (Solomon 2009).
If we accept such a premise, what should our realistic expectations be of a “one time”
peacebuilding meeting or even 2–3 yearlong project? As Gavriel Solomon argues: the Cath-
olic IRA terrorist from Northern Ireland who, after 17 years in jail, becomes a peace promot-
er is a rare case. Usually, participants will not come away with such extremely new and rad-
ically different views. So, how does this compare with a weekend of a meetings between
Jews and Palestinians? What chance does a program have to change deeply held convic-
tions? So, whoever believes that total transformation is possible, I don’t know where he
lives, certainly not in our region, or Northern Ireland, or Kosovo (Solomon 2009).
3.2 Methods
In responding to this challenge, we must not rely exclusively on quantitative data
collection or analysis; such data often fails to capture the nuances of peacebuild-
ing work, especially on sensitive change issues (for example national or religious
identity framing changes).
Relying exclusively on surveys will often not reveal the full story of local
people’s perceptions of a peacebuilding project. Furthermore, surveys might ac-
tually offend or contradict local people’s viewpoints on what needed to be done
and how it should have been done. For example, in an evaluation of a Burundi
conflict resolution workshop, participants refused to fill out the neatly designed
survey. Instead, they insisted on face-to-face meetings with the evaluators to nar-
rate their stories (Abdallah 2011).
Thus, as indicated by many scholars and researchers on the need to use
mixed methodology when searching for empirical evidence, the case is the
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same in peacebuilding evaluation (Bamberger 2012). The need to combine quan-
titative and qualitative measures in evaluation is overwhelmingly supported by
the peacebuilding evaluators. “One very important recommendation for evalua-
tion is you should not be satisfied with quantitative findings; you have to go with
qualitative interviews and observations, too. If your data is from the previous
morning, do not open a bottle of champagne. Wait for two months, repeat the
measurements, and if then you find that your positive outcomes are still there,
then write your mother a good letter” (Solomon 2009).
3.3 Too Narrow a Focus
Another challenge facing evaluators trying to connect peacebuilding pro-
grammes with macro peace is that majority of these programmes have the
over-tendency to focus on local cross-community dialogue and conflict resolu-
tion programmes, without looking at the wider environment of the conflict. Or-
ganizations in conflict zones need to rethink their strategies of peacebuilding
by examining the macro level of analysis. Local level impact may be occurring
due to peacebuilding initiatives, but the situation may be the reverse on the
macro level. The reality is that “no local level impact is going to be long lasting
if you’re going to be in a broader environment that’s deteriorating,” argues Rob-
ert Ricigliano, describing Mercy Corps’ work in Afghanistan and their attempts to
conduct a wider conflict assessment and analysis to demonstrate the impact of
their projects. “The guiding questions were: how can we get a greater macro im-
pact for our programmes? What do we need to have in place to achieve such an
outcome?” (Recigliano 2009).
Raising such questions are crucial in the field of peacebuilding today, espe-
cially among the main peacebuilding donors or funders, such as the United
States Institute of Peace (USIP), USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mit-
igation (CMM), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In the case of USIP, for exam-
ple, it is important to ask to what extent have its programmes in Israel-Palestine
contributed to the macro peace between Israelis and Palestinians? What type of
contribution has the organization had in advancing macro peace and stability in
Iraq and Afghanistan? To what extent has it had an overall capacity to examine
and conduct assessments of macro policies in these regions to be able to evalu-
ate the effects of the organization’s projects and programmes?
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4 The Push and Pull Factors for and Against
Evaluation Development
4.1 “The Donor Made Us Do That”
More and more donors are demanding more than a list of outputs and input ac-
tivities and participants. The rising trend is to seek indicators of success and ef-
fectiveness and to identify the wider impact of peacebuilding programmes.While
many peacebuilding programmers may not be interested in conducting an eval-
uation, they are forced by push factors such as the requirement of donors to pro-
vide empirical evidence or to produce a report showing progress, impact or suc-
cess as a condition for continuing or sustaining funding. Pull factors include a
greater access to more donors, grants and longer funding to be able to complete
the project or programme, and practitioners pulled by the desire or need to truly
be able to capture evidence showing they are effective beyond the small group of
participants. Thus, the general attitude of the staff is often that evaluation is a
burden or requirement from the donor, rather than a tool for learning or im-
provement of the design and implementation. Some staff members do not
view the evaluation as instrumental to improve their intervention; on the contra-
ry, they invest some efforts in painting an exaggerated positive picture of the
project, by manipulating the evaluators, target audience, or evidence. This atti-
tude often increases pressure on evaluators to focus on “self-serving and glowing
reporting.” For example, in several evaluations of projects in Sri Lanka, Egypt,
and Israel-Palestine, the sponsoring organization requested two reports: an ex-
ternal document to share with donors and public and the internal document
to share with their staff and board members.⁴
Such behaviour is influenced by the structural factors of limited resources
and the need to pursue funds, especially in the form of governmental contracts.
 The defensive attitudes against evaluation can also stem from the situation in which the
donor is not clear about the objective and possible expectation from the peacebuilding project.
A former international development officer stated: “On a particular project that I worked on in
Pakistan, the donor was always changing their mind about what they wanted the project to do,
and the project started and stopped a lot of initiatives as a result. We also felt really defensive
about some project failures that were a direct result of donor policy (for example, the project
didn’t complete any activities for 3 months while the donor refused to obligate more funds
while they were deciding if they were going to cancel all contracts with international organiza-
tions and shift all funds to local organizations) (Interview, Barday 2017). See also Allen, Susan et
al. 2014.
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Thus, there is a chronic problem of needing to get money from donors, having
adequate evaluations, and needing to ensure the next grant. Under these condi-
tions, it can be difficult for peacebuilding organizations to see evaluations as a
learning tool rather than a marketing tool. Similarly, donors are not exempt from
a failure to recognize the true value and role of evaluation in peacebuilding in-
tervention. Although the donors in the field of peacebuilding are trying to be
more evaluative, they are trapped in their inability “to come up with all sorts
of seemingly helpful measures” (Recigliano 2009). Donors also tend to treat
the evaluation report as a “box to check” on the form of requirement for making
their awards, and they are often not involved in the monitoring or the evaluation
process.⁵
Some evaluators argue that donors have a responsibility to be more flexible
in measuring the output and impact of the projects in deep rooted conflict areas
in which people have been through great deal of suffering and loss and lack
basic infrastructure. According to several interviewees, in the past, before donors
increased their interest in evaluation, they used to provide programmers with
some flexibility to assume certain positive outcomes would occur as a result
of the mere existence of a peaceful intervention in conflict area. The guiding
principle was just to make sure that funds were well spent, which resulted in giv-
ing programmers a significant amount of leeway. However, more recently, donors
have become “very specific about what the deliverables were going to be and
what the timelines were going to be” (Recigliano 2009). Richard Blue argues
that this type of donor flexibility is needed when evaluating locally run pro-
grammes: “Putting organizations through the competitive open bidding process
is mindless when you are talking about the kinds of folks who have been through
20 years of hardship, as in Liberia, and somehow expecting them to come up
and start creating social impact. They can’t do it and they shouldn’t have to
do it” (Blue 2010). In peacebuilding evaluation design imposing external criteria,
frameworks, and indicators can be an absolutely disempowering process.
4.2 The Curse of the Two-Year Project Cycle
Projects in conflict areas tend neither to abide by the donor’s expectations nor by
those of the implementing agency. The constantly changing dynamics of the op-
 According to an interviewee (international evaluator-requested to be anonymous) who worked
with US agencies in Iraq between 2003–2010, an organization in Washington D.C. that awards
over 2 million dollars in grants required two pages from each awardee. In addition, they never
contact the fellows for any follow up once the grant is completed, and the reports are filed.
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erating environment causes a project’s progress to move forward, backward, and
sideways, complicating the task of predicting a clear hypothesis for input and
change. This fluidity subsequently complicates the evaluation process. For exam-
ple, in its first year, the Christian-Muslim interfaith dialogue programme in
Egypt, carried out by the Christian Evangelical Social Services (CEOSS) in
2010, was marked by great success and it had a promising potential in reaching
out to policy makers and religious leaders. However, in the second year its suc-
cess criteria completely shifted when the Egyptian revolution erupted and
brought down the Mubarak regime. The programme was affected a great deal
due to security, public opinion and atmosphere, and shifts in national priorities.
An intervention peace plan or project is not an instance or a singular event
in the conflict context. Peacebuilding occurs in a violent conflict or post-conflict
dynamics, thus there is a need to examine a longer timeframe if a project or pro-
gram is expected to have forward moving progress and lasting impact, which is
often the aim or desire of the donating organization. However, a majority of do-
nors request and expect clear evidence for long term impact from short term and
immediate designs. As stated by Kinghorn:
To come in with a project that operates with a project framework that wants a forward-mov-
ing predictable, based-on-hypothesis of results, project is just ill-suited and so the two don’t
usually go well together. Projects don’t progress on the year time frames, which is usually
what donors want to give or usually the project duration is two years.Yes, usually it’s a two-
year horizon and so pretty much you need things to be moving around mostly a monthly,
quarterly, biannual timeframe. You need to be seeing progress and substantial progress,
two to five years depending on the project and because of the backwards-forward nature
of this instable period, it doesn’t usually happen. Now if a project was actually moving for-
ward and not encountering any of these conflicts or situations, it could be that it’s not – it
could be that it’s just not doing anything, it’s not effectual, it’s not actually addressing this
instability or the conflict that it needs to address… That it’s not actually getting in there and
addressing the system that needs to change, it’s marginalized. And so, because programs
are so locked into this project delivery paradigm that’s been set up, [the staff] is usually
frustrated because they are not getting their results (Kinghorn 2009).
The limited project cycle approach is often based on a results-based approach,
which itself poses the challenge of focusing on so-called end results, often with-
out taking into account more subtle indicators that could show impact. One of
the evaluators interviewed advocates for a systemic approach rather than a re-
sult-based approach:
Due to the complexity and fluidity of the conflict situation, it is not possible to follow re-
sults only and determine success and failure based on these results. Evaluators ought to
consider the whole system of a conflict and to what extent they are engaging in the system
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of conflict through the peacebuilding project. One can fail in achieving certain results but
still engage the conflict system. A country director can get calls from the ministry officer
and be blamed for certain outcomes of lack of results; however, these can be indicators
that the project is engaging the conflict system and leaving certain marks on it (Kinghorn
2009).
4.3 Lack of Donor Interest in Evaluations
The assumption that, “good things will happen as a result of peacebuilding
work,” is not only held by many practitioners, but also by certain donors. As per-
ceived by a number of evaluators:
Donors who are careful about evaluation want to know how it was spent and look for clear
indication that ‘good things happened.’ Nevertheless, it is not obvious that the donors are
well-versed in what a good evaluation method is itself and how they should judge whether
what we are hearing, for example, whether a survey done at the end of the workshop is
really the right [form of] measure (Malhotra 2009).
It is also more challenging to conduct any systematic evaluation with accurate
indicators of success when neither the practitioners nor the donors themselves
are specific and clear about their expected outputs and impact.
In some cases, donors have added to the challenge of developing evalua-
tions by not only not developing more specific goals for measurement of success,
but also having the lack of interest in doing so. For example, in the process of
reconstructing New Orleans, a foreign donor gave a large sum of funds to sup-
port the socio-cultural and structural development of the city. However, when
evaluators approached the donor to examine the impact and outcomes from
their funds, they said clearly and bluntly: “I do not care what they have done
with the money. I gave it and that is my duty” (informal meeting with a donor
representative in Washington, DC at American University 2008). The donor
was referring to his faith commitment as a primary motivation for why he
gave such a large amount for humanitarian relief aid in such context.
Some other possible explanations for the lack of interest in peacebuilding
evaluation among certain donors include: the ideological or political commit-
ment to support this type of work; the programme is too small for the donor’s
operation; the donor might have a low bar or expectations from the implement-
ers or the design, etc., or a lack of awareness of the need or importance for eval-
uation. The general perception among such donors and even some practitioners
that it is extremely difficult to evaluate peacebuilding programmes, especially
dialogue programmes, can hinder a donor’s willingness to fund valuable pro-
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grams due to the lack of empirical evidence. The difficulty is tied into several of
the previously mentioned challenges such as the short programme cycle, meas-
uring behavioural change, and the wide range of factors that can affect peace-
building processes. Some donors may then react by shying away from donating
money to peacebuilding programs, which only exacerbates the problem of short
programme cycles and difficulty in achieving macro-level impact. One interna-
tional evaluator elaborates on this frustration:
there is so much noise about the outcome variable, there is so much noise about the mea-
sure, yet what you have is meaningless. There is no way to know if there is an effect. Does
that translate into ‘you should not put any money in this’? No, it actually does not…then
what you probably want to evaluate is the design of the workshop itself … If you feel con-
fident enough that you have done good stuff to start out, even if you cannot measure, if it is
impossible to measure, you may still continue to do it because you have confidence in the
setup …[and]what you can do is to be very confident that you have put the right seeds in
place and then in theory it should work (Malhotra 2009).
4.4 Resistance to Evaluation/Evaluators
Programme staff may also be resistant towards evaluation due to the general per-
ception that outsiders are coming just to look for limitations, deficiencies, and
ineffective factors. Thus, evaluation/evaluators can have an “oppositional frame-
work” even before it starts.
Programmers may assume that evaluators are hired by the headquarters of-
fice with the main goal of identifying deficiencies and shortcomings of staff.
Thus, the tension between home office staff and field workers may be heightened
during the evaluation process if the evaluation and headquarters teams do not
properly address these assumptions. This dynamic is dysfunctional for peace-
builders whose projects are based on partnership, trust, and relationship build-
ing. The typical evaluation approach of an outsider team spending a few weeks
examining files and data contradicts the participatory (bottom-up) typical peace-
building approach. “It’s a fear that the people running the evaluation are looking
for something wrong with the programme as they come in. They talk to people
and distribute these instruments” (Ross 2009).
Programmers and implementers tend to resist the notion of evaluation for
various reasons and assumptions too. One evaluator noted:
In the ideology-driven peacebuilding field, many practitioners are doing what they do be-
cause they believe in it and believe that they are doing something good and necessary. So,
they resist the evaluators who might question the effectiveness and the need or necessity of
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such a program or intervention. The notion of doing evaluation seems like a waste of time
and resources, where practitioners question why they need to do [an evaluation] when they
already know what they are doing (Carstarphen 2010).
While the lack of clarity with goals is problematic for an evaluator, and the eval-
uator may find themselves retrofitting goals and as the programme evolves read-
justing them, however when programme staff is resistant even this can be diffi-
cult. Evaluators then have to engage the programme staff in a discussion to
determine what they are trying to achieve and how they think that they were
going to achieve those goals, and that conversation initiates a discussion
among programme staff about their theory of change. This formative evaluation
becomes an actual intervention in the programme and, if done well, it can help
implementers clarify problematic design issues and assist in adjusting to the
constantly changing context and may lead to become more effective over the
next period. However, for some peacebuilding officers/managers, this methodol-
ogy represents a challenge because the evaluator is perceived as an outside con-
sultant who is acting as an intervener in their programme. Experienced evalua-
tors have developed the capacity and skills to assume the two roles
simultaneously: a program development consultant and an evaluator. Obviously,
this evaluation role or approach does not correspond with the principle of “ob-
jective evaluation” where there is a clear and strict separation between evalua-
tors and programme development consultants.
Evaluators in this study suggested various strategies to overcome resistance
to evaluations, those included:
1. Pros and cons approach: Offer the programmers an appropriate and tailored
description of the pros and cons of the possible evaluation approaches that
they could utilize to evaluate their programme as opposed to imposing a set
of requirements for one type of evaluation that was determined by either the
donor, headquarters, or the evaluation team.
2. Invite staff and beneficiaries to the evaluation team: Involve some of the
staff and beneficiaries in the actual evaluation process (not only selecting
the design or approach), especially in design, data collection, interpretation
of results, and recommendations.
3. Adjust your language: Avoid the use of evaluation jargon to reduce potential
anxiety for many programmers who are not familiar with the process and
might be overwhelmed by its technical aspects.
4. Acknowledge past mistakes: Burnout from previous external evaluation re-
ports is a common source of resistance for a new evaluation. Acknowledge
the range of possible mistakes in past evaluations and share previous re-
ports to help reduce possible anxiety or frustration.
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5. Be sensitive to local people’s fears and worries: An external evaluator will be
able to gain more entry if they acknowledge local people’s worries or fears
about evaluations. For example, in an evaluation of a project in Mindanao,
one evaluator shared evaluation reports that a lead evaluator in another
Muslim community produced with the Muslim beneficiaries of the project.
In response, the leaders of the community asked directly: “Did you do
work in other Muslim minority context? You know we Muslims who live
among Christians are always threatened by outsiders who can come to our
community disguised in many hats” (Evaluation Team Leader 2013)Their re-
sponse demonstrates the fear of Christian missionary groups among Mus-
lims in South Asia.
5 Challenges in the Field – Conducting
Evaluations in Conflict Areas
Conflict produces scarcity of resources and a strong sense of victimhood among
people. In addition, there are often a plethora of donors and development agen-
cies who are constantly struggling (and competing) to meet the needs of the af-
fected populations (OECD DAC 1991). Thus, the arrival of an evaluation team or a
single foreign evaluator into this environment may raise expectations and cause
community members and individuals to ask, what are we going to get out of this?
To get accurate information and responses, an evaluator must convince project
beneficiaries or wider stakeholders that he or she has no additional immediate
funds or aid. Additionally, to elicit genuine responses, evaluators must reassure
local people that any negative views that they express about the project will not
necessarily result in ending the aid that they are receiving from the agency or or-
ganization.
5.1 Shifting Realities and Context
To evaluate the impact of peacebuilding programme, it is crucial to consider the
context in which the programme has been implemented. Capturing the context
through an early conflict assessment is certainly a helpful mechanism or neces-
sary step, however in many conflict areas the context is constantly shifting, and
the conflict dynamics and intervention priorities often change. Accounting for
these shifting dynamics throughout the three years or five years of the project’s
life cycle is certainly a challenge. In this study, 33% of the evaluators identified
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that the complexity and dynamic of conflict environment make the attribution of
any macro or even micro impact more difficult.
Except for action evaluation methodology, there are few well-defined tools
or measurements that can systematically capture the effects of the shifting con-
text on the peacebuilding programmes design and implementation (goals, prior-
ities, effect, and overall impact of the project during its various phases and de-
velopment) (Rothman and Ross 1999). Evaluators attempt to contextualize their
findings and report on impact by establishing a timeline or a list of chronological
events that took place during the project. Additionally, they look at how certain
events affected the project design and outputs. For example, the Office of Tran-
sition Initiatives at USAID (OTI) allocated certain funds for supporting Sri Lanka
in its transition from war to peace in 2002. Local partners and programmers were
encouraged to implement combined design by integrating peacebuilding and de-
velopment projects. However, when the 2004 Tsunami hit Sri Lankan shores,
there was devastation particularly in the conflict-affected areas. The OTI budget
was raised from $3–4 million to over $20 million. In 2007, while the government
launched its new war campaign against the LTTE (after the negotiation col-
lapsed), the final evaluation report had to address questions such as: did the
OTI operation in Sri Lanka contribute to the peace process? How did the Tsunami
catastrophe influence the OTI project in Sri Lanka? What effect did such an event
have on the objectives of contributing to the peace process?
Because conflicts are not static events but ever-changing organisms, often
evaluations can only detail a project’s impact in a specific moment of time. Eval-
uations, especially those designed only for a singular short-term project, high-
light the impact right at that moment, but usually are not designed to analyse
effects after the end of the project. However, peacebuilding projects in their na-
ture are meant to have longer-term effects that are often either not felt or not
fully embedded right at the end of the project.
You can be satisfied with an evaluation only the morning after you have completed the
workshop. There is a delayed post-test effect. After the evaluation is completed, there
may be more than one violent attack, and in the months in between, many political issues
and tragedies, which could have nothing to do with peacebuilding. You have no control
over [these events], and most everything remains the same. However, in regions like [Isra-
el-Palestine] events happen twice a week and what you get is a delayed post-test that may
just reflect the recent events, more than anything else (Solomon 2009).
In addition to the shift in macro events, there are micro changes on the ground
that can affect an individual’s life and determine the extent of effect of a peace-
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building project on his or her life. Most evaluation designs are unable to capture
the effects of these events in any systematic way.⁶
5.2 Programme Staff is Stressed Out
Operating in a conflict area generates more stress and frustration among pro-
grammers than in other contexts. Thus, there are certain challenges related to
the fact that in a conflict area:
Although, [project staff] might not be traumatized in the same way as violent trauma vic-
tims, nevertheless, they are completely stressed out, because the project usually doesn’t go
well [as planned]…A lot of the staff that I have encountered, as soon as I go into this they
wanted to justify their stance, [explaining] what happened, what went wrong and whose
fault it was. [staff members], were on a justification standpoint or ‘we are trying so
hard’, ‘they don’t appreciate what we are doing’, ‘look what’s happening.’ [managers/exter-
nal or headquarters] are unable to see this (Kinghorn 2009).
The lack of recognition of the impact of conflict dynamics on the capacity of
peacebuilding projects to demonstrate concrete and tangible impact often lead
to frustration among field officers and even lead to certain level of resistance
to result based approach as opposed to a system approach.
In this study, a few evaluators pointed to excessive staff stress due to a com-
bination of a donor-imposed accountability paradigm, the conflict environment,
and self-preservation issues as a challenge for evaluation.
[Programme staff have a] professional investment in these projects. It’s their job, this is how
they spend their day. This is the majority of what they give their focus and energies to. So,
when the project isn’t going well, and they are not getting their results or they are getting
conflicts because of their good work, they get completely stressed out and frustrated and
angry (Kinghorn 2009).
An evaluator’s approach ought to take staff attitudes and frustrations into con-
sideration, especially with the data collection methods and design. Mechanical
and detached social science approaches tend to produce more alienation among
the staff on the ground and can increase the resistance to the evaluation.
 Such impact was also captured in more details on the study of OECD DAC (2012); CDA Collab-
orative Learning Projects (2004)
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6 Access: Security and Trust
6.1 Trust Concerns with Government or Security Force
Involvement
Lack of security and distrust of others are two major obstacles in any conflict. As
one Palestinian participant in Ramallah responded when asked for his honest
opinion of evaluations: “We live in a reality in which you cannot trust anyone
in your environment. Everyone might hurt you and threaten your sense of secur-
ity.” In this study, 27% of the evaluators identified that security concerns were a
significant obstacle to conducting peacebuilding evaluations, and 27% of the
evaluators specifically mentioned that dishonesty and mistrust can skew data re-
sults. Furthermore, 30% indicated that access to data, beneficiaries, or simple
physical mobility inhibited the success of the evaluation.
Lack of trust in a conflict context is a product of the state of relations among
people in conflict areas that influences relations with evaluators as well. Evalua-
tors can offer reassurances that the evaluation is a confidential or anonymous
process, but many people in a conflict area may not believe such assurances.
Thus, evaluators have to gauge how much they can take what people say a face value by
[determining] the general level of trust and confidence in the community or the group
and [by considering] whoever is being interviewed or surveyed. If there is a high level of
mistrust, the chances are there is going to be higher levels-of not necessarily dishonesty-
but not complete honesty or complete information sharing (Carstarphen 2010).
The presence of government agencies, especially security forces, undermines the
security of evaluation participants. For example, in an Egyptian focus group dis-
cussing the impact of an interfaith dialogue programme, the participants could
not speak freely about the conflict or group relationships due to the daily pres-
ence of the security forces in their meetings and focus group discussions. Sitting
at the end of the room, a government security officer took notes while evaluators
posed their questions about the conflict and Muslim-Christian relationships in
Egypt.⁷ In response, the participants and the evaluation team had to develop cer-
tain codes and signals to communicate about sensitive issues that the govern-
ment might perceive as political or problematic. The evaluation team then shift-
ed their approach, using private, individual interviews to elicit more genuine and
revealing information from the participants. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, a represen-
tative from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) forces sat listening in the
 Based on experience of the author while working in Egypt between 2000–2016.
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training room while evaluators posed their questions to measure the impact of a
peacebuilding project in war zone areas in Baticaloa. Cognizant of the LTTE rep-
resentative’s presence, the focus group members began to praise the LTTE’s op-
erations while criticizing the Sri Lankan government’s policies in the region.
However, when the evaluators shifted their methodology and conducted anony-
mous interviews, participants felt freer to voice their criticism of the LTTE’s im-
pact on the project.⁸
Furthermore, government security forces and armed groups can affect partic-
ipation in evaluations by taking a step further and trying to include their repre-
sentatives in the evaluation team. “When the security forces in a Central Asian
state suggested a facilitator to manage the list of contacts for interviews, this was
a threat to evaluators and their interviewees from participating or collecting
data” (Chetwynd 2010). In response, it was crucial to get a local researcher
who was not connected to security to be the facilitator.
6.2 Conflict Group Dynamics
The asymmetric power relations and the various conflicting and non-conflicting
groups interactions in any conflict situation affect how the individuals and their
collectives perceive their relations and what constitute a successful intervention.
Thus,when the evaluator is engaged in the process of capturing success and fail-
ure of the intervention, one of the obstacle or challenges is to diagnose, name,
and identify the effect of the conflict group dynamics on the responses from each
participant.
Managing focus groups in conflict areas can also become sensitive due to the
conflict dynamics. Underlying ethnic issues and potential triggers require local
facilitators to detect or avoid them in order to elicit genuine responses from par-
ticipants. Such skills are not a necessary part of the typical “professional/re-
searcher evaluator profile.”
Evaluators must be sensitive to the extent to which the data collection meth-
ods and evaluation designs are affecting the power dynamics of the conflict. For
example, a focus group discussion with Tamil and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka during
an evaluation in 2010 could not be carried out due to the security restrictions
and confidentiality concerns. The evaluation team had to find creative ways to
gain access to the beneficiaries (phone interviews, a dinner party, an invitation
for a wedding reception). In another case, data regarding the peacebuilding proj-
 Based on the experience of the author in Sri Lankan context between 1996–2010.
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ects involving the Muslim Peace Secretariat in Sri Lanka had to be gathered
through more confidential tools of data collection due to the sensitivity of the
content as security services were monitoring and blacklisting outspoken opposi-
tion members and there was an overall threatening environment. Surveys were
also not possible due to security. Evaluators in this case chose to conduct indi-
vidual interviews as the primary data collection method because they insured
the highest level of confidentiality and trust for the interviewees.⁹
6.3 Mobility and Access
Security factors often prevent evaluators from reaching peripheral or less urban
areas of a country (which are often less secure). Thus, evaluators in conflict areas
find that they need to make sure that the sample of interviewees or stakeholders
are more inclusive and pay special attention to the peripheral areas where secur-
ity conditions are less conducive to travel or even limited to only basic commu-
nication for linguistic and/or security reasons. To reach a rural community while
conducting an evaluation of a project in north-eastern Sri Lanka in 2009, one of
the evaluation team members had to drive 80 miles into the non-clear areas
(LTTE controlled area with no government troops or security). This evaluator
found that in-fact in any LTTE-controlled Tamil area, evaluators and programm-
ers could not access the local leaders without explicit permission from LTTE,
thus limiting the type of leaders to which evaluators had access.
The limitation on travel often limits the scope of the evaluation to investigat-
ing the programme’s impact on only a certain group of beneficiaries. As Ander-
son stated: “When we were doing the OECD evaluation, [we were limited to meet-
ing with people who were] mainly in the capital city and then only people that
speak English, anyway. You really don’t get a perspective if you are staying in
only talking to one side or one group, or one echelon of society” (Anderson
2009).
Mobility into the conflict area is also problematic when the conflict area is
large and covers most of the country. Evaluators will not be able to get to certain
parts of the country, in particular affected areas, and typically are only able to
focus on the most accessible areas. It is very different to work on peacebuilding
projects in a small, accessible country than in a large country lacking extensive
infrastructure.
 Based on the experience of the author in Sri Lankan context between 1996–2010.
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In Macedonia, it was fairly easy because Macedonia is small place and most of the conflicts
occurred pretty close together. But in a place like Liberia where a lot of the conflict was in
the big patches of the country, we had trouble getting around because of bad roads and
everything else is that geographically you are constrained in the same way. In Sri Lanka,
we were constrained by the conflict from getting to the places where there was active con-
flict or where conflict was still prominent (Blue 2010).
Local evaluation participants also face security concerns. In Pakistan, a group of
50 project beneficiaries could not meet in their region due to the threat of Tali-
ban forces who opposed their Madrassa reform project, and they instead had to
travel for two days by train and bus to Islamabad to discuss their Madrassa
teacher training project and its impact on their community.¹⁰
In a conflict zone, the identity and the presumed religious affiliation of the
external evaluators can restrict their access to entering and conducting a peace-
building intervention in a country as a whole, or specific region. There are cer-
tain areas in which some external evaluators cannot have access without a
local person acting as a facilitator. In Pakistan, while conducting an evaluation
of a Madrassa teacher training project, it became impossible for the team of
Western external evaluators access to the project’s staff and beneficiaries oper-
ating in the Pashtun areas. The team then delegated a local religious clergy
who had previously worked with the Madrassa project to manage the relation-
ship and gather the necessary data. In this case, a western, Christian external
evaluator would have not been able to gain access to any of these schools or
teachers.
6.4 Fear and Distrust of the “Outsider”
Security is not the only obstacle that prevents access to data collection or inter-
action with participants. Suspicion and distrust of outsiders is often a major
challenge to be overcome by foreign evaluators.
Access to certain social sectors may be an issue also. For example, in the
case of evaluating peace education programmes in three countries (Armenia, In-
donesia, and Albania), the evaluators could not meet parents, due to timing and
other intervening factors. Thus, the entire evaluation of peace education and its
impact of the children was completed without direct input from the parents (Ash-
ton 2010).
 Based on the author’s experience in conducting this evaluation in Lahore and Islamabad in
2010.
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Even without the constraints of security and risks for peacebuilding pro-
grammers, many local partners feel a certain degree of alienation from and dis-
trust of external foreign evaluators that requires evaluators to work to build re-
lationships to be able to gain even minimal access for information. Building such
relationships is a crucial part of the external evaluator’s role in a conflict area.
Overcoming the cultural and language barriers is the first task. However, that is
not sufficient by itself; connecting with the staff and beneficiaries with respect
and dignity is the gateway for getting relevant and reliable data. Unfortunately,
in many cases evaluators do not have more than a few hours in the community to
collect data (survey, interviews, or focus group discussion), a time that is insuf-
ficient to build trust, rapport or any form of relationships with the beneficiary or
local staff. As a result, the responses are kept on the formal and surface level.
7 Lack of Baseline Indicators
The field of peacebuilding is still struggling to develop its generic set of indica-
tors of success and clear and systematic baselines for measurement of indicators
of peace (van Barbant 2010; Abu-Nimer 2003; Lederach, Neufeldt and Cuthbert-
son 2007). There is growing awareness of the need for programmes operating in
conflict areas to take the time and allocate the necessary resources to develop
their baseline data prior to their starting point (Chigas 2010). In this study,
40% of evaluators agreed that there is a lack of appropriate tools, for example
baseline data and for holding real focus groups as challenges in when working
in conflict area.
The difficulty of developing a set of indicators and baseline data for a long-
term evaluation also stems from the fact that peacebuilding is political more
than many other areas of intervention, for example, health or other branches
of development. It also tends to be more convoluted and nonlinear. “…I think
[peacebuilding projects are] about politics at some level or another even if it
does not appear on the surface to be political. So, you are really talking about
finding the spaces where you can do things, so if you start planning for year
one and you are laying out things for the next 5 years, it is not going to be
very linear” (Blue 2010). Opportunities emerge or develop throughout the course
of a peacebuilding project as a result of the fluid nature of the conflict and its
politics. Therefore, when programmers decide to shift direction and change
their course of action to capitalize on that window of opportunity, it is then dif-
ficult for an evaluator to develop baseline data or follow a set of standard indi-
cators of success. At least 25% of the interviewees in the study indicated that the
political nature of Peacebuilding increases the inability to function due to do-
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mestic and international government restrictions and/or negative response to
this work i.e., complexity, structural problems, intervening variables.
Finally, the heightened concern for the security and safety of the staff or pro-
grammers might influence the choice of data collection. The higher stakes of suc-
ceeding in a conflict context can also require that evaluators pay more attention
to how their evaluation will benefit the programmers in the field. An evaluator’s
decision to include certain groups and exclude other stakeholders from the data
collections can influence and shape the results of the evaluation. For example,
US government-funded projects and evaluators are prohibited from contacting
groups that they define as terrorists, for example, the LTTE in Sri Lanka and
Hamas in Palestine. Despite the fact that these groups and their constituencies
have been affected by the specific peacebuilding projects implemented in their
area of control, evaluators and programmers are not allowed to contact the lead-
ership affiliated with in these areas.
8 Conclusion
Obviously, the above list of challenges is selective and non-comprehensive. The
purpose of the discussion is to highlight the need to place such challenges on
the current and future research agenda of the field of peacebuilding evaluation.
While this article explored challenges that face evaluators of peacebuilding, nev-
ertheless, some evaluators who were interviewed for the study argued that the
above set of challenges can also be encountered in evaluating development, ed-
ucation, or and other area of social and economic development and not only in
peacebuilding. Therefore, these is no need to identify a special set of challenges
for peacebuilding. The serious risk of supporting this argument among donors,
peacebuilding, and development agencies is the deployment of international
and national evaluation teams to examine the impact of peacebuilding pro-
grammes. Such evaluators tend to use cookie cutter templates without fully un-
derstanding or being equipped with proper tools or qualifications to understand
the impact of the conflict and its dynamics on implementing peacebuilding pro-
grammes. The results can be devastating to peacebuilding and donor organiza-
tions who, in many conflict situations, devoted their career and lives to promote
peace and coexistence in their communities or society in general.
This is not a water tank project in a conflict area in which the evaluation
team is examining if it was used efficiently or built according to certain technical
regulations. For peacebuilders and their beneficiaries or stakeholders the stakes
are very high if the evaluator/s fails to capture the impact of the immediate or
long-term effect of their efforts on the promotion of peace. Thus, responding
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to the above challenges and taking them into consideration in peacebuilding
context becomes a more urgent factor in the design, implementation, or follow
up of any evaluation.
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Ethical Challenges in Evaluating Interreligious Peacebuilding
Faith-based peacebuilding has a long history. While the nomenclature of peace-
building may be recent – its contemporary deployment often attributed to Johan
Galtung (1976) –many pioneers who engaged in the peace activism, research and
practice that shaped and produced contemporary peace and conflict studies pro-
grams and peacebuilding were faith-based actors motivated by their convictions.
Looking at the 20th century, this ranged from early contributions by Leo Tolstoy
and Mahatma Gandhi, to mid-century voices such as Martin Luther King Jr., and
later scholar-practitioners like Elise Boulding, John Paul Lederach, and the list
goes on (e.g. see Boulding 1998, Miller 2000). Yet in the late 20th century, it
seemed that faith-based peacebuilding was either radically new or not credible.
Research and practice in mediation, negotiation, alternative dispute resolution,
problem-solving workshops and other conflict resolution and transformation ex-
panded and the religious or faith dimension of such work faded. In the 1980s
and 1990s it became a small part of textbooks in peace and conflict studies, typ-
ically with respect to principled nonviolence, peace movements and just war
theory (Barash and Webel 2002), religious militancy (Crocker, Hampson, and
Aall 1996), or as part of understanding the cultural context in which an interven-
tion occurs (Avruch 1998).
Then came the 21st century, with its rising spectre of religiously motivated
terrorism and conflict that crossed borders. Explorations of the relationship be-
tween religion and statecraft, heralded by the work of Doug Johnston and Cyn-
thia Sampson (1994), expanded. The rise in attention to religious peacebuilding
was concomitant with concerns about religion and violent extremism. It includ-
ed scholarly and practitioner work exploring fundamentalism (e.g. Appleby
2000, Juergensmeyer 2000), excavating particular religious traditions and their
contributions to peacebuilding (e.g. Sampson and Lederach 2000, Abu-Nimer
2003, Bamat and Cejka 2003, Schreiter, Appleby, and Powers 2010) as well as
broader synthetic reviews of the literature and practice (e.g. Little 2006, Omer,
Appleby, and Little 2015).
Note: Thanks to co-panellists and participants who commented on an earlier version of this
chapter presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in March 2016.
Thanks also to Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Renata Nelson and Khaled Ehsan for comments on
the chapter and helping to sharpen the argument.
OpenAccess. © 2021 Reina C. Neufeldt, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under
the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110624625-003
Over the last decade or so, calls for accountability accompanied the in-
creased attention to, and spending on, religious and interreligious peacebuild-
ing. It was no longer acceptable to be solely motivated by faith, it was important
to demonstrate the effects of one’s work. Concerns that faith-based peacebuild-
ing was fluffy, unnecessary or even harmful were brought to the fore. For exam-
ple, people critiqued high-level interfaith dialogues as superficial window dress-
ing for political negotiations (e.g. Micklethwait 2007). There were also concerns
that religious peacebuilding was understood simplistically as producing unidir-
ectional, positive change (Omer 2015). Taking a strong stand, Susan Hayward ar-
gued:
There is a pressing need for greater monitoring and evaluation of religious peacebuilding
work—and peacebuilding generally—to understand better which interventions, led by
whom, and in which situations, have the greatest effect. The lack of evaluation to demon-
strate the value of religious peacebuilding work has fueled skepticism about its effective-
ness, particularly among secular-biased peace organizations and diplomats, and being
able to show that religious peacebuilding works will help the field better integrate with
other sectors…. it is possible, and a moral imperative to ensure that religious peacebuilding
efforts constructively affect societies. (2012, 8)
Religious peacebuilders were to demonstrate the value of their work by showing
it produced constructive change.
In response to the call, new resources emerged in 2016 and 2017. These re-
sources identified the unique challenges of monitoring and evaluating faith-
based peacebuilding, and then offered guidance for how these efforts could be
better designed, monitored and evaluated (Steele and Wilson-Grau 2016, Wood-
row, Oatley, and Garred 2017). This volume too is part of the larger effort to eval-
uate faith-based peacebuilding, focusing on interreligious peacebuilding and
dialogue.
I review this history to note variations over time, in terms of the relative ac-
tivity of and prominence given to faith-based peacebuilding, as well as to signal
the tensions that exist with calls to evaluate interreligious peacebuilding and
dialogue. Most recently, the calls to account and demonstrate effect suggest
that well-intentioned religious or faith-based peacebuilders must look beyond
their intentions and beyond faith in the supernatural to assess human-based ef-
fects. This seems a reasonable and important call given the rise in attention to
religious actors in peacebuilding and the problem of unintended negative ef-
fects. Yet there are also concerns about instrumentalising religion, about taking
a reductionist approach and using religion as the means to a peacebuilder’s end
(Thomas 2005). Here the problem is that religious and interreligious peacebuild-
ing are used for particular purposes, outside of faith traditions. These two cri-
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tiques appear to be in opposition and an important question emerges: does the
call for a certain type of accountability in peacebuilding evaluation reinforce the
problem of instrumentalising religion and faith for purposes external to the re-
ligious tradition?
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the less visible effects that calls for
accountability may have on interreligious peacebuilding, particularly in terms of
effects on the moral values that guide interreligious work. Stated differently: how
do the values embedded in (secular) peacebuilding evaluation criteria affect re-
ligious and interreligious peacebuilding? Examining this relationship involves
three steps. The first step is excavating the moral values within the evaluation
criteria. The second is looking at values within an example of interfaith peace-
building; here I use interfaith dialogue with its divergent theories of change to
help draw out the different ways religious actors see peacebuilding change hap-
pen, and what is valued in the process. Finally, we can take the third step to ex-
plore ways in which valuations in evaluation criteria are likely to influence the
moral values of religious peacebuilding and discuss its import.
1 Clarifying Terms: Religious and Interreligious
Peacebuilding
Before going further, it is helpful to clarify the definitions of religion, religious
peacebuilding and interreligious peacebuilding. The term religion is used here
to refer to various forms of thought and behaviour around which people come
together to become aware of or relate to the divine (Hick 1993). Religion includes
theological beliefs, moral values and prescriptions for actions, ritual practices,
behavioural expectations, confessional communities and the sacred (Appleby
2000, Johnstone 2016, 8– 14). While some definitions emphasize organized reli-
gion, this definition does not, although it does require confessional communi-
ties.
Religious peacebuilding then refers to actions taken by individuals motivat-
ed by their religion or representing religious institutions to constructively and
non-violently prevent, reduce or transform inter-group conflict. Interreligious
or interfaith peacebuilding, which I will use synonymously, refer to peacebuild-
ing that is undertaken by people motivated by religion or representing a religious
institution or confessional community and working between and across faith tra-
ditions to prevent, reduce or transform inter-group conflict. This may include di-
rect work on theological beliefs, moral values and behavioural expectations, or
indirect involvement of ritual practices, theology and belief. Note that the defi-
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nitions of both religious and interreligious peacebuilding rely on a secular def-
inition of peacebuilding that is broad and reflects an emphasis on conflict trans-
formation that builds on John Paul Lederach and Galtung’s focus on changing or
transforming systems of conflict as well as the relationships and institutions that
generate and sustain conflict (Galtung 1976, Lederach 2005). Religious peace-
building grows out of religious or faith-based motivations and focuses on engag-
ing with religious actors, confessional communities, traditions, ritual practices,
institutions and theological or belief systems, and/or some combination thereof.
2 Evaluation and Moral Value Judgements
Evaluation very explicitly involves making value judgements about what is good
and right. Evaluators collect empirical data, analyse it and then interpret it in
order to make judgements about “the worth, merit or value of something”
(2005, 444). Did an intervention achieve good outcomes? Was the intervention
the right thing to do? Deborah Fournier notes that, “It is the value feature that
distinguishes evaluation from other types of inquiry, such as basic science re-
search, clinical epidemiology…” (2005, 140– 1). Evaluators weigh and choose
amongst contending ideas about what is right and good, what is worthy and val-
uable. As I argue elsewhere¹ and draw upon here,weighing and choosing what is
good and right also makes evaluation an exercise in moral judgement (Neufeldt
2016b).
In my experience as both a practitioner and an academic who works on
learning and reflection in peacebuilding (sometimes in the form of evaluations,
although I strongly prefer the language and approach of participatory and ongo-
ing learning), evaluators and guidance for evaluators do not focus on the moral
aspect of value judgements. The criteria and standards for judging things are
based on criteria commonly set by funders of evaluations. Concerns are typically
around accountability, the quality of an evaluation process, methodological
choices and analysis of findings, as well as implications for use. While there
are opportunities to engage with moral values, as Michael Morris (2007) identi-
fies, this process tends to fall into the background in evaluations themselves as
well as in training and support materials. For example, Michael Quinn Patton, in
his influential tome Utilization-Focused Evaluation, discusses rendering judge-
 This section draws on material produced for as a discussion paper for the Peacebuilding Eval-
uation Consortium, called “Wicked Problems of Ethics: Confronting the challenge of what con-
stitutes good peacebuilding done the right ways in peacebuilding evaluation” (Neufeldt 2016b).
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ments as part of making meaning out of the evaluation findings in only a short,
two-page section of his more than 600-page volume. He notes that judgements
about whether or not the data and findings are good or bad varies “depending
on the values brought to bear” (Patton 2008, 500). The discussion of judgement
then moves quickly to who judges values and the question of whether evaluators
should independently render judgements versus providing the data for stake-
holders to judge, or some combination thereof (Patton’s preference). The values
discussion then comes to a quick end.
The values dimension of judgement in evaluation requires careful scrutiny
as it is here that the real tensions with evaluating religious peacebuilding are at-
tenuated and often elided.² Now, there are some who argue that empirical data
can be gathered in order to inform rational decisions in a value-free way; this is
rooted in positivist social science tradition. A common value-free assertion goes
like this: if we collect the data then we will know what to do. This idea of being
able to collect data that will simply tell us what to do is popular yet highly prob-
lematic as it suggests a binary that does not exist (Patton 2008, Scriven 2012).
When we ask what constitutes good results or ask questions about what data
was determined as important to gather, we glimpse at the moral values upon
which claims regarding what is good or right are made. There are value-based
assumptions that underpin the determination of what is important and why cer-
tain evidence is selected. For example, one criterion used to evaluate whether or
not peacebuilding programs are good and worthwhile is if they generate data on
impact from scaling-up. Here, what is valued is a greater number of people af-
fected by an intervention over the quality of that intervention within a given lo-
cale. Or another value could be if the people involved in the initiative learn from
and make adaptations based on the evaluation data and process. Here, adapta-
tions and responsiveness are valued.
 In a special 2012 issue of New Directions for Evaluation, titled “Promoting valuation in the
public interest: informing policies for judging value in evaluation,” authors discuss roles for
evaluators and stakeholders in valuation, politicization, the role of associations like the Amer-
ican Evaluation Association, and the importance of context sensitivity in valuation. Michael
Scriven’s contribution aims to unpack the logic of valuing, and while questioning Hume and
the distinction between value-free and value-based argument in evaluation, his emphasis on
reasoned, critical thinking misses the connection with an area that does this purposively:
moral philosophy.
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3 Evaluation and the Push to Account for
Consequences
In order to assess how interreligious or religious peacebuilding moral values
may be affected in the process of judging good and right in peacebuilding, we
need to look more closely at evaluation’s valuation itself. Are there particular
moral values that are elevated uniformly in peacebuilding evaluations? By draw-
ing out the moral values that are prioritized in peacebuilding evaluations,we can
begin to see more clearly what conceptions of good and right are prominent and
their possible effects on interreligious peacebuilding and dialogue.
The values that guide judgements of what constitutes good or right in peace-
building are usually identified in the terms of reference (TOR) for an evaluation,
or perhaps in the statement of purpose for the evaluation. It is now common-
place for TOR to draw upon the criteria named by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and Development Assistance Committee (OECD
and DAC) (2008) as their foundation. These criteria for evaluation are broadly
recognized and widely used by non-governmental organizations as well as by
governmental and intergovernmental bodies. The 2012 publication presents a
slightly revised set of criteria from those initially put forward for public use, test-
ing and feedback in 2007–2008 (DAC Network on Conflict and DAC Network on
Development Evaluation 2008). The five criteria identified to judge good peace-
building are: 1) relevance to factors driving the conflict; 2) effectiveness vis-à-vis
intended objectives and the degree to which results were achieved; 3) impact that
includes intended and unintended positive or negative effects; 4) sustainability,
which refers to the continuation of benefits when funding stops (e.g. community
ownership of peace work or continued community resilience); and, 5) efficiency
of resources used to produce effects (OECD 2012, 65–71). Two additional suggest-
ed OECD-DAC criteria, which are not on par with the preceding five, are coher-
ence and coordination amongst intervenors or funders.
These five main OECD-DAC criteria are front and centre in recent materials
for evaluating religious and interreligious peacebuilding. They are identified as
the “criteria typically used in the professional evaluation of peacebuilding inter-
ventions” (2016, 7) in the thought piece by David Steele and Ricardo Wilson-
Grau, titled “Supernatural belief and the evaluation of faith-based peacebuild-
ing.” Steele and Wilson-Grau add the caveat that the five criteria are “neither
all obligatory nor exhaustive,” and one or more might be chosen and prioritized
in an evaluation (7). The 2017 guide produced for helping better design, monitor
and evaluate inter-religious efforts by Peter Woodrow, Nick Oatley and Michelle
Garred, also reproduces these five main criteria as central for evaluating interre-
58 Reina C. Neufeldt
ligious peacebuilding. They include as a sixth criteria “coordination and linkag-
es,” which is in-line with the suggested additional OECD-DAC criteria, and they
add a seventh criteria titled “consistency with values” (Woodrow, Oatley, and
Garred 2017, 106). There is general affirmation for the OECD-DAC criteria and
some additional work to bridge them into religious contexts. Given their impor-
tance,we need to examine what these widely embraced criteria say about what is
valued.
There is a strong, unifying moral claim embedded in these criteria, which is
that peacebuilding programs or projects are good if they achieve the greatest
good for the greatest number of people or produce at least as good as any
other course of action would produce. The consequentialist logic underpinning
the valuation of what is good is clear and unsurprising. Effectiveness, impact,
sustainability all refer to slightly different aspects of consequences upon
which programs, projects or initiatives are to be judged good. Consequentialism
is a moral theory of what constitutes good, which underwrites our ideas about
what makes the first three criteria valuable. It involves a cost-benefit, compara-
tive calculation that focuses on ends, not on the means to the end or the nature
of the character or relationships between those who pursue the end. As a moral
theory, it is attributed originally to Jeremy Bentham and his student John Stuart
Mill, with variations over time (such as act and rule consequentialism), and right
action is determined as that which produces the most intrinsic good for individ-
uals – whose feel good individually but are calculated collectively. While aspir-
ing to be universal, the origins of this moral theory were 18th and 19th Century
England.
Two of the OECD-DAC criteria suggest attention must be paid to means or
process considerations that effect the ends. The effects are judged better if
they are produced in an efficient manner and are relevant to the drivers of con-
flict as identified in a conflict analysis. The efficiency criterion is clearly part of a
cost-benefit calculation and noting that maximizing outputs in general are better
if they use fewer financial resources. Relevancy is a variation of efficiency, in
that the effects are efficient if they effect drivers of conflict. Both of these are,
again, consequentialist in moral valuation.
Consequentialism is not the only moral theory that focuses us on assessing
what constitutes right action. Deontology offers another way of understanding
what constitutes good, which focuses on defining universal goods and principles
prior to action, so that the good is defined independently and based on universal
reason. For example, Immanuel Kant’s humanitarian formulation of the catego-
rical imperative identifies as universal the imperative that everyone must always
treat people as an end and never as a means to an end. Kant’s imperative is a
variation of the golden rule identified in many religious traditions (Wattles
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1996, Neusner and Chilton 2009). The injunction to treat others as one would like
to be treated stands in stark contradiction to the valuing of efficiency, where it
suggests that people are used as a resource to an efficient end by peacebuilders.
This is one of the points of friction between deontological and consequentialist
ethics and indicates one of the ways in which the criteria used by professional
peacebuilding evaluators is skewed in its evaluation of what is good.
There is a related concern that ends-based consequentialist thinking, if
taken as far as it goes, allows some harm to occur. For example, it might be,
in the final calculation, alright for staff to continue to work even when they
are emotionally burnt-out or engage in some minor criminal activity as part of
peacebuilding, as long as the outcome is at least as good as any other course
of action in the final assessment of consequences. Now, the OECD-DAC docu-
ment includes a list of additional duties or principles that funders should pay
attention to in choosing which projects or programmes to fund, which include
the duty to “do no harm,” to promote non-discrimination, equality of participa-
tion of men and women, and so forth (2012, 23–26). These principles are seen as
universal and help to modify the OECD-DAC’s emphasis on consequentialism at
the start of an initiative, however they are listed separately as important princi-
ples for funders to follow but not directly considered part of the evaluation cri-
teria, with the exception of “do no harm” (a rule-based consequentialist injunc-
tion). For example, equal participation of women might be generally viewed as a
good principle to follow, but this principle is not factored into the project eval-
uation’s focus on efficiency.
Separating principles or duties for funders from criteria for evaluation is
consistent with a larger pattern in peacebuilding literature. Often ethics consid-
erations are seen to refer to how actors engage whereas how one understands
ends are not considered a value-informed choice (for example see Anderson
and Olson 2003, or for further discussion see Neufeldt 2016a). It is a version
of the idea that values and evidence are separate categories and obscures the
idea that consequentialism actually invokes a moral value choice. Consequenti-
alist moral thinking is one of the dominant lines of ethical analysis today and the
OECD-DAC peacebuilding evaluation criteria are firmly in the tradition of Ben-
tham and Mill’s 18th and 19th century ideas.
It may be worth noting that there are other important ways of thinking about
what constitutes good in moral philosophy and religious teachings.Virtue ethics,
for example, focuses on character and personal excellence. Ethics of care is a
relational moral theory that focuses analysis of the good on a foundation of re-
sponding to others’ needs and emphasize moral agent interdependence rather
than independence. Ubuntu ethics is likewise a relational moral theory. These
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foci of good are also present in peacebuilding practice and literature yet do not
figure in the widely used evaluation criteria.³
The literature on interreligious and faith-based peacebuilding added some
content to the five main OECD-DAC criteria, which hints that the criteria should
be more carefully scrutinized. Steele and Wilson-Grau added the caveat that the
five criteria are neither obligatory nor exhaustive and, while emphasizing that
professional evaluators use these criteria, they nuance the content and suggest
that religious beliefs will influence how the criteria are conceptualized. This
opens the door for recognizing that the criteria may be inappropriate or not fit
with religious and interreligious peacebuilding, it also opens the door for
those within a faith tradition to rethink external criteria using concepts internal
to the tradition. This seems promising; However, it is mentioned in a short paper
and the authors do not expand.
Faith Matters, the design, monitoring and evaluation guide for religious
peacebuilding builds on Steele and Wilson-Grau. The authors add a seventh cri-
teria, consistency of values,which again seems promising as a way of opening up
a discussion on the given consequentialist criteria. The description of what they
mean indicates that evaluators could assess whether the values embodied in a
project were consistent with various religious values, such as dignity of the per-
son, compassion, justice and so forth (Woodrow, Oatley, and Garred 2017, 112).
Here the lens of religion has expanded considerations around the five conse-
quentialist criteria yet clearly not displaced focus on the five as central for judg-
ing the value of religious and interreligious peacebuilding. The question then re-
mains: what happens to moral values in interreligious peacebuilding and
dialogue when those designing or supporting the dialogue are pushing to see
the initiative be more relevant, effective, impactful, sustainable and efficient?
Is there anything for faith-based peacebuilders to be concerned about? Are
there problems that arise if consequentialism dominates our understanding of
is valued as good and right in religious and inter-religious peacebuilding evalu-
ation?
 Evaluation resources are emerging to focus on principle-based evaluation. For example, Mi-
chael Quinn Patton has a new book called Principles-Focused Evaluation: the GUIDE (2017),
which aims to help assess organization’s based on their principles, abd assessing whether im-
plementing the principles achieved desired results.
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4 Accounting for Consequences: A Simple
Secular-Faith Divide?
To restate, evaluation judges what is good and bad based on a set of values. And,
to state the obvious, judgements of good/bad, right/wrong are also the purview
of religion. Religious teachings provide foundations for moral values.
We might think that the push to judge, based on consequentialism, is actual-
ly a tension between religious moorings and the secular call to demonstrate pos-
itive consequences.While there are aspects of the above discussion that could be
read as a secular perspective being brought to bear on religious worldviews, it is
also clear that there are a range of ways of seeing and assessing what is morally
good in religious traditions themselves. Simply focusing on Catholicism for the
moment, there are clear examples of ways in which consequences are viewed
as morally good which are in-line with consequentialist moral philosophy. To
name just two examples, Thomas Aquinas explores the doctrine of double effect
in Just War thinking in weighing moral responsibilities vis-à-vis the outcomes of
war (e.g. see Dower 2009). Catholic theologian and peacebuilder Todd Whitmore
has called on Catholic peacebuilders to broaden the understanding of moral ac-
countability related to peacebuilding and development and its effects (Whitmore
2010). Considerations of ends are important in religious discourse, as are consid-
erations of motives and core religious moral principles.⁴
Evaluations can raise internal arguments that exist within religions with re-
spect to how to prioritize values or how to enact values in a given context and
time. This means that the moral values are placed in direct tension with one an-
other as choices are made about which values are the right ones by which to
judge peacebuilding. For example, is it important to mediate or pray to pursue
personal transcendence, or to engage in social action and effects?
To better understand what is at stake in the tension of values, the next sec-
tion focuses on interreligious dialogue and looks at the values underpinning it,
which may be affected by the ways values are prioritized in project design and
evaluation. Interreligious dialogue is a subset of religious and interreligious
peacebuilding, and often explicit in articulating religious values, as discussions
of values are often part of the dialogue itself between traditions, which makes it
particularly helpful to examine.
 It is also interesting to note the tension between competing moral values is not solely the do-
main of religious peacebuilding either, as we see similar tensions between those committed to
duty-based responses and those who are looking at impact as producing the greatest positive
consequences in more secular discourse (explored further in Neufeldt 2014).
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5 Vying Values in Interreligious Dialogue:
Awesome Agency, Faithful Followers, Earthy
Ends
Interreligious dialogue itself is not uniform (e.g. see Abu-Nimer, Khoury, and
Welty 2007).We see at least three types of dialogue enacted today that value dif-
ferent types of change through dialogue and understandings of agency by those
engaged in the dialogue; these can be understood from a theological, political
and a peacebuilding perspective (Neufeldt 2011). The descriptions that follow
below briefly summarize the focus of each dialogue type, provide an example
and distil over-arching moral values regarding social change processes in
order to assess how the priorities in evaluations may affect interreligious peace-
building values.
5.1 Theological Dialogue
The theological approach to dialogue emphasizes theological exchange and re-
ligious experience as the central “modes of dialogue”.⁵ This type of dialogue
tends to be led by those with a background in theological and religious studies
and aims to be largely apolitical in content although spurred by experiences of
exclusion or violent conflict. The theological approach tends to focus on individ-
ual change and relationship development. Its purposes include increasing un-
derstanding of beliefs, doctrines, practices and values between groups; estab-
lishing areas of common values between faith traditions; probing areas of
theological difference; engaging in active theology where new theologies
might emerge; as well as developing relationships of mutual respect between
members of religious traditions. Prayer, mediation and being open to Ultimate
Reality or God as leading change are important in the process.
An example of a theological dialogue is the “Thinking Together” series that
was organized by the World Council of Churches Office on Interreligious Rela-
tions and Dialogue. This dialogue series, which ran from 2000 to 2009, brought
together a relatively small group of core participants to consider difficult ques-
tions from theological perspectives. The meetings included personal sharing
and worship ritual. As one participant, M. Thomas Thangaraj (2003) relayed,
 The descriptions of the three forms of interreligious dialogue draw on “Interfaith dialogue:
assessing theories of change” (Neufeldt 2011).
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“We were not simply talking, either; we prayed together and meditated together.
Every morning persons in the group, in accordance with their own religious tra-
ditions, led us in prayer/meditation/singing.” Through the dialogue, representa-
tives of different religious groups (including Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism,
Buddhism, and Islam) identified and explored theological concerns and differ-
ences utilizing the languages and methods of their respective religious tradi-
tions, developed new insights and forged bonds of friendship (Ucko 2001, 2005).
This model of dialogue valued religious and spiritual encounter, personal
change and new insights generated through exchange as part of a transcendent
process. The group periodically wondered about how to increase the effects of
their work, and published collected volumes in an effort to make the group’s
deep exchange more widely available (Ucko 2005, Premawardhana 2015). How-
ever, the primary good was the experience itself, exchange, the insights generat-
ed and the opening of space to God or Ultimate Reality. In this type of dialogue,
in the awesome presence of the divine, humans were not primary agents of
change, but they were part of a change process made manifest. Here we see
an ontological understanding of forces operating outside of the normal purview
of monitoring effects.What is front and central is the awesome agency of the di-
vine for faithful followers.
5.2 Political Dialogue
The political approach to interfaith dialogue typically occurs in response to ac-
tive conflict although strives to be apolitical in content in terms of formal politics
(e.g., political parties). The focus of these dialogues is to solidify the support of
religious leaders for politically negotiated peace agreements or peace processes,
and in so doing, generate more widespread grassroots support. Such events are
often hosted by governments and include political representatives in the midst of
highly placed religious leaders. There is a small element of theological exchange
in that religious beliefs or tenets related to “peace” and “violence” are voiced by
leaders, although typically they are framed as parallel monologues and the pri-
mary audience for each leader (at least as hoped by organizers) is their own faith
adherents.
An example of a politically sponsored interreligious dialogue effort by the
United States (US) occurred during former George W. Bush’s administration
and was led by then- Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
Karen Hughes. She met with religious leaders at various “interfaith dialogue”
events between 2005 and 2007, held around the world and in the US. Hughes
stated the reason why the US government was interested in interfaith dialogue
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and convened religious leaders was because “…faith plays such a critical role in
the lives of so many people across our world. Governments would be foolish to
ignore its power and impact or to leave the floor only to those who seek to use
religion as a force to divide or destroy” (Hughes 2006). The goals of dialogue in-
cluded: the desire to highlight the many voices speaking out against terrorism
and for greater interfaith understanding; to demonstrate that all faiths believe
in the sanctity of human life; and to give the world a more accurate picture of
Muslims in America (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2006, Hughes 2007).
To illustrate further what was involved, at a 2005 meeting in Istanbul, Tur-
key, Hughes had a joint meeting with the Mufti of Istanbul, the Armenian Patri-
arch, the Chief Rabbi, the Syrian Metropolitan, a representative of the Ecumen-
ical Patriarchate, and a Catholic Bishop in addition to a few others. At a press
conference prior to the meeting, the Syrian Metropolitan Yusuf Cetin leader stat-
ed:
…I think that for world peace, religious leaders and politicians are the two parties that have
very big tasks to fulfill, more than ever today.We need to pray much more for world peace,
and politicians need to work much more seriously for world peace. Religious leaders, of
course, are not politicians, but for world peace we are ready to discuss any topic, we are
ready to be present at any gathering so long as it calls for peace to reign all over the
world – because we have the tears and screams of war. These make all countries in the
world very troubled. We believe that when there are good intensions in a meeting like
this, God will hear our voice, respond to our goodwill and hopefully will show us good
days in the future. (Hughes and Powell 2005)
This quote draws out the nature of the dialogue, which was not mutual transfor-
mation but rather persuasion of others regarding the right thing to do in order to
work for peace. Religious and political leaders held distinct but important roles,
and the power of prayer was mentioned but not directly tied to the dialogue it-
self. In the quote, the emphasis on good intentions and internal motivations as
well as the consequentialist valuing of stability and cessation of violence are
named. However, within the political approach to interfaith dialogue, the prag-
matic brokering of peace – an earthy and observable end – takes priority over
any sense of awesome agency. Dialogue and mentioning the divine is a step, a
helpful means that faithful followers are willing to do, to prepare the way for
a longer-term politically brokered peace.
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5.3 Peacebuilding Dialogue
A third approach to interfaith dialogue emphasizes a broader commitment to re-
ligious peacebuilding that draws on peacebuilding and conflict transformation
frameworks. In this approach, interfaith dialogue is an entry point and way of
working towards multiple types of change. Peacebuilding initiatives integrate
dialogue to build mutual understanding and respect, broaden peace processes
to include community members, or function as a foundation for other types of
community-level engagements that address economic and social drivers of the
conflict. This approach attempts to value both the earthy ends of immediate ces-
sation of violence and observable changes, as well as the awesome nature of the
divine, and therefore includes joint rituals and sharing alongside other types of
intervention activities. These efforts seek to deliberately affect the political envi-
ronment and focus on political processes and actors as well as conditions that
give rise to the conflict with a greater sense of agency than occurs in the political
mode of dialogue. Religious peacebuilders operating in this mode are often mo-
tivated to do good peacebuilding work as an expression of their faith – they are
devoted peacebuilders in terms of their commitment to peace efforts as well as
their commitment to faith and religion. They tend to be rooted in the conflict-af-
fected communities and want to see effects and change happen because of their
efforts and so there may be a more immediate valuing of the earthy ends that are
produced through peacebuilding.
An example of a peacebuilding interfaith dialogue is Mindanao’s Bishop-
Ulama Conference (BUC), which was originally called the Bishop-Ulama
Forum. It involved Catholic, Protestant and Muslim clerics in a formal, interfaith
dialogue that was initially intended to help contribute to peace following the
1996 negotiations with the Moro Liberation Front. Over the years, the format
of dialogue evolved, moving from political dialogue to providing a platform
for a variety of types of peacebuilding initiatives that included purposive
peace education and grassroots projects, as well as behind-the-scenes involve-
ment in peace negotiations (Bishop Ulama Conference undated, Fitzpatrick
2007). Additional dialogue groups, such as the Ustadz-Priests-Pastors dialogue
and the Episcopal Commission for Inter-religious dialogue formed. There were
culture of peace and peace education trainings, youth, academic, grassroots
and church worker dialogue groups. Grassroots groups in particular developed
initiatives to respond to their needs, such as through small income generation
projects. The BUC expanded media attention for peace efforts in Mindanao,
which enabled the peace movement to gain a greater profile elsewhere in the
Philippines. The religious leadership themselves pursued peacebuilding training
early in the formation of the BUC because they were interested in affecting larg-
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er-scale social change. The inspiration was rooted in their faith, they continually
engaged in theological dialogue and worship experiences, but they also wanted
to respond to the needs around them effectively. In this mode of dialogue, it ap-
pears that the valuing of faith and a duty to do the right thing according to one’s
faith, was also modified by the valuing of earthly ends and outputs (decrease in
violence, increase in solidarity, and so forth). In this approach, there is some ef-
fort to embrace both earthy ends as well as the awesome agency of the divine by
faithful followers.
These three examples illustrate the point above – that the call to achieve
good effects is not a secular value foisted upon religious actors – these actors
themselves are interested in effects in this world, and this in part comes out
of their faith. Members of the Bishop-Ulama forum members want to be good ad-
herents of their respective faiths, but they also want to see peace – a just peace –
built in Mindanao and perceive themselves to be agents of change in addition to,
or because of, the divine. The multiple demands of being good faithful followers,
who are transformed by the awesome, and want to achieve changes in this world
is present to varying degrees in the theological and political forms of interreli-
gious dialogue. The modalities that are suggested in response are then further
informed by other religious values, such as reconciliation and a commitment
to recognizing the sacredness of the other. Yet, we also see that across these
three different types of interfaith dialogue efforts, there is some balancing of sig-
nificant moral goods. Religious actors are doing their best to be faithful followers
in the process of pursuing earthy ends. They are also conscious of awesome
agency even while making an effort to achieve earthy ends. Awesome agency,
earthy ends and faithful follower demands are variously prioritized in all three
approaches. How might evaluation values alter or transform these vying goods
in interreligious peacebuilding?
6 When Faithful Followers Prioritize Earthy Ends
over Awesome Agency
What issues of concern arise when interreligious dialogue and interreligious
peacebuilding more broadly embrace evaluation and the values therein? I
offer this final section as a thought piece to help religious peacebuilders identify
issues in advance, so that evaluation criteria may be developed in a more careful
way and appropriate to the moral values content as well as context, as well as to
recognize the limits of evaluation. With this caveat noted, I see three ways the
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values of religious peacebuilders in interfaith dialogue are likely to be affected
by evaluation criteria.
6.1 Dimming Awesome Agency
Evaluations that draw upon the OECD-DAC criteria (or other similar criteria) em-
phasize consequences and the moral value of earthy ends in interreligious dia-
logue, notably its effectiveness, impact and sustainability. One of the central
views around change that is most likely to be ignored or pushed to the side is
the ontological commitment to God or to Ultimate Reality as acting in human af-
fairs beyond human comprehension. God’s performance does not get evaluated
per se. While people may ask questions like, “why didn’t God act?” or “why did
God act in that way?” or even note that one of the assumptions in a log frame is
that “God will act” they do not expect answers in the form of empirical data, or
to understand that which is wholly other.⁶ Faith traditions require faith. The awe-
some nature of the divine will necessarily have to be bracketed, as one might
bracket one’s biases, in order to put the matter aside and assess what is acces-
sible and empirical. Indeed, this is precisely what we see Steele and Wilson-Grau
do, as they focus on belief and suggest “the primary question regarding belief in
the supernatural is not how one measures the transcendent, but how one takes
into consideration the effect of that belief” (2016, 5).
Of course, studies could be proposed to examine whether or not conflicts in
which more people pray or meditate for peace effects change. However, there
will not be controlled experiments to see if prayer and meditation improves
things – as experiments in health sciences for angioplasty patients have attempt-
ed – because it is simply not possible to control how many people pray for and
against any one side and any one outcome in a large-scale conflict and (more
importantly), these efforts domesticate the divine. The other complication is
that even if there are observable patterns, it does not mean we understand divine
or awesome agency. If we see something that looks like Ultimate Reality or God
intervening, it does not mean we understand, as the many holy texts, interpretive
texts, meditative practices, theological works, and confessional community dis-
cernment processes indicate.
The implication here, then, is that the push to pay more attention to conse-
quences such as effectiveness, impact, and sustainability, marginalizes an un-
 For an example of an effort to include mention of God in a logframe see Rich Janzen and
David Wiebe’s (2011)”Putting God in the Logic Model.”
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derstanding that God or Ultimate Reality acts in this world in ways that may in-
clude humans but also go beyond. Awesome agency does not figure in the val-
uation for evaluation.
6.2 Commodifying Dialogue Exchanges
A second area to consider is with respect to the ways in which exchanges in dia-
logue are commodified from a consequentialist perspective. In particular, the ef-
fects of positing efficiency as a universal standard to be valued in interfaith dia-
logue and religious peacebuilding. The valuing of efficiency as a good in the
OECD-DAC evaluation criteria offers an economic reading of peacebuilding
where efficient uses of resources are prioritized over less efficient uses of resour-
ces. Commodities such as social capital are to be efficiently built with the mini-
mum possible peacebuilder resources – financial, human, organizational. This
may sound normal and right in North America where relationships are often
commodified in financial terms (e.g., paying others to care for aging parents).
However, the emphasis on efficient exchange comes into conflict with the valu-
ing of moments of interchange and the quality of interactions as goods in and of
themselves for faithful followers.
Todd Whitmore, an American theologian and peacebuilder, has observed
the effects of economic and social context on Catholic social teaching in its ar-
ticulation of the relationship between development and peace, as evidenced in
Pope Paul VI’s statement that the new name for peace is development, in the
1967 Populorum Progressio (2010, 172). This thinking,Whitmore notes, had its ori-
gins in Europe, and its primary audience was European. Catholic social teaching
was speaking into a context that had experienced the industrial revolution, but
which he notes is vastly inappropriate for other parts of the world such as sub-
Saharan Africa. Whitmore forcefully writes, “Development as it has actually ex-
isted has not been an unalloyed good, or even a basically good set of activities
that has been led astray by self-interest. It has been from the start, whatever else
it has been, a tool for extracting labour and natural resources from indigenous
peoples. This is the context in which any effort to empower the poor necessarily
takes place” (2010, 175). In looking at the valuation of efficiently producing re-
sults, we see it reinforces an exchange dynamic, which represents the economic
and political context of donor countries and can be read as part of a continuing
problematic dynamic.
The value of efficiency as a moral good reinforces a commodified view of in-
terfaith dialogue and peacebuilding. It cuts against elements of interfaith dia-
logue in which faithful followers experience a deeply religious encounter in
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the presence of the divine or the quality of the experience, which are seen as
good in and of themselves as illustrated in the theological mode of interfaith dia-
logue.We have here, then, the danger of valuing peacebuilding and peacebuild-
ers without soul or quality.
6.3 The One, the Many, and the Connections Between
A third area to consider is less obvious in the criteria but relates to the ways in
which individual agency is construed within theories of change and the empha-
sis on individuality over community and relationships. There is a subtle shift to
emphasize individuals as agents leading social change as well as being the base
unit for analysing the effects of an intervention in consequentialist analysis. As
noted above, awesome agency is problematic to include in evaluations, what is
left then is individual agency. Why individuals and not groups or communities?
The answer relates to assumptions underlying the analysis of how change oc-
curs. For example, the widely cited Reflecting on Peace Practice Project produced
findings that highlighted the important role that key people play in affecting
structural change to impact peace writ large (Anderson and Olson 2003).
Works were clustered into initiatives that targeted either “more people” or
“key people” – while this simplification was meant for analytic purposes it
has powerfully shaped the imagination of how change happens and the role
that communities and social structures may play. Key individuals are important
actors in change. Effects are also measured based upon individual reports of
change, and cumulative effects on individuals as occurs in utilitarian conse-
quentialist calculations. This approach reflects Max Weber’s (1978) methodolog-
ical individualism in which individuals are the agents of social phenomena and
the focus of sociological study.
Here again is the concern that what is valued as good is shaped more by the
social and economic context of those pushing for evaluation based on conse-
quentialist values than religious faith and moral beliefs about what is good
and right, which are often communally inscribed. Further, the social and politi-
cal context that produces these norms benefit from the current political and eco-
nomic order. Miguel De La Torre, Professor of Social Ethics and Latino/a studies,
writes:
While the ethical positions held within the dominant culture are neither uniform nor mon-
olithic, certain common denominators nevertheless exist, such as a propensity toward hy-
perindividualism, a call for law and order, an emphasis on charity, an uncritical acceptance
of the market economy, an emphasis on orthodoxy, and a preponderance for deductive eth-
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ical reasoning.While such an ethics is congruent with the dominant culture, it is damning
for those residing on the margins of society because of how it reinforces the prevailing so-
cial structures responsible for causes of disenfranchisement.
The push to evaluate can unintentionally reinforce individualism, perhaps even
hyper-individualism. The valuing of individual agency and individual experience
is, of course, also present in religious discourse.⁷ We see this valuing of key in-
dividuals (religious leaders) possessing agency in the political mode of interfaith
dialogue, with the anticipation that key people are able to effect larger-scale and
institutional change. Yet many are concerned that this mode of dialogue is using
religious actors for political purposes. Ends considerations have the potential to
overshadow the valuing both of faithful followers and awesome agency – which
the peacebuilding strand of interfaith dialogue tries to hold in the balance.
6.4 Implications
The three themes noted above all point to a side-lining of some of the values pre-
sent most clearly in theological exchange as a likely outcome of efforts to mon-
itor and evaluate interreligious dialogue and peacebuilding.What is most likely
to happen is reinforcing an individualized subject (and object), a push towards
economic modes of reading interactions between people in conflict settings, and
a diminishing appreciation of the awesome in interfaith and religious peace-
building encounters. The already difficult balancing of earthy ends, faithful fol-
lowers and awesome agency, which we see in religious peacebuilding and the
three modes of interfaith dialogue, give way to the dominance of earthy ends.
The implication is that if the values that currently permeate evaluation discourse
pervade religious peacebuilding it will lose its uniqueness. To answer the ques-
tions that I posed at the start of this chapter, on whether the call for certain types
of accountability in peacebuilding evaluation reinforces the problem of instru-
mentalising religion, the answer seems to be yes, certain types of values in
this call for accountability do instrumentalise religion. At stake, then, is no
less than the soul of interfaith dialogue and religious peacebuilding.
Can anything be done to keep balancing awesome agency with faithful fol-
lowers and earthy ends? Perhaps, but I am not confident.What it will take is for
the criteria for evaluation to be only partially consequentialist. This part is not
too challenging.We can utilize the values of faith traditions themselves, as sug-
 Indeed, Max Weber’s analysis of the connections between Protestantism and the rise of cap-
italism reinforce this point in The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930).
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gested by Woodrow and colleagues, if they are identified in a careful process of
eliciting those values prior to planning an intervention, and in a way that does
not emphasize consequentialist views. For example, did people come to care
more for one another in the project, or did people enact their religious values
in each engagement with “the other.” We can choose to not use the OECD-
DAC criteria, or use them only very selectively.We can value personal transforma-
tion as a good in and of itself, as Steele and Wilson-Grau note.We can value re-
ligious community participation and collective transformation as well to move
away from hyper-individuality. For example, one creative effort to include dis-
cernment in evaluating a faith-based project in Canada adapted participatory ac-
tion research methods for its approach as a way to open-up the process to com-
munity participation (Janzen and Wiebe, 2011).
However, we also need to value awesome agency on its own terms. Not just
belief in awesome agency, but value that which is beyond belief: awesome agen-
cy that affects change on its own time and terms, beyond human understanding.
It is this ontologically unique piece of interfaith dialogue, and other types of re-
ligious peacebuilding, that remains firmly outside of evaluation criteria and
therefore lost in evaluation. While there is value in evaluation for many of the
activities in and elements of the theory of change in interfaith dialogue and
peacebuilding, evaluation is not an absolute good. Recognizing the things not
evaluated but valued will be equally necessary if interreligious peacebuilding
is to keep its soul.
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When My Peace Is Not Your Peace
Role of Culture and Religion in What Counts for Peace
1 Introduction
Evaluation connotes finding out the absolute or relative added value or contribu-
tion that an intervention brings to a given situation. Money, time, a target pop-
ulation, defined geographical areas, and a set of activities set the boundaries of
measurement of the value of the change or contributions of the intervention out-
comes. Of these boundary parameters, money is the major determinant of what
project interventions can be carried out, where, when, how, by whom, with
whom, and for how long. Hence, donors demand evidence to justify their invest-
ment of resources, and implementers focus on providing the evidence that dem-
onstrates the quality and value of the investments (Scharbatke-Church 2011). In
sum, the primary purpose of an evaluation is accountability; learning through
knowledge generation from demonstrable proofs of practice and of theories of
change comes second. In theory, “…accountability relationship classically
flows upwards to the donor but can also be ‘downwards’ to programme partic-
ipants or ‘horizontal’ to partners” (Scharbatke-Church 2011, 472). In practice, the
direction of flow of accountability tends to be upwards only; it is donor-aimed
and the responsibility for its delivery is implementing partner driven; seldom
are project participants the audience of accountability reporting.
Learning outcomes are measured in two dimensions. Project interventions
must result in “practical learning for improving theoretical learning to add to
knowledge [and] accountability learning in order to prove the merit of one’s ef-
fort” (Guijt 2008, 105). That proof of merit must be evidenced through the mea-
sures of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness, especially in respect to cost and
in comparison with the stated objective. Intervention outcomes and impacts, as
well as sustainability are the other measures of success or failure. At the bottom
line, quality and value are what count (Scharbatke-Church 2011). Hence, evalu-
ations have become, in effect, the measure of the value of what change a given
sum of money can make to an identified problem.
The search for valuable change presumes the existence of verifiable stand-
ards and measures of what was against what is or should be. By extension,
those measures must fit into a dualistic worldview in which change has either
happened or not happened; there are no in-betweens. This need for clear proofs
OpenAccess. © 2021 Hippolyt Pul, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
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requires that the supporting evidence must be quantifiable or at least objectively
verifiable. Attribution or at least demonstration of contribution is important, as
the observed changes must be traceable to the interventions initiated. Since the
lifespan of peacebuilding projects are short (hardly beyond 3 years), interven-
tions that prioritize the delivery of tangible products and countable outcomes
are favoured over those that aim at building relevant peace infrastructure
(Hopp-Nishanka 2012) and processes. This is “because it is easier to measure
the result as product than the outcomes as process” (Lederach 1997, 133).
This approach to evaluation raises a number of questions that peacebuild-
ing¹ evaluation and religious peacebuilding² evaluation in particular must con-
front – the fundamental social science question of validity: “Am I measuring
what I think I am measuring” (Baker 1999, 109). In the context of peacebuilding,
however, the challenge goes beyond the ability of the evaluator or the clients to
answer that fundamental question satisfactorily, since defining peacebuilding is
a challenge arising from the very broad and different dimensions that different
actors choose to apply (Scharbatke-Church 2011). “What is religious peacebuild-
ing?” is even more complex. Hence, in defining what is to be measured, a second
level of challenge for peacebuilders is the ownership question – whose peace are
we evaluating? This further leads to the questions: Whose definitions are being
used to describe the peace? Is there consensus between donors, and/or imple-
menters on whose peace are the interventions seeking to secure and what con-
stitutes peace? A third layer of questions look at specifics of the evaluation:
what are the definitions of quality and value in the evaluation? Does, what con-
stitutes value and quality to donors, necessarily have the same equivalency for
project participants? In other words, are there common grounds on what desir-
able change is and how that change is measured?
Additionally, the demands of objectivity in the establishment of the before
and after conditions as proof of success or otherwise of the theory and practice
of the intervention warrant that the planning, implementation, monitoring, and
 Peacebuilding aims to create conditions for lasting peace and the prevention of future con-
flicts through the positive transformation of the cultures, structures, systems, and other root
causes that generate and sustain the conflicts into ones that promote peaceful coexistence
among feuding groups.
 Religious peacebuilding draws its inspiration and motivation from the beliefs, values, practi-
ces, and rituals derived from the scriptures of one or more faith traditions; uses the institutional
platforms, networks, and resources; or leverages the moral voice and authority of religious ac-
tors (including the clergy and lay persons and organizations working in the name of the faith) to
facilitate the creation of the conditions for peace and the prevention of violent conflicts in div-
ided societies.
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evaluation of the interventions, including social engineering ones such as peace-
building, adopt models and language of the military-scientific worldviews of in-
tervention design and implementation. Accordingly, assessments, context analy-
ses, and problem identification lead to clearly stated strategic objectives,
intervention strategies, targets, benchmarks, indicators, outcomes, and impacts.
In other words, “Projects are seen as discrete, concrete, and measurable units of
activity bounded by parameters such as time and completion of tasks” (Lederach
1997, 130). These are to be achieved through precise military or surgical-like op-
erations that pinpoint and remove problems with carefully planned interven-
tions.
With increasing donor pressure for evidence that justifies investments, dem-
onstrating high feasibility of value for money requires that indicators must be
predetermined in very precise ways to secure access to the funding. Because
the outcomes must be tangible, visible, measurable, or at least objectively veri-
fiable, carefully crafted theories of change (Weiss 1995), logical frameworks,
planning matrices, and intervention metrics establish and demonstrate the
chain of causality between means and ends, in order to reassure donors their
money will be well spent.. Prior statement of assumptions helps to narrow the
scope of uncertainties and to eliminate all conditions that suggest the infeasibil-
ity of the project. The aim is to ensure near perfect conditions that would deliver
planned results. In a self-fulfilling way, success is guaranteed through tight con-
trol of the scope of error and determinants of feasibility.
While some relief and development interventions, as in health, education,
agriculture, and microeconomic projects, may lend themselves easily to such lin-
ear logic and rationalistic approaches to planning and evaluation, peacebuilding
does not so easily fit this quasi-experimental approach to intervention planning
and management (White and Sabarwal 2014). The focus on predetermining inter-
vention outcomes with time-bound indicators runs counter to the process orien-
tation of peacebuilding that emphasizes the creation of spaces of dialogue, heal-
ing, and the rebuilding of relationships (Lederach 1997; Ashworth 2014). To do
otherwise is to sidestep the use of “traditional peacebuilding tools [that create]
a safe place for telling and acknowledging the truth and [drawing] on local proc-
esses for reconciliation” (Ashworth 2014, 239). This turns peacebuilding into an-
other quick-fix intervention that leaves no space for the slow and longer-term
healing and reconciliation processes that religious peacebuilding in particular
requires. Critically, the processes of bringing religious values and norms of ac-
ceptance, forgiveness, and reconciliation in alignment with the hurts of victims
do not only take time, they are also highly individualized, as some people reach
the point of forgiveness and reconciliation much earlier than others. Therefore, a
one-size, quick-fix approach that fits into a particular time frame and activity
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plan would not make peace happen on the scale that makes it evaluable in short
periods of time.
Scharbatke-Church, (2011) laments that “[…] peacebuilding evaluations are
generally not delivering accountability and learning in the manner in which
they should [because] the average evaluation is not grounded in the basics of
good evaluation practice [and] the core drivers of evaluation – accountability
and learning – are rarely held at the heart of the process” (460). In other
words, rather than focusing on “peacebuilding’s perceived ‘distinctiveness’”
(Scharbatke-Church 2011, 460), greater attention to the techniques of evaluation
would make peacebuilding as evaluable as any other social science, goes the ar-
gument. Incidentally, the adoption of a purely technocratic approach to ensuring
the evaluability of peacebuilding projects, and religious peacebuilding interven-
tions in particular to meet the needs for accountability and learning is where the
sub discipline meets its nemeses. Unlike other social interventions that can pro-
duce externally observable outcomes, peace or the absence of it is in a large part
intrinsic, experiential, and subjective; peace is not what we see; it is what we ex-
perience and believe to be true. However, the conventional approaches look at
evaluation from the perspective of the “outsider” rather than the insider
whose lives have been affected by the ‘not peaceful’ situations in which they
are trapped or from which they have recently transited.
The outsider perspective risks equating the presence of presumptive ena-
blers of peace such as the rule of law, freedom of speech, and even economic
opportunities as measures of peace, regardless of the reality since their presence
does not translate into equitable access to services, freedom from unjust and dis-
criminatory practices, or the elimination of ineffective or unresponsive institu-
tional performances that create more structural violence on segments of the pop-
ulation than meets the eye. The existence of these enablers does not mean they
work to advance peace. As a respondent in an interview in Liberia observed, the
liberation of the airwaves in Liberia after the civil war expanded the opportuni-
ties for freedoms of speech such that “[…] now people are no longer afraid to
speak up their minds. But when you speak who listens? So, people speak, but
no one listens. People come and make speeches, very good speeches, but
there is no implementation” (Pul 2016, 28). In other words, the ability to
speak freely does not lead to genuine communication and dialogue that promote
introspection, truth-telling, repentance, forgiveness, reconciliation and peace.
Similarly, a judiciary that is perceived to put justice on sale (Allafrica.com
2019; Daily Observer 2019; LICHRD 2014) does not represent the rule of law; nei-
ther does it ease the pain of victims of crimes of war, rape, and other forms of
injustice for those who cannot afford the price of the justice system (Pul 2016).
In such instances, invisible, intangible, and unexpressed but deeply felt suffer-
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ing of the oppressed provide no indicators of peace or the absence of it. Similar-
ly, the role of religion as the container that holds and manages the diffusion of
the hurts may not be visible either.
Ignoring this deeply personal and experiential view of peace risks turning it
into an external entity that can be objectively assessed outside the self. The as-
sessor and the assessed are unconnected in their experiences of what happened,
how life was and is being lived. The assessed responds to questions on what has
changed, but do the assessors’ noted outcomes of reported changes, usually in
knowledge, perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, and practices connote longer
term, internalized changes that “disarm the hearts” (Pul 2017, 15) of those affect-
ed by the incidents of war and violence? As Twose and Mahoney (2015) found in
their study of reconciliation in Liberia, while individualized responses of study
participants give off a certain impression on the state of peace:
When all responses were considered together, the dichotomy between claims of individual
reconciliation and perceptions of societal reconciliation was striking. The sharp difference
forces one to wonder whether, when stating their personal views, people simply give the
socially desirable, “correct” answer, while reflecting on the country at large may have en-
abled them to respond more honestly. As such, the number of people who claim to be rec-
onciled and to have moved on from the past should be interpreted with some skepticism
(Twose and Mahoney 2015, 103).
2 Disentangling Labels, Religiousness of
Conflicts
If the literature on peacebuilding evaluation is replete with such kaleidoscopic
accounts of the challenges of measuring change, it is because the evaluation ef-
forts ignore the inherently distinct characteristics of peacebuilding in general
and religious peacebuilding in particular that do not lend themselves to the con-
ventional, decontextualized, and objectivized criteria of evaluation. In most in-
digenous religious worldviews in Africa in particular, the resolution of conflicts
is grounded in religious beliefs, values, symbols, and practices that provide
meanings and directions rooted in perceptions of the transcendental nature of
relationships between the living, the dead, and the unborn; humans and nature,
especially mother earth; and the eternal and the temporal. These factors govern
how people choose to deal with conflicts. Conventional evaluation efforts also
ignore the fact that the adoption of a purely technocratic approach to evaluating
religious peacebuilding in particular throw up a number of challenges. Of the
lot, four major ones, related to the need to disentangle labels and confront the
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religiousness of conflicts; the fluidity of religious identities in conflicts; the sym-
bolic and substantive nature and role of religion in peacebuilding; and the basic
need to agree on what to measure, given the differing meaning of peace. These
are discussed in this chapter.
Intervention designs set the boundaries for evaluations. In the field of peace-
building, however, such boundaries are not only porous; they are also fluid. In-
deed, there are no objective standards by which such analyses are conducted.
Contexts change rapidly and actors can lithely switch roles between victims
and perpetrators of violence. Besides, identity conflicts such as ones in which
religion is involved, are socially constructed with interpretative boundaries
that defy simple characterization. Preliminary questions such as how the conflict
became defined as a religious one or a conflict that merits a religious approach
to its intervention designs must be asked and answered. This calls into question
who defined the conflict as religious? What in the conflict makes it a religious
one? To what extent would the ordinary people trapped in the conflict consider
it a religious one? Do they believe that the people championing the conflict are
acting in defence of their faith or they are merely instrumentalizing religion as a
tool for mobilizing conflict actors and resources? In other words, a good religious
peacebuilding evaluation cannot sidestep asking the questions about how the
conflict got labelled as a religious conflict? Who decided on the labelling?
Does the religious label given to a conflict necessarily reflect how those involved
see and relate to the conflict? In sum, the first challenge in evaluating religious
peacebuilding is to establish how religious the conflict is and the peacebuilding
process thereof.
On the intervention side, who determines what constitutes “religious” in the
peacebuilding effort. Is the effort a religious one because of the issues at stake
e.g. contentions over religious beliefs, values, and practices; the actors involved
i.e. individuals and institutions clothed with religious functions who champion
the peacebuilding effort; the objective of the conflict, e.g. contests over sacred
spaces including fights over ownership of, access to, or inclusion in common sa-
cred spaces of worship and veneration; or because of the instrumentalization of
religion for political and economic ends, as when political and economic leaders
use religious sentiments, sympbos, and affiliations as the leverage for mobilizing
fighters and/or peacemakers?
Conflicts in Africa have suffered from labels that misdirect peacebuilding in-
terventions and evaluations. The 2013 spikes in Central African Republic’s (CAR)
protracted political conflict gained notoriety as a religious conflict that pitched
Muslims against Christians. This labelling became entrenched despite the pre-
vailing evidence that “There is no long history of religious hatred in this country.
It exploded out of nowhere after Muslim mercenaries from Chad and Sudan
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joined the Seleka alliance that swept to power” (Wood 2013). Before that, “The
Christian majority and Muslim minority had always lived in harmony until
March 2013 when Seleka leader Michel Djotodia seized power” (Laeila and Dia
2013, 2). Indeed, at the height of the conflict many Muslims and Christians
saved their neighbours of the opposite religion by alerting them on planned ad-
vance of armed groups (BBC News, 4 November 2013) or offered them protection
from such attacks (Pul 2017; Laeila and Dia 2013). This labelling also ignored the
fact that the existence of elements of local fighters, the Seleka and Anti-Balaka,
predated the onset of the 2013 conflict were either instrumentalized or pressed
into fighting under a religious banner (BBC 2013; Harding 2013; Pul 2017). This
labelling further ignored the deeper historical, political, and economic discon-
tent regarding issues of belongingness and citizenship; political and economic
exclusion of geo-ethnic areas; intergenerational herder-farmer conflicts that
have intensified, thanks to climate change and unstable political environments
that have increased movement of cattle from Chad, Cameroun, South Sudan,
and other surrounding countries, which locals resented as invasions into the
lush pastures of CAR. Also masked in this religious labelling are the external po-
litical influences, some with deep colonial roots that created political instabili-
ties and periodic outbreak of violence since CAR’s independence, and all of
which happened without any religious motivations imputed. Similarly, no one
blamed the conflict on the state failure of CAR since independence that allowed
for the sprouting of ethno-regional armed groups struggling for social, political,
and economic inclusion.
In this labelling, the western press ignored the vehement protests of most
Central Africans, led by religious leaders of both the Christian and Muslim
sides (Reese 2014); as well as the warnings of discerning diplomats that rejected
the religious label given to the conflict (Wood 2013). Ordinary Central Africans
point out that calling their conflict a religious one is a misnomer that hides
the real political and economic motivations around which the fighting gangs
are mobilized. They point to the fact that among the so-called Christian front
Anti-Balaka forces, there are Muslims, just as there are Christians in the fighting
forces of the Seleka. Neither of them has claimed doctrinal allegiance to Chris-
tianity or Islam, and both Christians and Muslims were victims of their atrocities.
In the eyes of Central Africans’ therefore, the conflict that is described as a reli-
gious conflict is not theirs. In the words of a respondent in an evaluation field
study in CAR:
Before the conflict there was no problem between Christians and Muslims or the different
ethnic groups. However, politicians introduced the conflict. Before Seleka came, there was
no problem. When they came, they brought bad governance: they stole from Christians.
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Anti-Balaka did the same thing, stealing from Muslims mainly. Therefore, the conflict quali-
fied as a religious one, but it is not; it has nothing to do with religion (Pul 2017).
The CAR experience parallels the Nigerian context where the perceptual split of
the country into “the Muslim North and the Christian South” is grossly mislead-
ing to the point of inaccuracy, convenient though it may be for the journalist”
(Onaiyekan 2012, 3). It is an aberration that has, nonetheless, perpetuated “the
unfortunate tendency to overlook the very important fact that in the normal
lives of our people, there is a commendable measure of peaceful and harmo-
nious living together across religious lines” (Onaiyekan 2012, 4). This misnomer
also masks the reality that it is “The failure of the state [that] gave rise to terrorist
groups in all regions of the country” (Niworu 2013, 245); a development which is
not “[…]unconnected with the search for political power, a sure avenue to eco-
nomic power and influence in the society” (Niworu 2013, 246) by groups seeking
a foothold in a state that makes little room for them.
Critically, the Nigerian example challenges peacebuilding evaluators to iso-
late the transposition of default religious characterization over ethno-regional,
political, economic and cultural grievances that underwrite the conflicts. As is
the case in other colonies, British colonial policy in Nigeria reserved and actively
supported the spread of specific brands of religious creeds in different parts of
the country (Brukum 1997; Bening 1990). Therefore, different geopolitical regions
took on imposed ethno-religious characters – a predominantly Muslim north and
a predominantly Christian south. It is perhaps pertinent to note, also, that Su-
dan’s pre-2005 civil wars were invariably characterized in the same terms as Ni-
geria’s – the Muslim north against the Christian south. And yet fighting in Sudan
and South Sudan has not stopped after the separation of the two. With a slight
twist, the same quick-fix religious labelling occurred in northern Ghana’s 1994
ethnic conflict, famously referred to as the Guinea Fowl War. Although Assefa
(2001) acknowledged that “the conflict was not about religion per se” (184) he
nonetheless found justification to argue that “[…] religion also played a role in
reinforcing the fault lines in the conflict [since] the leadership of the acephalous
groups is predominantly Christian […] while the chiefly groups are primarily
Muslim” (167). Given the imposed nature of these religions, should the fight of
a group for socio-political and economic inclusion in the state gain an automatic
religious tag because their fighters are predominantly drawn from one religious
group or because they use their religious values to inspire and justify their cause
of war? Be it as it may, the danger inherent in the categorization of conflicts as
religious ones on the basis of ethno-regional dominance of exogenous creeds
may indeed mask the deeper and more destructive non-religious factors that
fuel and sustain the conflicts.
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3 Fluidity of Religious Identities in Conflicts
The tendency to read religion into geo-ethnic conflicts when that is not the case,
runs against the reality that the exogenous religions, Christianity and Islam, in-
troduced by trade and missionary enterprises never seeped deep enough into the
psyche and cultural set up of ethnic groups in Africa to make them fight in de-
fence of the exogenous faiths. This is because in many parts of the continent,
“The Africans often had a rather flexible approach to Christianity” (Rothermund
2006, 127) and Islam because “[…] Islam like Christianity could not replace tradi-
tional African religion” (Brukum 1997, 14). So pervasive is the lack of depth in the
roots of these exogenous faiths in the traditions across Africa that “[…]some an-
thropologists question whether imported religions – Christianity and Islam –
have really affected African ancestral beliefs or given Africans different ways
of understanding the contemporary societies in which they live (Etounga-Man-
guelle 2000, 67).
This notwithstanding, the propensity to see the religious configuration of Af-
rica only in the Christian-Muslim paradigm leads to a dualistic categorization of
its participants in conflicts – fighters and victims alike – as belonging to one or
the other religious categories; they can only be Muslims, Christians, occasionally
Hindus, Buddhist, or Animists, but not hybrid believers. Once placed in this re-
ligious straitjacket, they cannot be one and the other at the same time; they must
be either one or the other. In this dualistic worldview, religion and culture are
viewed as asynchronous or even mutually immiscible realities in which a person
has to shed one identity in order to embrace the other. This goes contrary to the
experiences of those whose peace donor-sponsored interventions seek to salvage
and protect, as their religious reality is different. As a respondent in a recent
evaluation fieldwork in CAR explained in respect of religious belongingness
and participation in peacebuilding efforts:
The only religious leaders who did not participate are the animists, but that can be ex-
plained – the animists are not many. The fact is that they are mixed into or subsumed
among the Christians and Muslims. The problem is that people are socially compelled to
belong to either Christianity or Islam because of burial rites when they die. However, be-
longing to either of these is actually a practice of mixed beliefs, as people comingle
their acquired and declared faiths with their ancestral ones (Pul 2017, 32).
In such contexts, membership of a religious category does not stem from what
you believe in; it is what you were born into. In practice, religious identity is
fluid, as membership of multiple religious categories or cyclical migration across
religious lines is often a norm, not an exception. This is because religion, in
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much of Africa is a functional tool and the practice of poly-route monotheism
(Pul 2016) is the order, not the exception. In other words, although one may be-
lieve in the existence of one God in accordance with a professed creed, one also
holds that there are many routes to the same God. Hence, when a practicing fet-
ish priest walks into a Catholic Church in Ghana and takes the microphone to
ask “[…] worshippers to join him in thanking God for his mercies towards
him” (The Chronicle Newspaper 2013, 1) few are surprised or scandalized,
since the practice of being “Christian during the day and voodoo at night” (Fih-
lani 2017, 2), as is the case in Benin, is not uncommon a practice. Similarly, in
Liberia being a Christian or a Muslim and participation in the rituals and cere-
monies of the indigenous religious-cultural Poro and Sande Secret societies
are not deemed incompatible. In the same way, it is not seen as apostasy for
Christians or Muslims to seal a peace agreement with the performance of tradi-
tional religious rituals, as in the burying of the okro stick for some ethnic groups
in northern Ghana, which entails ritual sacrificing of animals or the chewing of
the cola to bond and bind the parties (Issifu 2017; Mohammed 2014). In one such
instance, the Christian church that sponsored the peace process saw no wrong in
providing financial support to the performance of the rituals because it is the
only way to make the commitment to peace hold. In the same way, when Chris-
tian and Muslim fighters go to battle strapped with amulets and other forms of
spiritual protection against bullets, they received from the fetish priests, it is not
a denial of the God they worship on Sundays or Fridays. It is a seamless contin-
uation of what they believe and practice.
In such fluid religious environments, a dyadic categorization of people as
members of one religion or the other is not only misleading, such categorical as-
signment of issues and actors may not reflect the realities of those whose peace
we seek to secure or evaluate. Indeed, nailing down the religious identities of
individuals or groups can be all but simple. Even names often belie the religious
identities of actors in conflicts and peacebuilding. In CAR, people frequently
have Muslim names, but are Christians, and vice versa. For instance Michel Djo-
todjia, whom the Seleka propelled into power as interim President in 2013, Syl-
vain Bordas and Sylvain Adamu Ndale, both Seleka rebel commanders, are all
Muslims bearing Christian names while Mamadou Nalie is a Christian with a
Muslim name (Pul 2017). In field interviews, respondents never missed a chance
to point out that among the Selekas, there were Christians, and among the Anti-
Balakas, there were Muslims as well. No census of membership of either group
exists to establish the proportionality of cross-religious membership of the
armed groups. Nonetheless, the evidence from fieldwork, however small, cau-
tions against the categorical characterization of conflicts as religious only by rea-
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son of the perceived dominance of one religious group over the other in the com-
position of the groups at war.
4 Ensuring Relevance and Validity
Indiscriminate acceptance of religious labels of conflicts sets the traps for failing
the validity test in the evaluation design, providing yet another example of how
evaluations often fail “to create opportunities to see the conflict through the eyes
of that community and [to identify] the community’s own resources for address-
ing or transforming conflict, as well as for healing trauma and reconstituting re-
lationship” (Ashworth 2014, 239). For instance, the labelling of the CAR conflict
did not only “misrepresent what began as ethnic and political violence” (Wood
2014, 2); it misdirected peacebuilding agencies to focus on a conflict that did not
exist, in the eyes of the victims of the violence. The result is that the theories of
change and intervention strategies that were elaborated based on these assump-
tions became irrelevant to the intervention needs of the communities that were
targeted. It took the midterm evaluation of Mercy Corps’ two-year USAID spon-
sored ASPIRE project to realize the target population did not accept the religious
labelling of their conflict. The implementing partner had to change course to
focus its interventions “on economic development through the micro project
and to use joint Christian-Muslim groups for the enterprises [because] “[…].
the conflict is no longer seen as a Muslim-Christian conflict (Pul 2017). In
sum, the design and evaluation of peacebuilding interventions have a task to
go past the simplistic religious labels foisted on conflicts. Beyond isolating
how religion is a cause of conflict, evaluators must also confront the challenges
of deconstructing religion as a solution for peace.
5 Nature and Role of Religion in Peacebuilding
The challenge lies in isolating what constitutes a religious action for peace ver-
sus actions derived from cultural, secular, or other values and belief systems that
are not necessarily derived from an institutionalized religious creed. In the cur-
rent literature, the role of religion as represented by systems of beliefs, symbols,
and values, is seen in multiple dualistic terms. It is either a factor of conflict or
an instrument in peacebuilding; religious actors are either promoters or inhibi-
tors of peace; they cannot be one and the same. This dualistic way of viewing
actors ignores the reality that to put groups in conflict situations in identity
silos amounts to denying the reality that is their lived experiences. In seeing re-
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ligious actors in conflict and peacebuilding as neither nor, donors, implement-
ers, and evaluators fail to see the duality and fluidity of the roles that religious
actors play in conflicts or in peacebuilding.
Additionally, most western theories of the causes and resolution of conflicts
take individualized, adversarial, and competitive perspectives (Abu-Nimer 1996;
2003; Avruch 1998). They emphasize the rights of the individual over the inter-
ests of the community; retribution over restoration; justice over mercy, compas-
sion, and forgiveness. Accordingly, they stand diametrically opposed to the col-
lectivized and collaborative approaches to resolving conflicts in other non-
western societies where individual interests may even be submerged in the inter-
est of the collective good.
Western conflict resolution systems through arbitration, the courts, media-
tion, and negotiation emphasize establishing who is right versus who is
wrong; retribution over restoration; and punishment of the wrongdoer and rep-
aration to the victims over forgiveness. On the contrary, an important “[…] distin-
guishing African characteristic [of conflict resolution] is the positive-sum inte-
grative thrust of the practices [with a very strong] emphasis on recuperation
and reinsertion of the errant member back into its place in society [to promote]
restoration of the harmony and integrity of the community” (Zartman 2000, 220).
Even in cases of arbitration or adjudication, the chiefs or council of elders that
preside over the processes and have the power “[…] to make binding judgments
[for the feuding parties always aim to] “[…] reintegrate the offender in the com-
munity and its norms” (Zartman 2000, 222). In this emphasis on restoration
rather than retribution, members of the larger society take responsibility for
any commissions or omissions that may have contributed to the “defection”
(Zartman 2000, 221) or errant behaviour of the member or group. This is because
in these cultures, conflicts are not about individuals or groups; it is a collectiv-
ized experience that radiates from the individual protagonists to the family, clan,
lineage, and to out-groups with which the parties may have affinal or conjugal
relationships (Wilson-Fall 2000). In such societies, socio-political and economic
organizations, culture, and religion are intertwined so much so that “The sacred
and spiritual [are] an indistinguishable part of a total way of life of social, polit-
ical, economic, and moral dimensions” (Dubois 2008, 1). Accordingly, in peace-
building, these “indigenous legal traditions, [which emphasize] mechanisms for
acknowledgement [of wrongs], truth telling, accountability, healing and repara-
tions, continue to assume a prominent role in the lives of African societies and
individuals” (Mekonnen 2010, 101)
Time is another important factor in religious peacebuilding. In cultures
where “it is often the traditional perspective that is used as a model to resolve
conflicts” (Wilson-Fall 2000, 50), such conflict resolution processes are founded
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on “a concern for long-term rather than short-term solutions” (Wilson-Fall 2000,
49). This is why “…peacebuilding faces the task of linking the long past with the
emerging present [ since peacebuilding] must simultaneously be long-term slow
and short term intensive” (Lederach 1997, 131). Unfortunately, most projectized
peacebuilding interventions have limited time and budgets for achieving peace
that resonates with what the target population counts as peace. Because of
their short-term, fast paced nature, external interventions may actually destabi-
lize internal and indigenous conflict resolution processes, allowing some or all
the parties to externalize their responsibilities for building peace. Rather than
working at it,as they look to “external actors to change the balance of power,
thereby undermining the mutual interests involved” (Deng 2000, 124) in the
search for authentic and durable solutions.
The interference of external actors usually sidestep the existence of cultural
and religious common ground that could have served as the nursery bed for
homegrown solutions to the conflicts. In the example of the protracted conflict
in the Dagbon Chieftancy disputes (Yendi Peace Center 2011; Agyekum 2002)and
the Sudan conflicts (Bereketeab 2015),, religion which was a binder within and
between the feuding groups had no place in the externalized mediatory efforts.
More than 90% of the people of Dagbon are Muslims. Many in community-level
peacebuilding workshops highlighted the need for intra-Dagbon dialogue lead-
ing to forgiveness and reconciliation, devoid of external interferences because
“a dialogue between the two gates is the only way out to the Dagbon crisis”
(NCCE ND, 4). They argued that “the government should be using the Dagbon
traditional methods of conflict resolution to tackle the dispute” (Conteh 2015,
1) instead of relying on external agents such as the Otumfuo Committee of Emi-
nent Chiefs to resolve the Dagbon crisis. This is because […] for healing and rec-
onciliation to occur, those who played any role in the death of the Ya-Naa and
other people should be identified and that their acceptance of responsibility
be used as the base for building reconciliation [because that is what will] enable
us get to the truth of what happened so that we can put the past behind us. (Boi-
Nai et al. 2011, 1).
Similarly, Christianity was a binder and rallying force for the South Sudanese
during the wars of independence with the north. Religious leaders and institu-
tions that played pivotal roles in maintaining the semblance of a unified front
of South Sudanese during the war were side-linedafter the attainment of inde-
pendence (Onger and Wilson 2014). They continued to cry out for peace but
were largely ignored in the game plans of the local war leaders and their interna-
tional supporters and mediators. As in the case of Dagbon, the shared beliefs
and values of religion have failed to create the common ground for dialogue, rec-
onciliation, and peace. In sum, religious identities are not fixed, neither are the
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values and the roles that individuals with a religious cloak may play in any given
conflict context. Hence a snapshot approach to evaluating religious peacebuild-
ing may miss the ever-changing nature and roles of issues and actors clothed
with religion in such conflict or peacebuilding processes.
6 Agreeing on What to Measure
Another challenge that interreligious peacebuilding evaluation has to deal with
is reconciling the meanings of peace. Appleby (2000) notes that the world’s re-
ligions do not have “a universal set of values or priorities in pursuing peace [in-
stead] religious traditions hold different worldviews and emphasize different
peace-related values” (141). The lack of consensus on how to pursue peace initia-
tives poses challenges for establishing commonly accepted and objectively veri-
fiable measures for evaluating peacebuilding in general, and interreligious
peacebuilding in particular (Anderson and Olson 2003; Royal Norwegian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs 2004). Hence, even when communities and donors agree
that there is a religious dimension to a conflict and its resolution, agreeing on
what change to look for and how to measure it remains a challenge for evalua-
tion purposes. A number of reasons account for this.
6.1 Differing Meanings of Peace
Peace is experiential and therefore subjective in its definition since what is con-
sidered peace is relative to one’s experience, not an observation of what has
gone before, is taking place now, or is anticipated for the future. It is not
some objectively verifiable phenomenon because those looking at a conflict sit-
uation from the outside have only snippets of the view of what has gone on be-
fore; they have not lived it. As a respondent in a research interview in Liberia put
it, “Looking at it from the outside and saying Liberia is peaceful is just not
enough. It is what people are feeling inside; what their perspective is; what
their problem is” (Pul 2016, 17). This personal and subjective definition of
peace means peace does not only have different meanings that are contextual-
ized; the experiential view of peace makes evaluating it more difficult, especially
from a religious peacebuilding perspective, where its definition is rooted in the
lived religious experiences, values, and beliefs of those who participated in or
survived the periods of violence. Peace is what they live with, not what another
can tell them they have; it comes from within, not without; it emanates from the
experience of interior peace first before radiating outward to the neighbour, the
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group, the community, the society. It is the product of the experiences of recon-
ciliation, forgiveness, penance, etc. In this, personal beliefs, values, and motiva-
tions are more the primary determinants of the experience and definition of
peace. Hence, from a religious peacebuilding perspective, the beliefs, values,
and doctrines of actors add other layers of how peace is defined, as their
views, voices, needs, and interests define its colour, tones, and contours.
For those affected by violence, regaining a sense of peace is a process, not
the products of events or short-run projects. On the contrary, evaluations are
snapshots, not movies. They capture an assessment of the situation at a given
point in time and with a given methodology. They do not provide the panoramic
view that captures fully the historical and ever evolving nature of the conflict
and the associated peacebuilding efforts; neither do they capture in full the ex-
periences of those who have lived through the conflict. Unlike other social sector
interventions that have relatively stable operating environments, the contexts of
peacebuilding can swing rapidly, widely, and in unexpected ways. For people
who have lived with these swings of the war environment for a long time, any
slight movement towards the state of life before the conflict is read as a return
towards peace, even if the external assessors disagree with them. This is because
those who have lived through violence have the view of the movie – movies in
which they are active participants, not distant spectators – while the outsiders
hold onto the snapshot perspective. A religious leader in the DRC captured
this perspective succinctly when he described the conflict situation in the coun-
try in October 2010 as follows: “If you look at the situation from the perspective
of a snapshot, you would say there is no progress. However, if you view it from
the perspective of a film, you will definitely see that there has been some prog-
ress towards peace” (Pul et al.2010, 29).
This perception of peace in relative terms requires that peacebuilding eval-
uation capture the various images, moods, and voices of the movie in a snapshot
without losing sight of the past scenes and the unknown ones of the future. Un-
like the elements of secular peacebuilding that have clearly defined objectives,
activities, timeframes, and concrete deliverables, those of religious peacebuild-
ing have indeterminate objectives, activities, timelines, or set deliverables. Ach-
ieving forgiveness, healing, and reconciliation do not happen at the sound of a
gavel; they are individualized processes that go with the pace, moods, and expe-
riences of those involved. The initiation of the process may be as important, if
not more important than the results; and the fact that victims and offenders
agree to talk may be more important than the outcomes of the talks – outcomes
that may never materialized.
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6.2 Differing Measures of relevance
The challenge to religious peacebuilding is the level of outcome tracking and
measurement. Evaluating peacebuilding in general is difficult enough because
of the challenges of developing “[…] concrete, tangible, and easily measurable
[…]” indicators. Hence, secular peacebuilders often settle for “more abstract
[…] approximators of the intangible changes” (USAID 2010, 7) rather than objec-
tively measurable indicators, in order to fulfil their obligations to demonstrate
results that account for the resources received from donors. On the contrary,
the preoccupation of religious peacebuilders is often not about seeing approxi-
mations of objectively verifiable evidence of change or the attribution of any
change to what they have done. They act out of “[…] a response of necessity
and a multiplicity of potential activities” (Lederach 2010, 31) in which their ob-
jective is to take care of the wounded and displaced, console the hurting, recon-
cile the estranged, rebuild relationships, and make peace happen. The aim is not
the achievement of some tangible, time-bound results; it is an effort to give those
most affected the possibility to “[…] feel as though they are persons again” (Le-
derach 2010, 41). Religious actors, in such instances, are on “[…] a journey to re-
store basic humanity [that] is needed and ordained by God” (Lederach 2010, 44).
In this journey religious peacebuilders do not see themselves as the ultimate
agents of peace or their efforts as time-bound interventions to deliver peace.
They see peacebuilding as an investment for eternity and a lifetime commitment.
Motivation is intrinsic, not extrinsic.Whereas secular peacebuilders are likely to
abandon the course once donor-funding dries up, religious peacebuilders will
engage in peacebuilding work in the way they know best and with whatever re-
sources they have. They may do less with fewer resources in less effective and
efficient ways, but they will do what they have to do all the same, with or with-
out external support. In that conception of duty, time is not finite, and the focus
is on rebuilding relationships – with neighbours and the higher creator; not in
signing peace agreements or achieving some tangible results. They do not see
themselves as the source of any change and so may not actively look out for,
much less design their interventions to lead to specific observable changes. As
such, they do what they do and can and leave the rest to God.
This is because the process of healing, repentance, and “forgiveness is some-
thing that comes from God” (Starken & Caritas Internationalis 1999, NP). As
such, the conflict actors and the facilitators of peacebuilding are both instru-
ments, not actors suis generis, in the processes that lead up to forgiveness and
reconciliation. They understand that “We do not forgive because we have to,
or should, or have no other choice. We forgive because we have been able to
come to see the world, even in its brokenness, from the perspective of God”
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(Starken & Caritas Internationalis 1999, NP). This is because in a God-led process,
“all reconciliation comes from God […]” (Caritas Internationalis 2002, 15) and the
steps towards its achievement put reconciliation before repentance and forgive-
ness, instead of the “repentance (followed by) forgiveness (followed by) reconci-
liation” (Starken & Caritas Internationalis 1999, NP).
To be sure, religious peacebuilders would also love to see the return of visi-
ble peace in the course of their work, but t achievement of this is not the reason
why they labour. Indeed, they will most likely not attribute whatever achieve-
ment there is to their work; it is seen as the work of God – work whose design,
execution, and results go beyond their human capacities. This self-effacing pre-
disposition poses challenges to conventional measures of attribution or contribu-
tion of project investments in evaluations. Since religious peacebuilders may not
have set out specific performance and outcome indicators for their work, any as-
sessment of the contribution of their work to peace will have to come through
outcome mapping processes rather than direct measures of progress and ach-
ievement. Evaluators must glean the contributions that religious peacebuilders
make to a conflict situation from their stories of what they did, how, and why,
rather than from indicator tables and carefully documented results.
6.3 Accountability: Whose Accountability and to Whom?
The transcendental view of religious peacebuilding evaluation adds a challenge
of determining the stakeholders and criteria for accountability. The grounding
question is whose accountability is the evaluation seeking and to whom is ac-
countability due? Accountability goes with ownership, or stewardship of the
ideas, processes, and resources destined for the implementation of the interven-
tions. Only those who hold positions and resources in trust for others have a duty
to account for their stewardship. Those in whose name the resources are ac-
quired and managed are seldom responsible for or recipients of accountability.
Hence, in peacebuilding evaluations, those most affected by the lack of peace
are seldom involved in accountability reporting except when providing informa-
tion to questions they are asked. Beyond that, “it is not yet common for peace-
building agencies even to share the results of an evaluation with those who they
seek to aid” (Scharbatke-Church 2011, 465).
The reality, in most cases, is that this category of participants is not only
seen as a source of extractive information at the evaluation stage; they are
also largely viewed as end-users in the entire project conceptualization and im-
plementation processes. This is because donors and implementers of peacebuild-
ing interventions narrowly define the criteria and direction of accountability to
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ensure an upward flow only of responsibilities of accountability; a flow from
project implementers to donors (Campbell 2018). Seldom are those most affected
by the conflict viewed as persons to whom accountability is due, even though
both donor agencies and their implementing partners used their conditions
and names to secure and use the project resources.
The neglect to include end-users in the ownership of project interventions
and definition of accountability responsibilities from them and due them triggers
another level of challenge for determining accountability for inter-religious
peacebuilding. Unlike with secular organizations, the involvement of peacebuild-
ing individuals and institutions clothed with religious tag is often derived from
their perception of a vocation rather than a project as the motivation for engage-
ment. In other words, they don’t engage because resources have been made
available for engagement; they do so because they see a need, and they jump
into it, often with limited resources and expertise; but they do it, nonetheless.
Such religious peacebuilders have different levels of accountability than donors
and intervention implementers. For them, accountability is to a higher other
than project financiers. In their view, time is not a boundary setter for account-
ability and money is but a catalyst, not the raison d’ȇtre of their engagement in
peacebuilding. They will do whatever they can for peace because it is their call-
ing, not because it is a project with objectives that they have to achieve. The scale
on which they do it may be smaller; the speed slower, the range of activities
much more restrained and non-technical but they will do what they feel called
to do. For some in this category, they are accountable to none but the ultimate
master they serve. And since God has no measure for his achievements in
time and money, they see no need to provide any measures for their success ei-
ther. They don’t gauge their contribution to peace because theirs is but an insig-
nificant drop in the infinite plan of the creator. They tend to deprecate their roles
and contributions and so have no measures for them. For them, accountability
does not equate to the countable or verifiable; it is good enough to have done
what they did.
In Sudan church leaders played very active and central roles in the search for
peace during the wars of independence from 1983–2005, in the run up to the
elections in 2010, and in the referendum in 2011 that granted the south its inde-
pendence. They have continued to be active in the search for peace, since the
outbreak of the civil war in December 2013 between politico-ethnic groups in
what is now South Sudan. Despite their influential role, “Church leaders [have
not] consider[ed] themselves “peace-builders”. They considered themselves pas-
tors and shepherds, whose first obligation was to reflect Christ’s fidelity to the
Church through their own fidelity to the people” (Ashworth 2014, 241). As
heads of churches in South Sudan have noted, they are engaged in the search
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for peace because “As Shepherds, we experience the suffering of our people,
their pain is our pain, and it propels us to work towards peace” (SSCC 2017, 1).
The leadership of the Episcopal Conference in South Sudan would add that
they feel compelled to go “between the warring parties and […] stand in the
gap” of dialogue because they “have a spiritual, ethical and moral responsibility
to help our nation out of this endless political crisis” (ECSS 2017, 3). In parallel,
religious leaders engage in the public sphere even though “We are not politicians
and we do not want to give detailed political recommendations. Nevertheless, we
dare to speak to political leaders as Jesus instructed us” (SSCC 2017, 3). In other
words, their primary obligations are to the people, and they are accountable to
God, not to donors for their actions or inactions in the face of conflicts.
To the extent that project interventions and resources help them expand
their reach, increase their speed of intervention along that path to accountabil-
ity, and/or enhance their effectiveness in service delivery to their target popula-
tions, they are receptive and thankful. Beyond that, they would not see donor
funding and associated project interventions as the only means to that end.
They would continue do what they believe is a duty to do and in the best way
they can even if with little resources, less impact, and less visibility; it is a voca-
tion, not a job. A respondent in a field study in CAR echoed this with the view
that “The Inter-Religious Platform takes the lead in organizing intercommunity
dialogues because their leadership has a deeper and permanent connection
with the people. These religious leaders are largely members of the community
and will remain and work here long after the project funding ceases to exist” (Pul
2017, 26). Their engagement is timeless because religion “is an institution that
never disappears. It is an institution that will be there forever. People will con-
tinue to be believers; therefore, they will be a sustainable source of peacebuild-
ing” (Pul 2017, 35). They seek little rewards because “religious peacebuilders are
not discouraged by their modest achievements, but instead see their role as re-
sponsible to God to do what they can, rather than to be successful in material
terms.” (Funk Deckard 2012, 14). In short, they count nothing to be accountable;
they just do what they have to do. For them, accountability does not equate to
countable; it is about doing your best and leaving the rest to God.
7 Conclusion
Evaluations seek to isolate changes that project investments make to a problem
situation. Donor demands for verifiable changes lead implementing partners to
emphasize categorical diagnoses of the problems to produce metrics that are
measurable. In peacebuilding, the need for quick frameworks of analysis leads
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to the mislabelling and distortions of the conflict narratives, especially when re-
ligious tags are used. This masks the real issues and interests of the conflict lead-
ers and deflects the objectives of peacebuilding interventions and evaluations to
focus on issues that do not reflect the lived experiences of the people whose
peace the interventions seek to secure. The misdiagnosis of conflicts is exacer-
bated when religious identities from historical accidents are used to pigeonhole
the parties in conflict, without regards to their non-fixated and instrumentalist
approach to how they view and practice religion. It masks the reality that reli-
gious identity itself is very fluid in many contexts, allowing for spiritual and rit-
ual migrations across faith lines in the search for healing, reconciliation, and
peace.
In such contexts, the views of donors and implementers on what to measure
as indicators of peace is often fields apart from that of beneficiary communities.
Hence, what counts as peace for the insiders may be discounted in the metrics of
the outsider and vice versa. Additionally, the use of individualized and dyadic
frames for viewing the conflicts and the parties involved blurs the reality that
in non-western societies conflicts are seldom individual affairs or simply secular
versus religious. The secular and the sacred are always intertwined and in ways
that link the dead, the living, and the unborn of the feuding communities.
Hence, the search for peace is neither secular nor sacred; it is both, and resolu-
tions that do not pacify the dead and account for the unborn will not hold. For
local religious peacebuilders who understand this, time is not of the essence in
their efforts for peace. Accordingly, while access to donor resources is welcome
help, it does not set the targets, pace, or accountability standards for them. They
do not work to the dictates of donor timeframes and accountability is to a higher
order. For the conflict-affected, true measurement of their peace requires more
community-centred and open-ended methodologies that minimize cases where
participants give responses that please donors, implementers, and evaluators
while suppressing the simmering pains of conflicts in their hearts.
Evaluators of religious peacebuilding must be wary of reliance on conven-
tional approaches to evaluating religious peacebuilding that focus on using ver-
ifiable metrics or their approximations to track and report change. They must ap-
proach the task with open minds, recognizing that those who have lived through
conflict know best what to call peace. In other words, those who commission
evaluations and those who carry them out must be aware of their own cultural
frames of peace and how such frames may cloud their judgement of what con-
stitutes peace or its absence, when protected onto contexts dissimilar from
theirs. They must learn to bracket their own expectations and definitions of
peace. To arrive at this, theories of change of religious peacebuilding interven-
tions in particular must be derived from the expectations of peace as defined
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by those who have lived with and experienced the evolution or movie view of the
conflict and witnessed to the role of religion in its triggering, sustenance, or res-
olution. This calls for theories of change to be grounded in the expectations and
measures of peace that the affected populations define, instead of some generic,
abstracted metrics. The use of grounded theory approaches, which are akin to
outcome harvesting methods of evaluations, in which those who commission
or carry out the evaluation do not begin with a theory of change and try to
prove its validity or otherwise, is recommended. This is because evaluating reli-
gious peacebuilding will be better served if evaluators begin with an exploratory
approach and allow the theory of change and associated indicators to emerge
from the data so mined. A good baseline study done using this approach can
provide a participants’ list of grounded indicators that better measure what
changes in their contexts are meaningful measures of peace. It is the only way
to tease out from the participants, what role religion has played in their defini-
tions of what is peace and their engagements towards achieving and sustaining
it.
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Khaled Ehsan
Exploring Power Dynamics of Religious
Leaders
The Need for Objectivity
“The fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is
the fundamental concept in physics” – Bertrand Russell (1938, 10)
1 Introduction
While power is the result of action, it is also, in turn, a condition for the possi-
bility of action. Action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public
part of the world common to us all but is the one activity which constitutes it.
Acting together in concert is constitutive of the public, political realm in
which action itself takes place. Insofar as one’s identity as an actor is only
fully realized in and through action in the public, political realm, and the public
political realm is constituted by power, it makes sense to see power as a condi-
tion for the possibility of (the full achievement of) agency. It is, therefore, impor-
tant to recognize that power dynamics set the tone at almost every level of
human interaction. They influence individual actions, shape an organization’s
approach to engaging its members, and even guide the ways in which a govern-
ment treats its citizens, responds to dissent, and enforces reforms. We all inter-
nalize and externalize power relationships in unique ways; yet our individual
differences are often perceived through shared assumptions about power passed
down to us by the histories of our own societies and individual experiences.
Foucault wrote that power “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touch-
es their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses,
learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault 1980, 30). The importance of
power, according to him, was its substantive effects on individual and collective
behaviour or practices in general. Thus, although power emerges out of individ-
uals acting together, it also makes possible such collective action by providing
the space within which such actions can be carried out. And, insofar as power
is constitutive of public space, it also serves as a precondition for agency,
since one’s identity as a religious actor, for instance, can only be fully achieved
through action in public.
When evaluators use value claims based on religious symbols or texts as
part of criteria for assessing the role of religious leaders in peacebuilding,
OpenAccess. © 2021 Khaled Ehsan, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
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they have to make certain assumptions.¹ This inevitably involves – to a consid-
erable degree – subjective judgements by the evaluators. Although the potential
value-ladenness of such criteria has been extensively problematized in evalua-
tion literature, it has not so far led to a systematic strategy for analysing this
value-ladenness with reference to the underlying role of power. In a similar
vein, one could try to fully apply – even if that were possible in a particular con-
flict situation – some of the ‘suggested’ and hard to apply OECD/DAC Evaluation
Criteria (OECD ND)as an alternative to the five standard criteria (i.e. Linkages,
Coverage, Consistency with peacebuilding values, and Coherence). While these
might prove useful at some level in helping to analyse the conflict and peace en-
vironment and specifying the peacebuilding ‘needs’, they do not allow us to
readily appreciate either the power differentials within the peacebuilding re-
gime, or the power differentials among religious leaders.² I try here to explore
this issue – how to effectively link objective evaluation measures to the relevance
of power dynamics among religious leaders using social anthropological and so-
ciological frameworks, where the concept of ‘self ’ or ‘self-identity’ as well as no-
tions of the ‘other’ are part of social construction that form the basis for shared
assumptions about reality whereby people rationalise their experience by creat-
ing models of the society they belong to and share and reify these models pri-
marily through language and other symbols.³ I argue that for religious leaders
to be agents of social and political change towards peace and coexistence, a rec-
onceptualization of power and power dynamics and a critical discussion about
the consequences and limitations of instrumentalist approaches in evaluative
work are needed. Based on the foregoing analysis I offer some suggestions on
how to incorporate a conceptualization of power and power dynamics in evalu-
ation and how it may be used to help inform programme design or further stud-
ies.
2 How Values, Principles and Assumptions
Shape Objectivity
Before embarking on the power dynamics among religious leaders, there is a
need to clarify what we actually mean by values, principles and assumptions
in so far as they relate to objectivity in general and evaluation criteria in partic-
 See, for instance, the concepts of “Merit” and “Worth” in Steele and Wilson-Grau (2016).
 For example see Ofir (2017)
 For example see Berger and Luckmann (1966).
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ular – especially what is sometimes referred to as ‘consequentialist’ OECD DAC
evaluation criteria – or mainstream evaluation practice. This is relevant because
the terms values, principles, and assumptions are sometimes used as if they all
mean the same thing – the underlying truths on which we base our dealings with
the world. In fact, although they are all “truths” to some extent, they are differ-
ent in meaning and substance. Understanding the difference can help us sort out
when we’re operating on facts or well-examined experience (objective criteria),
when we’re applying moral or ethical rules or judgments and/or symbolic values
(mainly subjective or supernatural criteria), and when we’re responding to emo-
tion or bias or unexamined “knowledge” that may or may not be accurate.
Values are our guidelines for living and behaviour. Each of us has a set of
deeply held beliefs about how the world is or should be. For some people,
that set of beliefs is largely dictated by a religion, a culture, a peer group, or
the society at large. For others, it has been arrived at through careful thought
and reflection on experience and is unique. For most of us, it is probably a com-
bination of the two. Values often concern the core issues of our lives: personal
relationships, morality, gender and social roles, race, social class, status and
the organization of society, to name just a few.
Principles, on the other hand, are the fundamental scientific, logical, or
moral/ethical “truths,” arising from experience, knowledge, and (often) values,
on which we base our actions and thinking. They are the underpinning of our
understanding of the truths that shape both our reasons for taking action on
something, and the action itself. Scientific and logical principles are derived
from experience and experiment, from knowledge (which itself comes from ex-
perience and experiment on the part of someone else), from logical analysis,
and/or from theory.⁴
Moral and ethical principles are where values come in. These principles
grow out of deeply held beliefs and values and are often the principles upon
which peacebuilding and/or humanitarian work is founded. Devotion to demo-
cratic process, to equity and fair distribution of resources, to a reasonable quality
of life for everyone, to the sacredness of life, to the obligation of people to help
one another – may be in adherence to injunctions or commandments from a
“Higher Being” or Deity; for many such injunctions come from religious ideas
and precepts, while for others, for instance, atheists, they are simply part and
parcel of humanism. Yet, all these ideas do not necessarily come from logic or
scientific experiment, but from a value system that puts a premium on things
that range from notions of human dignity and relationships to transcendent re-
 See Webster Dictionary (2020).
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ligious knowledge, laws and principles. At the same time, people may hold the
same principles, but interpret them through different value systems. Two individ-
uals may both believe, for instance, that all humans are created equal. For one,
this may mean that she has a duty to treat everyone as an equal, and to try to
gain equity for all. For the other, it may mean that since everyone starts out
equal, anyone who doesn’t achieve or do well is at fault for his or her failure,
and therefore deserves no help or respect.
To be sure, even scientific principles are, to some extent, based on values
(Kuhn 1962). The use of the scientific method, the adherence to empirical evi-
dence (i.e. evidence actually observed or experienced), the willingness to believe
the evidence even when it conflicts with religious or cultural assumptions –
these are all characteristics of a value system that puts a high priority on logical
and scientific thinking and on the pursuit of a kind of knowledge in the real ob-
servable world. However, many people around the world subscribe to different
values, which place much more importance on religious or cultural traditions
and see the work of science as of a lesser order when it conflicts with those tra-
ditions. Thus, for instance, there are a number of practicing Christians and Mus-
lims worldwide that do not necessarily believe in evolution theory.
This brings me to the notion of assumptions, which are the next level of
truths, the ones we feel we can take for granted, given the principles we have
accepted. If we accept, for instance, that life is an “inalienable right” – a right
of every human being that cannot be taken away – then we will usually assume
that killing another person is wrong, or at least that we don’t have the right to do
it. Assumptions are often unexamined. They are the facts or beliefs that we don’t
question, because we “know” they’re accurate, even though they may not be. It
is nevertheless true that we all bring assumptions to what we do, and the context
of interreligious peacebuilding work is no exception. We hope our assumptions
are based on carefully thought-out principles and try to re-evaluate them from
time to time to make sure we are not operating on false premises.
According to the Cambridge Dictionary ‘assumption’ is something that you
accept as true without question or proof. For instance “People tend to make as-
sumptions about you when you have a disability” or “These calculations are
based on the assumption that prices will continue to rise”.⁵ Assumptions are
sometimes made by evaluators when they have different spatial, temporal or sys-
tem scales that need to be bridged somehow. Assumptions can be made explic-
itly or implicitly. Often, an assumption explicitly made by the evaluator, auto-
matically implies additional, implicit assumptions. There are at least three
 See Cambridge Dictionary (2021).
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reasons why we need to deal more explicitly with assumptions: first, assump-
tions can lead to biased evaluations (value-ladenness mentioned earlier), sec-
ondly, assumptions can limit the quality of results in evaluations, and thirdly,
dealing more explicitly with assumptions can improve certain uncertainty as-
sessment practices in evaluation. Since assumptions by definition cannot be ob-
jectively determined (since something is assumed), there always is an element of
subjectiveness in assumptions. Two analysts assessing the same issue will not
necessarily make the exact same assumptions in the calculation chain. Conse-
quently, an evaluation is not made up of objective, value-free scientific facts
alone. For this reason, virtually all evaluations of social groups and institutions
can be considered to be value-laden to a certain degree and, as such, they sel-
dom reflect an exact science.
Numerous studies from the history and sociology of science have problem-
atized the classic distinction between facts and values since Kuhn’s influential
work highlighted above. Scientific facts and knowledge claims, especially
when produced at the science-policy interface, have been shown to be at least
partially socially constructed and co-shaped by implicit or explicit negotiation
processes. Observation has been shown to be theory-laden and cognitive author-
ity of science is ultimately produced by boundary work and negotiation at differ-
ent levels. Attention is paid to the assumptions that are made and to the commu-
nication with regard to these assumptions. Thus, although the value-ladenness
of assumptions has been extensively problematized in evaluation literature,
this has not so far led to a systematic strategy for dealing with this problem.
The central question here is how assumptions in peacebuilding interventions
of the implicit influence – power – of religious leaders and their actions can
be systematically identified, measured, and prioritized, in order to assess the po-
tential value-ladenness of important assumptions and to deal with these poten-
tially value-laden assumptions in an explicit and transparent manner.⁶
For this purpose, we need to zoom in on the value-ladenness of assump-
tions, starting from the viewpoint of the evaluator carrying out the evaluation.
In many instances it has been shown that choices made by an evaluator are af-
fected by a range of factors. The choices are influenced by knowledge, perspec-
tives and situational factors. Arbitrariness can also play a role, in situations
where the evaluator has no reason to prefer one particular assumption to anoth-
er. Based on the nature of factors influencing the choice for a certain assump-
 See, for example, Nkwake (2015). In this fascinating study we see many examples showing
how assumptions can be coloured through the eyes of the evaluator and lead to a biased eval-
uation.
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tion, one can distinguish four different types of value-ladenness of assumptions:
value-ladenness in a general epistemic sense (e.g., assumptions are coloured by
the approach that the evaluator prefers), in a disciplinary-bound epistemic sense
(e.g., assumptions are coloured by the discipline in which the evaluator was
educated), in a socio-political sense (e.g., assumptions may be coloured by po-
litical preferences of the evaluator), and in a practical sense (e.g., the evaluator
is forced to make simplifying assumptions due to time or other mundane con-
straints). At first glance it may look strange that we include constraints having
practical reasons in the typology of value-ladenness, but assumptions that are
justified by a practical constraint can still lead to biased assessments as there
is a potential to exploit references to such constraints to introduce assumptions
that favour a politically desired outcome of an assessment. Also in case that
there is no intentionality, practical constraints can introduce assumptions that
lead to assessment results unduly favouring one position in a discourse over an-
other.
A recent meta-review of ‘Interreligious Peacebuilding Program Evaluation’
undertaken by the Alliance for Peacebuilding critically looked at the design as-
pects of ‘seven evaluations that assessed programs in six different countries,
conducted by a total of 15 different organizations.’ The main objective was to ‘as-
sess the “state of play” in evaluation of inter-religious action’ so as to improve
methodologies in peacebuilding evaluations and evidence-based policy and
practice. While nearly half of the evaluations reviewed included questions or
data sources specifically related to various inter-religious initiatives, these
were not free from selection bias that distorted the findings of these evaluations:
Only three evaluations used religious leaders as main data sources, although those leaders
were also the direct beneficiaries of the programming. Unfortunately, the evaluations that
did ask questions about changes in attitude or behaviour through inter-religious program-
ming still suffer from many of the problems discussed in this report; data points were most-
ly self-reported through interviews and in two cases a survey, and little effort was put into
triangulating that data with other methods. Future areas of interest in this area would be to
explore theories of change in inter-religious programming. (Vader 2015)
In such cases in addition to a focus on theories of change in inter-religious pro-
gramming, it is important to stress the need for extended peer review, in which
stakeholders and citizens are involved in the review process of evaluation results
where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent.
In summary, it can be concluded that transparency, diversification of assump-
tions, extended peer review, and insight into the influence of assumptions on
the outcomes of the evaluation are seen as important elements in a strategy
for dealing with value-laden assumptions. A relatively simple method for analy-
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sing explicit and implicit assumptions in the calculation chain is to follow three
basic steps in evaluation design: an analysis step, in which the assumptions are
identified and analysed; a revision step, in which the evaluation is altered or ex-
tended based on the analysis results; and a communication step, in which it is
determined what should be communicated with respect to the assumptions in
the evaluation, based on the analysis. The relational aspects between values,
principles and assumptions and their significance in evaluation and in defining
sources of power dynamics and indicative measures are further elaborated in the
subsequent sections.
3 Changing Role of Religious Leaders and
Institutions
Taken collectively religious communities are the largest and most deeply imbed-
ded institutions in the world, claiming the allegiance of billions of followers that
often cuts across race, class and nationality. More than any other kind of repre-
sentation, religious leaders often have the experience of establishing and lead-
ing such communities. Their expertise can greatly benefit the global peace ef-
forts; they are often the most respected figures in their communities. For
instance, Buddhist monks and nuns, imams, pastors, priests, pujaris, and lead-
ers of different religious communities play a powerful role in shaping attitudes,
opinions and behaviours because their followers trust them.
In most societies worldwide, community members and political leaders lis-
ten to religious leaders. Especially at the family and community level, religious
leaders have the power to raise awareness and influence attitudes, behaviours
and practices. In many ways, they are shaping social values in line with faith-
based and religious teachings that are relevant to social cohesion and peace-
building initiatives and practices. More importantly, religious leaders and insti-
tutions also have the power to advocate and support public policy on a number
of issues that may be directly or indirectly related to social cohesion efforts to
bring people together using interreligious dialogue, such as:
1. Mobilise youth and other groups towards peaceful coexistence.
2. Bring religious dialogue into different kinds of organizations to promote tol-
erance, diversity and pluralism.
3. Magnify the voices of the marginalised and/or poor when and where laws
and policies are made.
4. Influence policymakers to put in place policies that protect marginalised
groups.
Exploring Power Dynamics of Religious Leaders 107
5. Advocate to relevant government and other institutions not to support or cre-
ate policies likely to contribute to divisiveness in society and/or discrimina-
tion of certain people.
6. Make it harder for certain religious leaders or institutions to promote extrem-
ism, intolerance and hate speech for political reasons.
7. Speak out for sustainable development as they are well placed to add their
moral and spiritual leadership to local and global efforts.
These are just some emerging issues where they can make a significant differ-
ence. Efforts towards promoting dialogue on such issues imply that to be
more impactful, they must be able also to participate in the formulation of public
policies; get involved in relevant function in governmental administrations; work
with non-governmental organizations; and represent their governments in inter-
national fora – all of which have significant capacity development implications
to enhance their representation, leadership and influence in various areas of
civic engagement. However, within this context, there is a need for a better inte-
gration of power variables and the role of religious leaders that for too long have
been treated as opposing and contentious issues. I would argue that there is a
difference between positive and negative uses of power by religious leaders
and institutions and these are valid subject matters for any serious evaluation.
The following perspectives illustrate this point quite clearly:
Case 1:
The crisis of leadership today in Nigeria provides a formidable challenge to political and
other social scientists. Between 1999 and 2015 several elections have been held with
many leaders elected and sworn into office; with interactions between religion and politics
the ongoing subject of academic analysis…Political office holders often drew on religious
ideas, practices and symbols as a tool of negotiation with the electorate during political
campaigns. As a result, candidates were often selected based on their religious rhetoric
and affiliations. Thus the debate about Muslim/Muslim or Muslim/Christian tickets
emerged as a key issue in the elections. Religious leaders are often political actors in the
elections. There were several media allegations that some religious leaders were complicit
in compromising and corrupting the electoral process (Oguntola-Laguda 2015)
Case 2:
Multiple actors—from the Taliban leadership to local commanders—have played a key role
in creating and shaping the movement’s policy in Afghanistan. Taliban policymaking has
been top-down as much as it has been bottom-up, with the leadership shaping the rules
as much as fighters and commanders on the ground. The result is a patchwork of practices
that leadership has increasingly sought to exert control over and make more consistent.
This became possible as the Taliban put structures and mechanisms in place, particularly
after 2014, to enforce compliance among its ranks. However, although the rules may be set
at the top, local variance, negotiation, and adaptation is still considerable. Policymaking
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has been driven by military and political necessity: the Taliban needed to control the civil-
ian population and compel its support. Beyond this, a mix of ideology, local preferences,
and the practical exigencies of waging an insurgency have guided policymaking and imple-
mentation (Jackson and Amiri 2019).
Case 3:
Fear, the pursuit of power, and an approach to public policy built on an unhealthy dose of
nostalgia have plagued evangelical politics for a long time. Since the 1970s, the Christian
Right has followed a well-known political playbook. Its members want to elect the right
president of the United States who will appoint the right Supreme Court justices who
will then overturn decisions that the Christian Right believes have undermined the repub-
lic’s Christian foundations. In the past, this playbook was inseparable from the moral char-
acter of the candidate. In 2016, however, the Christian Right executed the playbook in sup-
port of a candidate known for his sexual escapades, nativism, deceit, xenophobia, racism,
and misogyny. This is a new development. The playbook survived despite the candidate.
This is a testimony to the playbook’s power and the role that Christian Right leaders
such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson played in reshaping American political culture
(Fea, Gofford, Griffith and Martin 2018).
Case 4:
Dilemmas of a secular state: The use of religion for political purposes was almost non-ex-
istent at the time of independence. Since the ’60s, Indian politics has seen drastic changes
in style, language, modes of behaviour, reflecting the actual cultural understanding of rural
Indian society rather than the Western ideals of the elite which inherited power in the
Nehru years. There are two consequences of this amalgamation of religion, politics and
public administration. First, it has given prominence in public life to religious leaders
like “saints” and “mahants”, “imams” and “priests”. They have started playing an active
role in governmental decision-making. The interference of religious leaders in administra-
tive matters can prove dangerous to India’s secular democracy (Singh 2019).
It is worth mentioning here that Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state in India,
now has Yogi Adityanath as its Chief Minister. His fiery brand of communal pol-
itics and promotion of the most virulent form of Hindutva reflects a new kind of
alliance between Hindu religious leaders and the state under the BJP govern-
ment.
Case 5:
The assessment of religion’s importance in Myanmar’s politics has now completely
changed, as a violent and exclusionary religious nationalism appears to be on the rise
across the country … . The violence has also coincided with the rise of Buddhist nationalist
networks and organizations, including the 969 Movement and the Organization for the Pro-
tection of Race and Religion (MaBaTha, in its Burmese acronym), both groups with prom-
inent monastic leaders or spokesmen (Walton 2015, 507).
In general, religious leaders have been known to use political tactics that arise
from the use of different power sources, which are framed in the change litera-
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ture either as dirty tricks to be avoided or as astute strategies for advancing a
change towards peace objectives. Despite the underlying discomfort of many
with the use of manifest individual charismatic power in evaluating the role of
religious leaders, it is necessary to recognize that there is sufficient empirical evi-
dence to suggest that more often than not such leaders frequently draw on these
power bases to sustain their image and role in society.
Kadayifci-Orellana identifies three distinct levels for interreligious dialogue,
namely high, mid and grass-roots levels that have certain strengths and limita-
tions. The high level includes religious figures like the Pope, a Chief Rabbi,
Mufti or Monk. Despite their high-profile visibility and credibility, such figures
are not easy to access by others and are unable to devote themselves to the
time needed for sustaining effective dialogue. Mid-level dialogue leaders include
clergy as well as religious scholars. While they do not have the visibility or rep-
utation of high-level leadership, they usually have strong links with both high-
and grass-roots levels, making them ideal candidates for interreligious dialogue.
The grass-root level dialogue leaders include, among others, ordinary communi-
ty level clergy who can play a transformative role at this level, which is consid-
ered significant for ensuring lasting peace (Kadayifci-Orellana 2013, 155– 156).
What is singularly important here is that the distribution of power may differ
from one level to another, from one type of religious leader to another; neverthe-
less, power remains an important tool in achieving their individual goals and ob-
jectives. Leaders must recognize their power, must know how to use it effectively
and how to precede its positive or negative effects. By learning how power oper-
ates in society and various institutions, they are better able to use that knowl-
edge to become more effective leaders.⁷
4 Framing Individual and Collective Power
Dynamics
While the role of power affecting institutional change in society has been recog-
nized as being important for many decades now in mainstream Social and Cul-
tural Anthropology (as well as other disciplines), the conceptual thinking about
the relationship between power and religious leaders in peacebuilding and inter-
 It is worth noting that age and gender play a key role in the leadership of interreligious dia-
logue; it still remains a largely masculine activity since the most typical role in this category of
leaders tends to be a male in most parts of the world, with perhaps a few exceptions where
women are beginning to assume such role.
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religious dialogue has only started to evolve and has been enriched by different
underlying theoretical assumptions.⁸ To explore various different approaches to
understanding power and change and the role of religious leaders, the analysis
here has been structured around an approach that differentiates two different
types of power, namely individual charismatic vs collective structural power. By
conceptualizing these two fundamentally distinct but interrelated dimensions
of power, various different aspects of institutional or transformational change
can be appreciated. As highlighted in Table 1 below, they are not mutually exclu-
sive, and most actions in society are based on a blend of these strategies where-
by power is ultimately actualized through force, influence or authority (Gerth and
Mills 1958, 249–250). The tension between individual charismatic and collective
structural power is well articulated in social science literature and informs the
earliest developments in theories of organizational power. Giddens describes it
in the following way:
One is that power is best conceptualized as the capability of an actor to achieve his or her
will, even at the expense of others who might resist him-the sort of definition employed by
Weber among many other authors. The second is that power should be seen as a property of
the collectivity (1979, 69).
This tension rests on dualisms in social theory such as between volunteerism
and determinism or between individual action and structure (e.g. Reed, 1988).
Proponents of the individual agency perspective argue that individuals have
free choice to pursue and use power wilfully towards some intended objective.
This perspective deals with observable and intentionally used authority and le-
gitimate power of agents. Personal power is required to make change happen in
organization or society. This view is rooted in a social psychological research tra-
dition that investigated power bases. The two perspectives and the change impli-
cations I review are not fully comprehensive, yet they offer an interesting outlook
on how we assess the role of religious leaders in the interreligious dialogue field.
Moreover, they do not exclude each other but can be used in combination in re-
viewing or evaluating institutional change processes in peacebuilding efforts. I
am relying on the notion of polarity to help us analytically review certain differ-
ential aspects of power; rather than assert the dominance and legitimacy of one
aspect of power, the notion of polarity suggests that opposites necessarily co-
exist.
 See, for example, Haynes 2001, McDuie-Ra and Rees 2010, and Moksnes and Melin (eds,)
2013.
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On the collective side of the debate are those who say that the social structure
(e.g. roles, rules, and resources) determines, or at the very least constrains,
the use of power. They argue that structurally determined power can explain be-
haviours in organizations and societies that were previously attributed to indi-
vidual qualities. Others suggest that culture (e.g. values, principles, assump-
tions, beliefs etc.) constrains individual agency. From this perspective, power
is a property of a social group and sources of power are shaped by the observ-
able structures and taken-for-granted culture of the collectivity. An interpretative
worldview and studies of culture by social anthropologists and sociologists, for
instance, have led to an increased understanding that power also resides in the
more latent or subtle and unobtrusive operation of language, symbols, myths,
and a range of other meaning-making activities.
In this latter perspective the focus shifts towards the less observable and un-
conscious forms of power use. Central issues here from a practical view are the
construction of perceptions, values, and norms through identification and man-
agement of meaning. At the level of deep structures of power, certain issues and
conflicts are prevented from arising at all and the existing order of things is seen
as natural and unchangeable. If power operates in an invisible or latent way,
then questions of resistance and acquiescence are surfaced. Foucault (1977)
Table 1: Sources of Power Dynamics
Individual Charismatic Power vs. Collective Structural Power
Individual Charismatic Power Collective Structural Power
Basis of Power:
Exceptional personal attrib-
utes, such as heroism, mysti-
cism, revelations, or magic;
charisma allows a person to
lead or inspire without relying
on set rules or traditions.
Basis of Power:
Economic Power is based upon an objective relationship to
productive resources, a group’s condition in the labour
market, and its chances; it refers to the measurement of the
ability to control events by virtue of material advantage.
Social Power is based upon informal societal or community
opinion, family position, honour, prestige and patterns of
consumption and lifestyles that may sometimes take prece-
dence over economic interests.
Political Power is based upon the relationships to the legal
structure, party affiliation and extensive bureaucracy. Politi-
cal power is institutionalized in the form of large-scale state
systems and bureaucracies that are usually controlled by
elites or select, privileged groups.
Both source of power underpinned by values, principles, assumptions, beliefs etc. actualised as
power through force, influence and authority
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and other postmodern theorists have also echoed this, deepening our under-
standing of power and its invisibility in dominant discourses.
5 Individual Charismatic Power
This is one of the best understood and widely shared conceptions of power and
is primarily informed by Weber’s conceptual framework as well as the work of
other scholars such as Dahl (1975). According to Weber charismatic power or
leadership implies extraordinary characteristics of an individual, whose mission
and vision inspire others and who might also be seen as possessing certain re-
ligious ‘qualities’ or ‘power’ that could be used to lead any social or political
movement. However, charismatic leadership is considered relatively unstable
as it is related to faith and belief; once these diminish, the authority and leader-
ship also tend to dissolve. Thus, charismatic power or leadership depends on the
extent to which a religious or political figure is able to maintain moral influence
over his followers (Gerth and Mills 1958, 53). Basically, from this perspective we
say power is a force: person A has more power than B to the extent that A can get
B to do something they would not otherwise do.
Apart from social anthropologists and sociologists describing power bases of
individuals in society, where power is viewed as the potential ability of an indi-
vidual agent to influence a target within a certain system or context, social psy-
chologists John French and Bertram Raven created a typology of power sources –
all of which are both manifest and identifiable. They were concerned with two
fundamental questions: i) how do people lead, guide, direct, influence or control
other people? And ii) what methods do they use? In a study published in 1959
they proposed five bases, or sources, of social power that people use in leader-
ship: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, expert power, referent
power. A sixth, informational power, was later added by Raven. According to
them “The phenomena of power and influence involve a dyadic relation between
two agents which may be viewed from two points of view: (a) What determines
the behaviour of the agent who exerts power? (b) What determines the reactions
of the recipient of this behaviour?” (French and Raven 1959, 150). Their approach,
which was primarily focused on how people run organizations or corporations,
have proved to be equally relevant to individuals and institutions in society at
large. Their idea of social influence and power is that “social influence and
power is limited to influence on the person, P, produced by a social agent, O,
where O can be either another person, a role, a norm, a group of a part of a
group” (French and Raven 1959, 151).
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Based on their famous analysis Table 2 below defines the power that derives
from expertise, legitimate authority, referent power, rewards and coercion, and
informational power that requires association with other powerful people. Re-
ward power increases with the magnitude of the reward, the bigger and better
the award, the more that P perceives O can mediate for him. Reward power de-
pends on the ability of the giver to administer positive feedback and remove neg-
ative outcomes and responses. Coercive Power is the same as reward power, only
it uses negative cohesion instead of positive, it uses punishment instead of re-
wards. French and Raven say that “the strength of coercive power depends on
the magnitude of the negative valence of the threatened punishment multiplied
by the perceived probability that P can avoid the punishment by conformity, i.e.,
the probability of punishment for nonconformity minus the probability of pun-
ishment for conformity” (French and Raven 1959, 157). Legitimate power is the
most complex of the different types; it is induced by some internalized norm
or value. It stems from internalized values in one which indicates that another
has a legitimate right to influence one who is obligated to accept this influence.
The main basis for this power is the cultural values that one individual has over
another. Referent Power is a feeling of oneness of one with another, or the desire
to want this identity. If someone is attracted to something about someone else,
that person will want to become closely associated with that person. Expert
Power is the strength that knowledge and perception which one person attrib-
utes to another within a given area. Expert power results in primary social influ-
ence on one’s cognitive structure and probably not on other types of systems.
Table 2: Elements of manifest individual charismatic power
Basis of Power [Generic
evaluation criteria]
Sources and Definitions [these include positive or negative values,
principles and assumptions]
Coercion/Reward Power Behaviours that reward or hurt others but also ensure compliance
and buy-in
Legitimate Power Formal position of power and roles that define responsibilities and
appropriate scope of activity
Referent Power Power that comes from trust and commitment given to the individ-
ual because of his/her personal traits and characteristics, including
notions of an authentic existence or belief system
Expert Power Power as knowledge and skills that others see as relevant to the
peace process and which the individual religious actor is seen as
possessing
Informational Power Association with powerful people affords direct and indirect infor-
mation
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It is important to note that all five sources of power either rely on, or are
strengthened by, belief of the followers. The actual power that leaders possess
in granting rewards, punishing, or issuing orders is significant, but not as signif-
icant as the beliefs that followers have about them. Even if leaders do not truly
have the power to reward, punish or control others, they can exert influence if
their followers believe or assume they have such power. The same is true of
the two forms of personal power – Expert Power and Referent Power. The leader
may not have superior expertise, but if his followers believe he has, they will
grant the leader power over them – at least for a while.
Similarly, if the leader is not someone to be trusted, followers will let him
lead if they’ve been fooled by a positive image – until they discover he cannot
be trusted. A key point here is that power does not depend only on the leader;
it depends also on the perceptions that the followers have of the leader. The tak-
ing and giving of power stems from a relationship between leader and follower,
and how the followers perceive the leader. Let us now turn to the attributes of
Legitimate Power and Expert Power from Table 2 as they reflect the most relevant
variables for religious leaders working in peacebuilding contexts.
5.1 Legitimate Power
A religious actor who is also an authority figure might be able to use his author-
ity and effect changes by using legitimate position power. Such power stems
from the religious actor’s formal position and implies the legitimate authority
to use, if deemed necessary, positive and negative sanctions such as rewards
and coercion. Thus, legitimate power mostly refers to the existing organizational
or institutional hierarchy that provides religious leadership with the ability to
control the behaviour of others and to either change the organizational structure
and processes or maintain status quo. This use of power is observable and direct.
In order to employ sanctions it is necessary to know to what extent such reli-
gious leaders perform the required actions.
The power embedded in formal organizational structures and processes are
usually directed at domination. Decision-making is often based on the exclusion
of others and the one-sided realization of interests of certain specific groups or
individuals that may or may not use such power-coercive strategies to enforce
change. When a religious leader is protected by his legitimate power in a social
system and is able to use certain sanctions, he could, in principle, use power-co-
ercive strategies to effect changes that he considers desirable, without much
questioning on the part of those with less power. In these situations a power-co-
ercive way of decision-making is accepted as in the nature of things and is seen
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as functional for the state. The limitations of this power model of change are re-
lated to the strong top-down approach, where there is limited participation of
others – even from the religious community.
5.2 Expert Power
Expert power as the main basis of power usually involves a process of change
that is often initiated, coordinated, and controlled by people’s perceptions of re-
ligiosity, spirituality or magical attributes of an individual, including religious
leaders, who may be seen as a leader attempting to promote peace. As a change
agent the religious actor is seen to play this important role where success de-
pends, among other things, on his religious ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’ to assist
or support groups in the peacebuilding process. The educational background of
the religious actor also seems to be connected to the way problems are analysed
and solved. Here, a key element of the strategy depends on religious knowledge
as a legitimate source of power. The desirable direction of influence is from the
religious experts, that is, from those who know, to those who do not know
through processes of dissemination of information and rational persuasion.
Sometimes the problems with the expert power approach to change lie in an
insufficient consideration of the cultural and other political impediments and
the emergence of resistance to positive change within the specific peacebuilding
context. In such a situation a religious actor might develop an explicitly political
strategy that begins with a complete assessment of all the potential manifest-in-
dividual power bases highlighted in Table 2. This might ultimately lead to a proc-
ess where the religious actor aligns himself with those in power and then influ-
ence them to desire and accept the changes towards peace. To do this, he or she
must convince the powerful that the change is in their self-interest. In general,
religious leaders as change agents can employ many tactics, such as increasing
their referent power by expanding their social networks and having lunch or cof-
fee with key people. Becoming an assistant or staff adviser to board members in
government, for example, can enhance personal expert power through advice
giving.
Understanding personal power and developing tactics for using it, however,
are not always enough and constant monitoring of the political activities of oth-
ers is required because this will allow the religious actor to develop, adapt, and
modify his/her political strategies based on carefully selected goals. A power
audit, identification of targets, an inventory of tactics, adequate resources, and
monitoring with a commitment of time and energy are key ingredients for suc-
cessful implementation of a peacebuilding process.
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In other words, it is critical for religious leaders to begin with an understand-
ing of the sources of power for himself and exploration of the mechanisms by
which such resources may be controlled and used tactically within the peace-
building process. A wise religious leader will manage the impressions he creates
in order to generate stature and will form multiplex relationships with key fig-
ures in the political arena. Timing of interventions and building of credit are
two key political tactics that will build on identified power bases and these in-
clude aligning with powerful others, using a neutral cover, limiting communica-
tion, and withdrawing – as necessary. One might also argue that while they can
either play down politics or avoid them, it is better to use them to effect ends that
are going to positively impact on the peacebuilding process.
5.2.1 Spiritual and Symbolic Considerations
Within the notion of Expert Power, there are latent power elements that require
further clarification; some evaluators may see these elements as distinct or in-
trinsic to the role assumed by religious leaders. However, in what I am calling
spiritual and symbolic considerations there is recognition of the deep and perva-
sive operation of religious symbols that often, if one takes these at the level of
the psyche, are connected to what many consider to be spiritual or sacred ele-
ments. While there is no one school of thought in this area, there are efforts
by many to apply the insights that grow out of recognition of latent personal
power using various subjective evaluation criteria⁹. This approach to change
sometimes uses interventions that work at the level of the unconscious in
ways that engage the myth-making processes of the society or culture within
which the peacebuilding process is located. Methods for engaging the deep
meaning systems drawing on psychological and other disciplines are being ex-
plored to enhance understanding and integration. However, addressing the un-
conscious and spiritual aspects of religious dimensions simply cannot be framed
in objective terms; by their very nature they must remain subjective, making
comparisons extremely difficult, if not impossible.
This perspective on power has its roots in the psychoanalytic, postmodern
theories (Thompson 2004). It is not a look at how structures or cultures constrain
agency but how individuals themselves come to limit themselves and to unques-
tioningly obey. Here, there is the assumption that power is inherently diffused
and shared among individuals located anywhere within a social system. This dif-
 See for example the chapter by Steele and Wilson-Grau in this volume.
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fusion allows individuals to potentially become active agents who can deploy
their power even if they are at the bottom of the hierarchy or relatively powerless.
Second, implicit in this approach to power is the recognition that power relations
are often latent or even unconscious and they then become embedded in the ac-
tual psyche of the individual. To the extent that an individual is unconsciously
complicit and has internalized various mechanisms of control and obedience
is the extent to which their freedom to act according to (or even to know)
their own values and beliefs is constrained. From this perspective, for example,
members of oppressed groups could be asked to understand or explain how they
collude in maintaining the very systems that oppress them.
Alternatively, as suggested by Foucault (1977, 27), the disciplinary mechanisms
of the dominant groups also play a part through the use of surveillance, examina-
tion, and normalization in ways that are so subtle that people may not readily re-
alize that they have internalized them into a type of “panoptic consciousness”.
This aspect of disciplinary power according to Foucault may even become normal-
ized overtime in shaping people’s self-image or identity, further contributing to
power as a means of ‘keeping tabs’ on people and controlling them.
In the face of these types of latent control mechanisms, there are a number
of sources of power, which can be mobilized by the individual. Some of these
have been identified in Table 4 with certain indicative measures. For example,
attempting to be authentic and acting in congruence with one’s own values
and beliefs. This involves not only honestly identifying one’s powerlessness
and complicity with the dominant systems but also owning one’s taken-for-
granted power and privilege. Authentic existence requires those with power
and privilege to make this explicit and then act on the consequences of this un-
earned advantage. Another source of deep personal power is the development of
a critical consciousness that Freire (1970) defines as a perception of the social,
political, and economic contradictions inherent in society.
It is assumed that an attitude of focused scepticism and critical detachment
is necessary if an individual is to utilize latent-personal power. Only by standing
outside the dominant discourses and seeing how one has unconsciously carried
them within himself can he unlearn these mechanisms of power. Through a proc-
ess of questioning and de-familiarization, one can replace an attitude of defer-
ence to power with an ability to make autonomous choices. Often the ability
to develop a detached and sceptical attitude is facilitated by exposure to other
systems and styles of organizing, for example, from outside the society of
which we are members as well as outside our own religion. Experiencing contra-
dictory structural principles will often allow us to move in directions that are in
contradiction to the dominant cultural or social rules of which we are a part.
Hence, the role of interreligious dialogue – whereby individuals can ‘import’
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the experiences they have with other external institutions with different beliefs,
rules, values, and resources – becomes all the more critical to help religious
leaders and their followers develop a critical consciousness.
6 Collective Structural Power
Social relations are characterized by a typical structure and culture, based on
rules, habits, institutions, language, communication, use of symbols, and defini-
tions of reality, which serve as a foundation. Culture represents relative stability
in a society and is related to power because power relations come to be seen as
natural and unquestionable. Perceptions, cognitions, and preferences of individ-
uals and groups are shaped by culture that, in turn, prevents them from seeing
alternatives. Thus, cultural artifacts, language, rituals, and values construct
meaning for members of a society, including those who simultaneously work
to suppress conflict, prevent issues from being identified, and control, the actual
agenda for decision-making and non-decision-making. In these ways, power re-
lations become entrenched in the society and those who can set the agenda, who
manage the meaning systems and who have others believe their definitions of
reality, have more power than those who do not. Thus, power is increased to
the extent that the group, which defines reality has others accepting their defi-
nition in unquestioning and taken-for-granted ways.
In this perspective on power the emphasis moves away from personal power
that is ascribed to the individual, towards an understanding of the power that
rests in the position or location that an interest group, community or organiza-
tion holds in society. Thus, power potentially belongs to any collectivity in a par-
ticular structure regardless of their members’ personal traits or characteristics al-
ready described above. There are various underlying dimensions that determine
collective structural power bases; Table 3 simply highlights the three key ones
first proposed by Weber (1958), namely Economic Power, Social Power and Polit-
ical Power. Here, structural factors become the major influence in understanding
power relations, where both cooperation and competition are seen to character-
ize relational networks of interdependent groups. As such, these could also be
used as the main evaluation criteria since social and political issues are influ-
enced by them.
The existing structure and the distribution of power are often characterized by
stability,which usually results from a commitment to decisions or interests of those
holding power. This kind of structural power is believed to be natural or ‘given’
while still being largely latent and observable if appropriately evaluated. In societ-
ies, there is a balance of power between the interests of individuals and of the in-
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terdependent groups. Sometimes these interests are at odds and this can result in
conflicting political issues, objectives and controversies in decision-making. The
tension between the interest of individuals and groups is viewed as inevitable
and as a normal part of the way of getting things done. This perspective on
power is also known as the pluralist view, which is related to the exchange theory
in social psychology in which the power of an actor is derived from the possibilities
this actor or his or her group have of providing others with relevant resources.¹⁰ The
implication here is that groups have to cooperate and that agreement between
them is necessary for their functioning and to warrant their continuity. Negotiation
and exchange of resources tend to characterize the power process.
7 Applying Power Dynamics in Monitoring and
Evaluation
A postmodern perspective can be usefully applied to identify and respond to
power dynamics in monitoring and evaluation. It can also help oppressed or
marginalised groups attempt to reveal, expose, deconstruct, and question the
ideological assumptions embedded in organizational discourses and show
how they suppress conflicts. From this perspective, power is assumed to be
taken-for-granted and latent. Some would even argue that it is a cultural artifact
that becomes entrenched in the hands of certain dominant and privileged
Table 3: Elements of manifest collective/structural power
Basis of Power [Generic
Evaluation Criteria]
Sources and Definitions linked to positive or negative values,
principles and assumptions
Economic Power –
Control of scarce resources
Ability to allocate resources (information, uncertainty, money,
people, etc.) among groups with competing interests
Social Power –
Criticality/relevance
Roles and tasks that are essential in the peacebuilding process
and that have the potential to cause the process to break down
Social Power –
Flexibility/autonomy
Positions that are characterized by discretion in decision-
making that are not always visible in the public sphere
Political Power –
Visibility
Positions that are seen by those of power and influence in the
society, community or organization
Political Power –
Coalitions
Power that comes from building support from groups with
similar interests
 See, for example, Homans 1961; Blau 1964; and Strauss 1969.
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groups. This dynamic exists to the extent that the meaning systems in which the
relations of power are embedded are shared collectively by various interest
groups and are reproduced through discourses, practices, and routines within
societies. Religious leaders have the opportunity, perhaps more than others, to
give meaning to events and in doing so contribute to the development of peace-
ful norms and values in a crisis or conflict situation. In some ways, this could be
seen as the management of meaning as a process of symbolic construction and
value-use designed both to create legitimacy for one’s own peaceful demands
and to de-legitimize the non-peaceful demands of others.
Management of meaning involves the ability to define the reality of others.
Thus, religious leaders can be powerful agents who could create shared mean-
ings, ideas, values, and reality through communication and the manipulation
of symbols where power is seen as an interpretative institution and pervasively
hegemonic. Lukes (1974) argues that sometimes people accept the status quo and
their role in it because they view the current systems as natural and unchange-
able. The role of ideological hegemony is important to understand as we see that
existing organizational and societal structures are supported by inherently
classed, gendered, and raced assumptions and values.
In recent years there has been increased interest among certain international
NGOs to focus on ‘power’ as an analytical tool for monitoring and evaluation.
Oxfam, for instance, offers extensive case studies of successful policy, advocacy
and learning initiatives around the concept of power that are based on four key
strategies:
1. Learning how a political system works to understand what need to change to
address an identified problem, who has the power to achieve change, and
how to achieve change.
2. Designing, framing, timing and adapting the presentation of evidence to the
changing context to maximise its influence on target audiences.
3. Using additional insider or outsider strategies to influence policy and prac-
tice.
4. Embracing trial and error.¹¹
Other organizations have utilized power analysis mapping or drivers of change
approaches to evaluate the different levels of power that may exist among stake-
holders in an intervention. Most of these efforts have focused on power dynamics
 “Oxfam and its partners have been effective at evidence-informed policy change, usually as
part of wider alliances and networks. It uses evidence to influence policy and to understand how
to do so more effectively, via evaluation and lesson-learning” (Mayne, Green, Guijt,Walsch, Eng-
lish and Cairney 2018).
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in multi-stakeholder processes in order to develop a common understanding of
how issues relating to power and privilege act as barriers as well as opportuni-
ties in societies.¹² But so far there are few cases where power variables or criteria
have been explicitly used as a methodological tool for conducting evaluations.
Most of these approaches are related to international NGO programmes con-
cerned with human rights, accountability for marginalised groups, and the as-
sessment of civil society strengthening and participation. However, there is no
justification for not extending and adapting these approaches to objectively as-
sess the role of religious leaders in peacebuilding. Power dynamics discussed so
far requires our applying a framework for context analysis and strategizing in
evaluation that could significantly contribute to more nuanced readings of real-
ity and to the refinement of strategies or the consideration of new entry points
for programmatic action.
To be sure there is no single approach to undertake power analysis in an
evaluation, as it fundamentally depends on the scope of the evaluation and con-
text. However, the answers to the following key questions can offer useful infor-
mation to help develop an evaluation strategy around power dynamics of reli-
gious leaders:
1. What is the purpose of the proposed power analysis?
2. What kind of power analysis is required, why and how will it be used?
3. What actors and relationships do you need to understand?
4. What are the core issues and questions that need to be explored?
5. How to link such issues and questions with indicative measures?
6. What forms of power need to be considered?
7. What can be learned from existing studies?
8. What approaches and methods will be helpful in establishing baselines?
9. What process will enable voices and perspectives of religious leaders and
other stakeholders to be included?
10. What political sensitivities are there likely to be in undertaking such an anal-
ysis and how will these be managed?
11. What people, time and resources are available?
12. What is the proposed evaluation timeline and how does it fit with the con-
sultation process?
13. How can the process of power analysis build staff competencies, or improve
the skills and understandings of other key actors involved with the evalua-
tion process? (e.g. consultants, partners and participants)
 See, for example, Magaña, Castillo, Spotnitz and Piña 2017; DfiD 2005; and Brouwer, Hiem-
stra, Van der Vugt and Walters 2013.
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The criteria developed by French and Raven can be used once there is clarity
with regard to the above. Power is dynamic, so individuals and groups may ex-
perience it differently from one moment or place to another. In order to identify
opportunities, obstacles and risks for effective peacebuilding it is critical to un-
derstand how power works, who it benefits and how it can be changed. The cri-
teria can help to explore power variables among religious leaders, including
their multidimensional sources, both in terms of individual charismatic power
and collective structural power, where each has distinct implications in so far
as evaluation finding is concerned. Some of the sources of indicative measures
highlighted for individual charismatic power and collective structural power in
Tables 4 and 5 respectively are well developed and tested. Others are newer
and emerging as we struggle to create change in peacebuilding contexts that
are embedded in complex, latent, subtle, and fragmented power relations. Un-
derstanding the broader peacebuilding change process requires attention to
both the individual charismatic and the collective structural dimensions of
power to help us analyse how religious leaders participate or resist, adapt or
rebel to bring about change with reference to these two notions of power.
While contradictory in fundamental ways, if a situation can be looked at first
from the lens of the individual vs. collectivist views, then rich new potential for
change can emerge and be enabled. As evaluation of peacebuilding contexts be-
comes more uncertain, varied and complex and the mechanisms of power both
more entrenched and more difficult to understand, it is fair to say ignoring the
dimension of power or having an uni-dimensional and undifferentiated ap-
proach to power has serious limitations to how we look at the role of individuals
in general and religious leaders in particular.
As shown in Table 4, sources of indicative evaluation measures for different
types of power should be linked to an analysis of basic strategies utilized by re-
ligious leaders; the analysis should clarify the underlying dynamics or power
constellations that make such leaders behave in certain ways. The aim is not
to sort out all underlying motives or constellations, but rather to identify factors
that are central to those leaders that have the ability to influence dynamics and
developments within the society. Religious leaders’ influence in terms of power
base, intentions and goals should be identified. Preferably, they are to be divided
into either connectors with positive impact, or dividers with negative impact on
the specific context or conflict. Thereafter, the indicative measures need to be de-
veloped and systematically monitored overtime.
As power dynamics hold the keys to societal transformation, it is important
to recognize the polarities or dialectics of power within peacebuilding evalua-
tion, i.e. we need to specifically focus on the tensions created by such a multi-
faceted conceptualization. Given the difficulties of transformational change and
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the complexities of power, we are challenged to name and understand the multi-
plicity of approaches to change. If we can value and celebrate differences and
nurture alternative change potentials, we are more likely to enable transforma-
tional change. If, however, we rely on one set of assumptions about change or,
worse yet, suppress, deny, or devalue some perspectives, then the status quo
is actually reinforced.








things of value to others or punish-
ments which can harm others
Data/perceptions on coercion and
reward being applied by religious




Ensuring roles and role expectations
are clear and recognized as legiti-
mate; demonstrating focused scepti-
cism and critical detachment
Data/perceptions on political status
and/or formal official title or position
of religious leaders influencing le-
gitimacy of reciprocity; individual ca-
pacity to refuse; make choices to take
action against oppressive elements
of reality as it is constructed
Referent Power Build respect and trust through per-
sonal integrity, charisma, and group
affiliation; being able to work in ways
that reflect one’s own and experience
and which take into account both
power/privilege and powerlessness/
oppression
Data/perceptions on individual char-
acter, awareness and charismatic
qualities; data/perceptions on dem-
onstrating both personal power and
powerlessness
Expert Power Obtaining credentials or ongoing ex-
periences that others respect and/or
consider divine/magical; showing
critical consciousness – engage in a
deep learning process which facili-
tates a search for religious internali-
zation of political issues/awareness
(e.g. theatre of the oppressed, liber-
ation education, notions of justice,
well-being, equity, human rights)
Data/perceptions on religious/spiri-
tual/ magical attributes, credentials
or powers; leader’s perception on
social, political, and economic con-
tradictions and inequities with refer-
ence to mainstream ideas of beliefs;
leader’s ability to stand apart from
the dominant discourses, micro-
practices, and disciplinary mecha-




Networking and developing connec-
tions and associations
Data/perceptions on scale and scope
of informational networks being uti-
lized
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Additionally, power analysis can be used for looking back at moments of
policy or political change and drawing lessons on why things changed and
what can be learned for the future. The monitoring and evaluation of power dy-
namics of religious leaders needs to be based on strategies to engage effectively
in their own policymaking environment, such as to identify which policymaking
‘venues’ are making key decisions, and the rules of those venues in so far as the
engagement of religious leaders is concerned with reference to both individual
charismatic power and collective/structural power.
In Table 5 each power variable is a generic evaluation criterion that corre-
sponds to a distinct set of strategies for which sources of indicative measures
are highlighted. The latter, in turn, can help formulate the development of spe-
cific pre-determined indicators for enhanced objectivity in assessing efforts or
actions not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice. It is
critical that the indicative measures are based on principles that are as “objec-
tive” – as free of bias, untested assumptions, etc., and as firmly based on prov-
able fact or reasoned analysis – as they can be and are considered true until pro-
ven otherwise. However, indicators can only help to point out to what extent
progress has been made in an intervention or a desired change is happening;
they are not to be taken as ‘proof ’ of change because they cannot tell us why
an intervention has made a difference or why and how change occurs. That re-
quires substantive analysis of the specific context or issue being evaluated.
Moreover, indicators are sometimes used to support a predetermined position
for political or tactical reasons. Ideally, indicators should be used as a tool to il-
lustrate concepts, helping to change the understanding of an issue. They should
be used to measure the impact of certain decisions, and when used to measure
effectiveness, they should be instrumental in changing policies. Otherwise, they
are redundant.
In this sense, indicators developed through power analyses can be inextrica-
bly linked to a function of monitoring and evaluation leading to observations on
what has happened or is happening, what is being done about it and what could
be done better. While the proposed analytical framework around power typolo-
gies and their sources are sufficiently flexible and can be applied to different cat-
egories of individuals and groups in society, it provides useful markers or generic
evaluation measures – in addition to the standard OECD DAC Criteria – to effec-
tively assess leadership role and power dynamics of religious leaders in peace-
building and other contexts. Each of the power-based criteria represents funda-
mentally different sets of assumptions, implications or what might be called
paradigms of power, and some or all of the generic evaluation criteria may be
applied, depending upon the scope of an evaluation.
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Furthermore, as well as revealing different options for change, applying power
dynamics in monitoring and evaluation also calls on change agents in general
to personally ask different questions of themselves and their role. The questions










Obtain and maintain positions which
are responsible for distribution and
allocation of resources; reveal (or
establish) repeated processes for re-
source and task allocation which
leave certain assumptions unex-
plored and unquestioned
Data/perceptions on distribution and
allocation of resources; data/percep-
tions on mundane, historically insti-
tuted processes and tasks which
benefit certain groups over others,




Obtain positions responsible for the
most critical roles and tasks essential
to key peacebuilding and/or survival
goals; Use organizational procedures
and events to symbolically signal
which issues are important and how
decisions will be made
Data/perceptions on roles and tasks
of religious leaders in upholding
peace; data/perception on control of
the language, symbols, rituals, and
values which are culturally embed-





Seek out roles and tasks that are not
routine and that contain autonomy
and room for independent decision-
making
Data/perceptions on level of flexibil-




Seek out roles and tasks which have
high profile in the society, community
or organization;
control of the agenda – cultivate
power which comes from being able
to define the issues which are im-
portant and will be acted on
Data/perceptions on visibility of reli-
gious leaders and institutions among
major powerbrokers and influential
groups; data/perceptions on direct
attention and energy towards peace
which align with own group’s inter-
ests (these are likely to alternatively
suppress or generate conflict)
Political Power
Coalitions
Systematically seek support from
others based on an analysis of their
interests; the determination of what
is ’sayable’ (known) through the
construction of discourses and dis-
cursive practices within coalitions
Data/perceptions on level of support
received by religious leaders from
others; data/perceptions on issues
being made visible and prioritized,
giving voice to alternative/sup-
pressed knowledge claims and chal-
lenge the objectification of knowl-
edge claims of certain (sometimes
dominant) groups
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change, for example, from what should be done to improve the situation? Or
how does one get key leaders or constituencies on the side of peace? To
whose meaning systems are we to support? And how do people perceive a
given role – whether it is secular or religious? If a change effort is seen as an in-
tervention in the peacebuilding process, how does a religious leader’s role im-
pact on these processes and towards what ends? Unless such issues are sincerely
addressed, chances are that change agents could lose their power by being se-
duced themselves into the worldview of the powerful. A key proposition here
is that any peacebuilding negotiation outcome is a function of the context the
negotiators find themselves in and the characteristics of the negotiators them-
selves. Contextual characteristics are fixed elements of the negotiation environ-
ment, e.g. dialogue functions between the parties, time pressure, whether nego-
tiation occurs through a third party, or bilaterally. The fact that the concept of
power lies at the confluence of multiple fields in the social sciences, it is neces-
sary to understand how power is leveraged (sometimes even increased) by reli-
gious leaders to their advantage and the contingencies of when conflict is a
blessing and a curse for a person or institution.
Perhaps the most critical aspect of what is being suggested here is that tough
questions must be addressed, bearing in mind the relevance of values, principles
and assumptions underpinning such questions. For example, when the manifest
perspectives on power are identified in a given peacebuilding context,whether at
the individual or collective level, it becomes necessary to change our language
and address questions of oppression, inequity, abuse, neglect, collusion and ac-
countability. Yet such language is not often found in the discourses of traditional
peacebuilding evaluation literature.
8 The Importance of Objectivity in Dialogue and
Negotiation for Change
Conflict management and negotiation tend to characterize the change ap-
proaches or models that draw on both manifest individual charismatic and col-
lective structural aspects of power described above. Hence the basis of these as-
pects of power can also be used as critical objective evaluative criteria to assess
change in peacebuilding contexts. All interest groups play their roles in the
change process, based on their position in the society or community, their spe-
cific power sources, and their own interests. In change processes, both the struc-
ture and systems of the community or society and the balance of power are
brought up for discussion or negotiation. In such a process, different groups
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or coalitions will direct their attention at securing their interests, objectives, and
power positions.
Resistance to change is seen as a result of the exercise of power and can be
understood as a struggle to achieve power or to escape from it. The main agents
in the peacebuilding process focus on preventing conflict in the change process
by regulating participation of the groups involved or by negotiation about the
objectives of the change process and the way it is organized and managed.
Most peacebuilding strategies imply that a change agent sets the conditions
for the way change is realized by providing the material or other means. Positive
outcomes are for parties who accept the change. The exchange strategy appeals
to the comparison of costs and benefits parties make and it stresses what will be
gained by the change. Negotiations are directed at smoothing opposition, ten-
sions, and differences in opinion between parties and the goal is to accomplish
an agreement that does justice to the interest of all involved parties. In such a
change process, most of the negotiations are visible and parties are aware of
the power processes. In the negotiations, many of the power bases described
above are used to secure a good starting position and to influence the process
by building good arguments, getting control of scarce resources, coalitions, gain-
ing a position of visibility or flexibility, or controlling the procedures.
Religious leaders, like political leaders, may not always possess the necessa-
ry amount of structural power, but they can certainly use their power bases to
win conflicts and to strengthen their position in the negotiation process. This in-
creases the chance that their interests are realized at the expense of the interests
of other parties involved in the change process. The use of positive spiritual or
religious values and principles, as part of an exchange strategy aimed at nego-
tiations, seems suitable in politically charged peacebuilding situations. If multi-
ple parties with opposing interests and relatively balanced power are involved in
a change process, negotiations will be needed to come to an agreement about
things such as goals, the way the change is going to be implemented, and the
role of the different parties in the change process.
Yet, the pluralist view has been criticized by some scholars because it sug-
gests or assumes that all involved parties can defend their interests in the nego-
tiation process. The power embedded in formal structures in societies generally
tend to support the interests of the most powerful than those of others. Organiza-
tional structures, rules, regulations, procedures, decision-making, and negotia-
tion are seen as products and reflections of a struggle for control that puts the
most powerful in a privileged position (Giddens 1979). In the critical modernism
of Habermas (1984), which takes the ideal of emancipation through dialogue,
knowledge is seen as having the potential to counteract the realities of domina-
tion and allow for emancipation based on unrestricted freedom. This can be ach-
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ieved by critical reflection and independent thought and by way of thoughtful
evaluation of various viewpoints and arguments in an open dialogue. It is
assumed that in dialogue and open discussions, based on good will, rational ar-
gumentation, and questioning, consensus can be reached about desirable objec-
tives. Learning with a strong emphasis on participative design and development
and democratic dialogue are approaches to change that can be used in the sense
that Habermas intended. However, some people use these methods in a way that
explicitly recognizes the latent power dynamics inherent in dialogue while oth-
ers ignore power and attempt to use the methods in a power-neutral or blind
fashion.
Ultimately, what is of critical importance is ensuring that objectivity is main-
tained in evaluating the contributions of religious leaders and institutions in
peacebuilding outcome – taking into account the underlying realities, especially
the power dynamics of a given context. This means paying special attention to
the question of ‘construct validity’, and it is a challenge in all impact evalua-
tions. In peacebuilding it is more difficult because here outcomes (e.g. gover-
nance, reconciliation, trust, cohesion) usually tend to be ‘hard-to-measure’ in
quantitative terms, which is where experimental approaches tend to focus
their attention. However, it should be emphasized that objectivity is a means
rather than an end in itself. Improved decision-making should remain the ulti-
mate goal. Thus, greater objectivity should ideally be promoted as part of the
overall evaluation planning process to ensure policy relevance and practical ap-
plication.
9 Conclusion
Ideas from postmodernism, social anthropology, sociology and social construc-
tionism offer new perspectives that could be usefully incorporated into analyses
of power dynamics in peacebuilding evaluation.When we include them,we must
also ask questions such as change towards what, and towards whose ends? It is,
however, naive to assume that because we do not explicitly deal with these ques-
tions that they are not relevant and are not currently being answered in the si-
lence. We often know whose power is currently being enhanced and we are
learning how to expose silences in the dominant discourses. For instance, liber-
ation education techniques, first used by Paulo Freire, are now being utilized in
many other contexts to help individuals break silence and value their own expe-
rience and voice. Once silence is addressed, then we can also name the abuse
and oppression that is being ignored. Likewise, this type of dialectical model
challenges change-agents, including religious leaders, to ask whose interests
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they are serving, what ends are served through their interventions, and how
aware are they of their own internalization of existing power relations and
their own unconscious privileges?
Thus, addressing power dynamics within the context of interreligious dia-
logue and peacebuilding should be considered a key characteristic of credible
evaluation – regardless of whether it is a process evaluation looking at imple-
mentation issues, an outcome evaluation investigating changes in peoples’
knowledge, skills, attitudes, intentions, or behaviours, or an impact evaluation
trying to determine any broader, longer-term changes that have occurred as a re-
sult of an intervention. New approaches and evaluation criteria need to be devel-
oped from the margins as well as lessons learned from the application of the
standard OECD/DAC criteria. The question of how to link interreligious dialogue
and peacebuilding to power dynamics will continue to increase as the role of re-
ligious leaders and institutions become more prominent and extensive overtime.
In conclusion, I want to re-emphasize the importance of holding both ends
of the polarities in dynamic tension in order for transformative change to be un-
derstood and enabled. For example, groups and individuals must engage in de-
construction and resistance at the deeper levels in order to reveal oppression and
raise awareness. But to make meaningful change, it is also necessary to use the
surface sources of power and change strategies associated with restructuring
and personal action. The manifest sources of power must inform the latent
and the latent inform the more manifest. Likewise, individual agency must be
mobilized while simultaneously acknowledging the role of the collectivity. Reli-
gious leaders can work as active agents, but we also need to understand the con-
straints and limits imposed by the systems of which they are a part.We must also
understand how power is concentrated in the hands of the dominant groups and
through understanding of shared oppression and privilege look at how subordi-
nated groups can work together collectively and politically to create change. I am
proposing this as a way of informing and enriching our understanding. Recog-
nizing the complexity, diversity and relevance of power sources and need for ob-
jectivity is obviously the first step.
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Transcendence and the Evaluation of
Faith-Based Peacebuilding
1 Introduction
There is very little research on professional evaluation¹ of religious or faith-
based peacebuilding (terms we will use interchangeably), despite the existence
of a variety of efforts over centuries to promote peace within many faith tradi-
tions. Therefore, this chapter will address pertinent concepts and principles re-
lated to the perception of transcendent experience that, to varying degrees, influ-
ences any intervention in which religious conviction plays a role. There are three
specific roles which religion can play: (1) the interveners, either indigenous or
external, can be motivated by faith-based perspectives; (2) local actors whom
the interveners wish to influence can be religiously motivated; and (3) the con-
text can be one in which religion plays a significant role in the society as either a
conflict driver or mitigator. Therefore, when speaking of faith-based actors, we
include any interveners or those they support who are motivated by religious
conviction, whether or not religion plays a significant role in conflict dynamic.
When speaking of a faith-based context, we refer to any situation in which reli-
gion plays a major role in the social dynamic, whether the role is negative, pos-
itive or of a mixed character and whether or not the interveners are themselves
motivated by a faith commitment.
Note: Four people graciously peer reviewed a draft of this paper: Cynthia Clapp-Wincek, Isabella
Jean, Michelle Garred and Peter Woodrow. They commented and made suggestions in their per-
sonal not institutional capacities. The paper is enriched by their contributions, but the final con-
tent is solely our responsibility.
This chapter is a slightly modified version of a briefing paper by the authors titled “Belief in the
Supernatural and the Evaluation of Faith-Based Peacebuilding” that was commissioned by CDA
and is posted on http://www.DMEforPeace.org. An extract was used as the section ’Considera-
tions for evaluating religious peacebuilding work’ in Effective Inter-Religious Action In Peace-
building: Guide for Program Evaluation, CDA-Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2017.
 “Professional evaluation” refers to the norms and practices promoted by over 188 (end of
2013) national, regional and international evaluation associations and societies. See Internation-
al Organization for Cooperation in Evaluation (2016). The use of this terminology, however, is not
meant to ignore the important professional role of religious leaders or diminish the value con-
tributed by faith-based actors involved in peacebuilding.
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In each of these cases, it is important that evaluators, whether they are reli-
gious or secular, understand the concepts and principles related to a perception
of transcendent experience and conviction based on the particular faith tradition
and worldview held by those involved in faith-based peacebuilding. The chapter
will address the application of these conceptions to evaluation practice. It is the
authors’ intention to provide guidelines for peacebuilders and evaluators, both
religious and secular, as well as policymakers and donors who frequently play
an important role in the design, monitoring and evaluation process.
We aim to contribute to the growing effort to learn, share and collaborate be-
tween religious and secular peacebuilders, supporting both with perspectives
they can incorporate into the evaluation of their work with faith-based commun-
ities and within religious contexts. Furthermore, since intra-faith conflicts be-
tween different entities within one religion can also be deep rooted and equally
intractable, the framework and methodology we present can apply to intra-reli-
gious as well as inter-religious contexts. Differences based on identity, authority
structures and interpretation, can influence worldviews and various faith-based
practices, adding significantly to the complexity of a conflict and to the process-
es employed to address it effectively.
So far, however, cooperative exploration among religious and secular actors
and evaluators has engaged only a part of the full spectrum of faith-based peace-
builders – those who have been integrated into the Western-dominated world of
non-profit NGOs. Many more traditional faith-based entities exist across the
world and work primarily within their own networks. For these religious peace-
builders that have not participated in professional evaluations, the paper will
potentially serve them as well since many in our audience will work with them.
The primary factor that distinguishes religious from secular peacebuilding is
the conviction that one’s experience and comprehension transcend the ordinary
or the normal.What distinguishes faith-based or religiously motivated actors is a
conviction that those involved in the process are part of a reality greater than the
sum of all human endeavours. Their transcendent worldview implies the exis-
tence of a reality beyond the natural world, a realm they also refer to as the
supernatural. We will, therefore, use the terms transcendence and supernatural
interchangeably to refer to a perception of a presence that defies normal expla-
nation.
In addition, there are a number of other factors that contribute to the distinc-
tive nature of faith-based peacebuilding.
1. Its primary focus on personal transformation aligns it with only certain parts
and priorities of secular peacebuilding practice.
2. Religion is fundamentally about narrative and symbol that explain the
meaning of life and death and its aftermath, the cosmos and human nature.
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From this the faith-based peacebuilder derives morality, ethics, religious
laws or a preferred lifestyle. The centrality of narrative and ritual, which
focus on storytelling and symbolic dramatization, have only more recently
been incorporated into the wider peacebuilding arena.
3. The existence of religious hierarchy adds a different context in which deter-
mination of mission and accountability might be understood.
4. One of the most distinctive features of faith-based peacebuilding is its access
to extensive networks, many worldwide. Collectively, faith communities con-
nect with all sectors of most societies, linked to both the most powerful and
the most marginalized. (Gopin 2009)
5. At the same time, many individual faith communities are very locally orient-
ed.
6. Unlike most secular peacebuilding programmes, usually religious commun-
ities have very long-standing relationships to their societies and view their
activities through a long-term lens. Consequently, they tend to view the
key element of personal transformation as a long-term process, and many
of their peacebuilding efforts are not project or programme oriented.
All of these factors have implications on theories of change, definitions of suc-
cess, criteria used to measure progress, and other aspects of professional evalu-
ation methodology when applied to religious peacebuilding.
Nonetheless, conviction of the existence of the supernatural, however de-
fined, is the only factor that is unique to faith-based peacebuilding. It is the
one that most profoundly influences the distinctive nature of a number of the
other factors listed above. Religious peacebuilders from all faith traditions,
whether mono-, poly- or non-theistic,² are motivated by their sense of connection
with supernatural agency, whatever it may be called: divinity, ultimate reality or
superior, transcendent good. Consequently, if evaluation is going to be relevant
to faith-based peacebuilders, it must provide ways to monitor and evaluate faith-
based action that is grounded in a perception of the existence of a powerful,
transcendent presence.
 In addition to the monotheistic (Jewish, Christian or Muslim) and polytheistic (Cao Dai, Pa-
ganism, Hinduism, Shamanism, Shinto, Wicca), there are non-theistic (Mahayana Buddhism
and Jainism). In each religion, we also find a wide range of religious practice or non-practice
among both the nominal and devoted within a particular faith. For example, there are those
who are culturally influenced by aspects of a given religious tradition’s worldview and values,
but do not engage in regular religious practice or belong to a local faith community.
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2 Principal Features of Faith-Based
Peacebuilding and Evaluation
There are five distinct features of any faith-based activity, due to the perception
of a transcendent or supernatural presence, that are especially relevant. Later in
the frameworks section of this chapter, each of the following features is associ-
ated with one of the typical criteria used in professional evaluation of peace-
building. The presentation of these features, as well as other characterizations
of faith-based actors, are based on general tendencies. Not every viewpoint at-
tributed to religious conviction or practice can be applied uniformly to every
faith-based individual or group.
2.1 Accountability
Both secular and religious groups are concerned with evaluating their effective-
ness, leading them to emphasize the need for accountability. However, religious
peacebuilders have their own perspective on “accountability.” In many instan-
ces, it is not tied to achieving predefined results. Often, the primary sense of ac-
countability is about faithfulness to a supernatural presence, to the faith tradi-
tion, or to a personal sense of calling that has been legitimized within their
faith community. Religious peacebuilders frequently value motive, loyalty and
relationships more highly than common secular perspectives regarding efficient
use of resources or effectiveness in reaching specific pre-determined outcomes.
From the perspective of many faith-based peacebuilders, this frees them from
the need to demonstrate observable results within a set time period.
Being less project oriented or time bound, religious peacebuilders also often
enjoy greater flexibility to change strategies and objectives. The theories of
change, and consequent approaches to evaluation, are determined by their val-
ues. For many, this reflects the priority placed on personal transformation. Yet,
there is also a perspective common to most faith traditions that full consequen-
ces, whether they be positive or negative, can be postponed indefinitely in this
life and sometimes beyond it. Whether it is due to a conviction regarding divine
judgment or grace, karma, or a debt/merit relationship with deceased ancestors,
there is the possibility that cause and effect can be postponed to a distant future,
including the afterlife. In this light, the fact that faith-based understandings of
accountability are measured primarily by faithfulness to the religious tradition
and its values, is of paramount importance for evaluation.
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2.2 A Distinctive Value System
The focal point of any religious value system is a framework of meaning that
makes sense of life and one’s place within it, a worldview that provides a
moral compass from which a code of conduct is derived. The religious peace-
builder’s worldview is intuitive, not primarily rational.
Most faith traditions hold some generalized values in common with each
other, as well as with much of secular society. One can find adherents within
most religions that claim to value peace, justice and compassion. Different reli-
gious communities, however, give particular meanings to those values. Since the
actual practice of a given community is influenced more by the particular, rather
than the generalized meaning given to the values, conflict can arise. For in-
stance, Christians, Buddhists, Sunni and Shia Muslims can have different per-
spectives on peace, conflict, justice, compassion and reconciliation, as can dif-
ferent secular societies.
In cases of conflict driven by values differences, it is important to under-
stand the particular meanings given to those values and the specific practices
derived from them. Practices involving concrete issues like land ownership
and women’s rights, based on very specific faith-based understandings of justice,
are at the heart of local conflicts all across the world. Effective handling of differ-
ent values between faith communities or with secular groups requires sensitivity
for each tradition’s framing of values and a search for areas of compatibility. In
such a context, it is wise to engage local participants in a discussion of key con-
cepts and elicit the language and meaning upon which they can agree, rather
than impose external religious or secular perspectives.
2.3 Understanding of Success/Failure
The ways in which religious communities traditionally define and measure suc-
cess are, in some ways, quite distinct from the methodology and criteria devel-
oped by the professional peacebuilding evaluation community. For the faith-
based person or group, success is not understood solely in temporal, material
terms. Ultimately success (or failure) is understood as transcendent. Religious
actors traditionally see themselves as part of something beyond the natural
world. Faithfulness to a calling, or a full awareness of (or alignment with) ulti-
mate reality, is often the standard by which success of human effort is evaluated,
rather than more easily measured objectives.
Yet for the religious peacebuilder, success is never based solely on the reli-
gious actor’s performance. A basic assumption is that their initiative is only a
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small part of a larger intervention process in which supernatural agency influen-
ces other human actors and has impact throughout the process, well beyond the
reach of any human activity. Developing scientific mechanisms to measure that
magnitude of transcendence is not possible. Nonetheless, an understanding of
this perspective is essential in evaluating what is achieved and how, what is un-
derstood and recorded, and what has been learned. For example, it enables the
evaluator to understand the difference in outlook that allows a Mother Teresa to
labour for years among the poor without much sign of measurable success, or
why liberation theologians continue the struggle for peace and justice when
their secular revolutionaries desist.
2.4 Motivation
As illustrated by the above examples, supernatural direction, guidance and call-
ing, via scripture, spiritual mentor, or meditation, can be a major factor in deter-
mining what a faith-based person does. A strong conviction that the supernatur-
al can act independently from the action of any part of the faith community or
even the entire human race has great influence over what direction faith-based
actors follow.
Faithfulness to one’s religious tradition can, in some cases, mean a willing-
ness to live within the status quo rather than pursuing efforts to solve an issue or
change an inequitable system. Such a commitment can even motivate some re-
ligious propel to resist any intervention by others. Within many faith traditions,
there is an emphasis on perseverance in the face of suffering and injustice. Usu-
ally it involves more than merely “staying the course.” For devotees within many
traditions, “faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things
not seen.”³ There are many faith-based practices, including various forms of
meditation and lament, which are specifically designed to enable the faithful
to find an inner way to live in hope, despite troubles which might appear unsur-
mountable and unending. Ultimately, most of these religious practices do enable
reengagement, though frequently after considerable time spent in contemplative
practice and occasionally never outside their religious community. For example,
the only activity of some cloistered monastic orders is to pray for the world, de-
pending on supernatural agency alone, or perhaps on the inspiration of their spi-
rituality, to move others to action. In most cases, however, the actions of faith-
 A verse from the Bible, Hebrews 11:1 (RSV), though a sentiment shared widely among reli-
gions.
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based peacebuilders are based on a combination of human and supernatural
agency. There are multiple ways in which one might conceptualize the balance,
all of which can have various effects on motivation.
2.5 Faith-Based Transformation
Religious transformation has its ultimate sights set on the whole world and be-
yond. If one listens to the vision, common within many religious traditions, of an
ultimate solution, one hears of a transformation that can have no bounds. Some-
times, such a vision moves faith-based actors to attempt the seemingly impossi-
ble, despite evidence to the contrary. Yet, the kind of transformation seen as pri-
mary often differs from that stressed by secular peacebuilders. The most
common religious theory of change assumes that peace will be built to the extent
that people-to-people efforts are in accord with a transcendent vision, design or
transformation process. That is, a religious peacebuilder is not tied only to a spe-
cific human agenda, even when it is the funder’s!
Therefore, faith-based actors prioritize outcomes that are more often related
to change of an individual person or a primary group, rather than at the socio-
political level. In fact, many faith-based peacebuilders see their people-to-peo-
ple efforts as the most effective way to facilitate structural change and sustain-
able peacebuilding. They may even resist pressure from secular peacebuilders to
redirect their attention. This distinction between secular and religious peace-
builders, however, is one of emphasis since many religious peacebuilders also
work directly for social and structural transformation.
In sum, evaluation of faith-based peacebuilding must provide ways to assess
action that is grounded in a conviction regarding the existence of the superna-
tural, a powerful, transcendent presence as manifest in five distinct features.
The religious peacebuilder understands accountability as faithfulness to a tran-
scendent process more than a commitment to implementing projects and pro-
grammes. The faithfulness is rooted in a distinctive value system which provides
a specific worldview and moral code. Success (or failure) is determined in light
of supernatural, as well as human, agency. The faith-based peacebuilder is mo-
tivated by sense of supernatural guidance and direction, leading the religiously
motivated actor to become part of a uniquely faith-based process of transforma-
tion. So, for evaluating religious peacebuilding, the primary question is not how
one measures the transcendent, but how one takes into consideration the effect
of that conviction. How does one factor that consideration into the way one de-
signs and implements the entire evaluation process?
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3 Three Common Components within Religious
and Secular Peacebuilding Experience
Psychologist Jonathan Haidt, in his book, The Righteous Mind writes about the na-
ture of religiosity – the function of experience, activity and belief within religion:
Supernatural agents do, of course, play a central role in religion, just as the actual football
is at the centre of the whirl of activity on game day… But trying to understand the persis-
tence and passion of religion by studying beliefs about God is like trying to understand the
persistence and passion of… football by studying the movements of the ball. You’ve got to
broaden the inquiry. You’ve got to look at the ways that religious beliefs work with religious
practices to create a religious community (Haidt 2012, 290).
Haidt goes on to describe believing, doing and belonging as three distinct, com-
plimentary components of religiosity, each influencing the other (Figure 1). He
proposes that one cannot understand the faith phenomenon without examining
the interactive relationship between these three. In fact, he claims that belonging
is the most fundamental, while the purpose of believing and doing is to support
the faith community to which one belongs. He proposes that the specific role be-
liefs and conviction play in this relationship is to create rational explanations
designed to support both of the other two – what the believer does and, most
important, where the believer belongs.
We have here a creative presentation of the role of the supernatural within reli-
gious faith – as a belief, but more than that, a presence that provides an ultimate
experience of belonging, and a source of motivation that pervades what the be-
liever does. Finally, there is the faith community to which one belongs, which
shares the belief and legitimizes one’s activity.
DoingBelieving
Belonging
Figure 1: Haidt’s components of religiosity
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It is important to note that these three dynamics operate on all members of a
community, whether they see themselves as religiously motivated or not, as they
inform the underlying value systems and social norms that are passed on to all.
We can, therefore, draw parallels with the secular field of peacebuilding which
certainly has its own forms of belief or conviction and identification of the prop-
er activities that constitute the work of building peace. Within peacebuilding,
there is also emphasis placed on belonging, not only to the community of actors
with whom one works, but to the many communities which the secular peace-
builder seeks to heal, strengthen and empower. In this case, one might also con-
clude that peacebuilders’ convictions are formed in response to what they do,
and most importantly, the quality of belonging they help to create and to
which they belong.
Certainly the process of evaluation within both religious and the secular
peacebuilding must take into account the interrelationship of these three: beliefs
and convictions, activities in which we engage, and the communities of belong-
ing we seek to enhance, often framed as “improving social cohesion” among sec-
ular peacebuilders. Within both peacebuilder networks, there is an ongoing
assessment of all three, albeit using different lenses, which sometimes empha-
size the dissimilarities.
How to do this? First, when working within faith-based contexts, peacebuild-
ing and professional evaluation must respect indigenous religious frameworks of
believing, including assumptions about the supernatural. Any effective evalua-
tion of a peacebuilding process and its results, therefore, will assess the degree
to which the desired transformation is informed by the wisdom and values found
within the indigenous faith tradition. Such an assessment requires an examina-
tion of the role played by beliefs and their underlying values in the process of
attitude change. The importance of this kind of inner personal transformation,
and the specific way in which beliefs become important indicators is explored
in the last part of the following section presenting a framework for evaluation
of faith-based peacebuilding.
Second, professional evaluation of faith-based peacebuilding should exam-
ine the doing. – the activities performed in order to facilitate all the levels of
transformation – inner personal, inter-personal, social and structural. This
must include faith-based adaptations of traditional peacebuilding practice and
various categories of distinct religious practice (addressed separately in the
rest of the chapter).
Third, to broaden and deepen the sense of belonging within faith-based con-
texts, the evaluator must address the fundamental basis upon which each spe-
cific faith community’s identity and solidarity is based, as well as its understand-
ing of its moral commitment to “the other.” All faith traditions include some
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vision of a desired, wholesome relationship within and beyond their in-group.
The way this vision is understood within one specific faith tradition can vary
greatly depending on its status within a given society and the interpretation
given to its defining narrative. Effective faith-based peacebuilding evaluation
must begin by asking questions about their perspective rather than assuming
the superiority of the non-indigenous perspective.
4 A Framework for Evaluation of Faith-Based
Peacebuilding
4.1 Purpose
Jonathan Haidt, in the previous section, proposed three essential components of
religiosity, each of which is also very important to peacebuilding and professional
evaluation. Insights from these key components of religiosity fit well into basic
frameworks developed by professional evaluators. In fact, the field of professional
evaluation of peacebuilding has much to contribute that supports and augments
such an approach to the evaluation of faith-based peacebuilding.
Evaluation of a peacebuilding initiative can be understood as an effort to
support accountability, understanding and learning by determining the merit,
worth or significance of what has happened and been achieved.⁴ These three
foci, derived from professional evaluation, are also relevant to faith-based peace-
builders, because they can be applied to the distinctive nature of religious peace-
building (as presented in Table 1 and described in detail in the rest of the chap-
ter). Merit, worth and significance correspond to the three interconnected
components of faith experience – believing, doing and belonging.
Table 1: Foci of Professional Religious Peacebuilding Evaluation
Focus of Professional Evaluation Focus of Religious Peacebuilding Evaluation
Merit is about intrinsic qualities, performance
or results of an intervention – how well the
activities implemented meet the needs of
those it intends to serve.
Excellence of performance of the religious
peacebuilding process, including use of faith-
based practices and religious networks, as
described below, to facilitate personal and
communal transformation. (Doing)
 See American Evaluation Association (ND).
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Table : Foci of Professional Religious Peacebuilding Evaluation (Continued)
Focus of Professional Evaluation Focus of Religious Peacebuilding Evaluation
Worth is the extrinsic quality of an interven-
tion or its results – the value of the pro-
gramme for the broader community or society.
Value of the results of peacebuilding efforts,
whether they are in line with the faith tradi-
tion’s vision of community and sense of pur-
pose, as informed by its worldview, values
and source of motivation based on the faith’s
understanding of human and supernatural
agency. (Belonging)
Significance is the potential importance of the
intervention or the influence of its results –
the prospect that the programme will have
more or different merit or worth.
Importance of what has been done and ach-
ieved in light of the faith-tradition’s under-
standing of accountability and standards for
measuring success, both of which are influ-
enced by belief in the transcendent interven-
tion of the supernatural as described below.
(Believing)
As previously noted by Haidt, the distinctive role played by belief, including af-
firmation of the supernatural, is to explain or legitimize any activity undertaken
as well as the understanding of belonging, the ultimate objective. Discerning
(but not measuring) the influence of belief helps establish the significance of
the peacebuilding effort. Religious belief, then, can influence the way in
which faith-based actors conceptualize each of the following criteria typically
used in the professional evaluation of peacebuilding interventions:⁵
1. Efficiency measures how cost-effectively resources used in a peacebuilding
effort are converted to results. Religious actors’ sense of motivation affects
how they will view efficiency.
2. Effectiveness measures the extent to which a peacebuilding activity attains
results within its immediate environment. Religious actors’ understanding
of accountability influences how they view effectiveness.
3. Impact refers to the wider effects produced by a peacebuilding intervention –
positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended. Religious
peacebuilders’ understanding of success/failure affects how they think
about impact.
4. Relevance is the extent to which the peacebuilding activity is suited to the
priorities and policies of the parties in conflict, the peacebuilders and
 Adapted here from OECD, Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fra-
gility: Improving Learning for Results, 65–71.
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other stakeholders. The distinct sets of values, held by each group – reli-
gious or secular, will influence relevance.
5. Sustainability is concerned with assessing whether the benefits of a peace-
building activity are likely to continue after the intervention ends. The way
faith-based peacebuilders conceive of transformation affects how they
view sustainability.
These five criteria are neither all obligatory nor exhaustive. In each evaluation,
one or more are chosen or prioritized. Furthermore, other criteria may be added,
such as coherence and coordination. In addition to providing an assessment of
the purpose for an evaluation and guiding the selection of criteria to be used, the
framework needs to address the type of activity to be evaluated.
4.2 Types of Activity
Many of the types of activity involved in faith-based peacebuilding (e.g. media-
tion, conciliation, dialogue, educational efforts, advocacy, problem solving, or
structural reform) are also performed by secular peacebuilders. In particular, re-
ligious actors will adapt their efforts in order to fulfil the specific needs of faith
communities. For example, advocacy efforts are likely to include specific reli-
gious activities such as preaching or fasting. Intermediary efforts might include
faith-based storytelling, interfaith dialogue sessions or inter-religious round ta-
bles that produce joint statements.
However, some distinct categories of religious practice are used by faith-
based peacebuilders, sometimes as part of traditional activities, sometimes as
stand-alone activities. Five such practices are of particular significance: expres-
sions of piety, education/proclamation, rituals, reconciliation processes and
faith witness, living out one’s faith in the world. These practices will be explored
in detail in the next section on selecting an evaluation methodology.
4.3 Importance of Attitudinal Change
Professional peacebuilding evaluation has increasingly recognized the impor-
tance of personal and public attitudes, especially within fragile contexts. In
fact, the OECD DAC guidelines for professional evaluation recognize the impor-
tance of assessing this kind of subjective experience (OECD 2012, 64–65):
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Many interventions work to build peace and prevent conflict by creating change in people’s
attitudes, thought processes, and relationships. In such cases, it may be necessary to collect
attitudinal data, conduct interviews,workshops, or focus group discussions with stakehold-
ers, or carry out surveys to collect quantitative data. Measuring intangible changes in areas
such as perceptions through interviews requires the same triangulation vetting as other
types of data.
Changes in attitude are especially important in faith-based peacebuilding. The
identification of significance, as one of the central foci of effective evaluation,
requires asking what the parties involved see as high priority in the process of
transformation. Given the centrality of inner personal transformation – individ-
ual and collective – to faith-based peacebuilding, it is essential to assess when,
why and how people’s attitudes change and how to utilize such data to inform
future intervention efforts. For religious peacebuilders, attitudinal change is not
merely a precursor to behavioural change. Instead, it is viewed as a central, un-
derlying dynamic that pervades the entire transformation process. Much of the
time it is less visible, yet can play a critical role, especially prior to the emergence
of the more visible behavioural changes.
For the faith-based peacebuilder, the task of discerning even the least visible
sign, just the possibility, of change in peoples’ perceptions is very important.
Faith-based actors are less likely to abandon a hoped for significant behavioural
change,when they sense, in themselves or others, even the slightest beginning of
a change in someone’s mental outlook. For example, even a minor lessening of
acrimonious remarks may be just enough expression of openness for a religious
peacebuilder to see it as an initial steppingstone to a not yet seen behavioural
transformation. Yet, attitude change is also seen as useful, in itself, even if
there is little or no apparent behavioural change.
For the evaluator of religious peacebuilding, the challenge is to take into ac-
count attitudinal changes perceived through intuition and insight beyond what
is known through the five senses. For example, informants declaring “I sense
their attitudes are changing” must be seen as process indicators because the be-
lief or conviction in changing attitudes can be the key to moving forward (or
backward) in religious peacebuilding.
The role of belief in relation to attitudinal formation and change is especially
relevant to faith-based peacebuilding. Expressions of belief can be important in-
dicators of underlying attitudes, both negative and positive. Identifying patterns
of belief can be used to point to either constancy or change in someone’s per-
spective. Yet, even changes in belief often take time to emerge. Once the refram-
ing of beliefs has begun, however, it can signal the presence of even deeper
changes in attitude toward other groups and serve the important role of explain-
ing and legitimizing new patterns of behaviour. Designing a process that will as-
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sess these kinds of changes in participant attitudes about beliefs can provide ex-
tremely important data to be fed into a major learning process which can help
redirect the faith-based intervention.
5 Selecting a Religious Peacebuilding Evaluation
Methodology
5.1 Overview
Professional evaluation gathers and analyses quantitative and qualitative data⁶
to inform learning, decision-making and action. The field has been conceptually
visualized by Marvin Alkin⁷, as a tree with three main branches: methods, values
and use (see Figure 2) (Alkin 2010). An evaluation theory, or approach prescrib-
ing how to evaluate “must consider: (a) issues related to the methodology being
used, (b) the manner in which the data are to be judged or valued, and (c) the
user focus of the evaluation effort.” (Carden and Alkin 2012, 103) Most evaluators
are influenced by the theoretical approaches represented by all three branches,
but individual evaluators tend to emphasize one over the others.
In the methods branch, scientific research methodology is the central focus.
Although there are many quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods, evalua-
tors who emphasize methods as central to evaluation tend to demand rigorous
adherence to experimental and quasi-experimental designs that determine cau-
sation by establishing the difference between what an intervention achieved (the
factual), and what would have been achieved without the intervention (the coun-
terfactual).⁸ These experimental approaches to evaluation are inappropriate for
 Quantitative data can be statistically aggregated and numerically compared and contrasted to
produce broad, generalizable sets of findings presented succinctly. In contrast, qualitative data
produces a wealth of data usually from a relatively small number of people responding to open
questions. This increases the depth of understanding but reduces generalizability. The “quanti-
quali” data can be complimentary, for example,when you need to know what happened but also
so what does it mean to people. (Patton 2015, 22).
 Marvin C. Alkin’s research includes Evaluation Essentials: From A to Z, Debates on Evaluation,
Evaluation Roots, and the four-volume Encyclopedia of Educational Research. Dr Alkin is current-
ly co-section Editor of the American Journal of Evaluation.
 These evaluations require random controlled trials (RCTs) using a “treatment” group and one
or more comparison groups. In these evaluation modes, causation in religious peacebuilding
work would be determined by comparing the results of interreligious peacebuilding in one pop-
ulation (of individuals, groups, communities, or countries) with the same results in a similar
population not subject to those peacebuilding activities.
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religious peacebuilding because attempting to establish experimentally that
there has or has not been the presence of the supernatural in a faith-based
peacebuilding intervention will be, not only a fruitless task,⁹ but not relevant
to an evaluation of the role such beliefs play. Furthermore, most if not virtually
all religious peacebuilding falls within the 70% of development interventions
that cannot be evaluated experimentally.¹⁰
As presented in the introduction of this paper, evaluation which is relevant
to faith-based peacebuilding needs to provide ways to evaluate a religious
peacebuilding initiative that is grounded in belief in the supernatural. For this
purpose, the two other branches of evaluation theory are relevant. The valuing
branch emphasizes that evaluation is basically about making value judgments.
The use branch stresses the utility of evaluation for the stakeholders of the proj-
ect, programme or organization being evaluated. There are dozens of evaluation




Figure 2: Alkin’s evaluation tree
 There have been at least two rigorously experimental studies of supernatural causation in re-
ligious interventions. One study concludes that “the findings are equivocal” about proving or
disproving supernatural intervention. “…although some of the results of individual studies sug-
gest a positive effect of intercessory prayer, the majority do not, and the evidence does not sup-
port a recommendation either in favor or against the use of intercessory prayer.We are not con-
vinced that further trials of this intervention should be undertaken and would prefer to see any
resources available for such a trial used to investigate other questions in health care.” (Roberts,
Ahmed and Davison 2009)
 Bamberger, Rugh, and Mabry (2012) estimate that experimental methods are applicable, at
best, in 5% of development interventions and quasi-experimental in between 10% and 25%
of interventions.
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5.2 Key Components of an Evaluation of Faith-based
Peacebuilding
In selecting what approach or mix of approaches is appropriate for evaluating a
specific faith-based peacebuilding initiative, three essential components must be
considered: complexity-awareness, participation and the qualitative nature of
the data.
5.2.1 Awareness of Complexity
Religious peacebuilding must be complexity-aware because, like all peacebuild-
ing efforts, it contends with an uncertain and volatile, i.e., complex, reality. This
is how Michael Quinn Patton characterizes the challenge of complexity for eval-
uation:
Complex dynamic situations are characterized by high uncertainty about how to even de-
fine the nature of the problem. Often there is great disagreement among diverse perspec-
tives about what the issue is and strong disagreements about what to do. The situation
is turbulent, dynamic, ever-changing, and variable from one place to another; non-linear
interactions exacerbate the problem and search for solutions within a dynamic system.
Key variables and their interactions are unknown in advance. Each situation is unique
and in flux. Causal explanations are elusive (2018, NP).¹¹
Faith-based peacebuilders face this substantial uncertainty and lack of agree-
ment at the moment of planning their initiative and dynamism during its imple-
mentation. In fact, introduction of supernatural agency, however understood,
adds an infinite dimension to complexity. The relationships of cause and effect
necessary to plan in the conventional manner what to achieve, and how to do it,
often are unknown until they emerge, sometimes with unknown degrees of ef-
fect. Equally important, no situation is 100% complex.
Religious peacebuilding is an area of work in which there is considerable
uncertainty and often a lack of agreement about the nature of the challenge
and how best to address it. To a large extent you do not know what will work
and what will not work, and furthermore, you expect things to change, often dra-
matically, as you work towards peace. Thus, beyond the outputs related to imple-
mentation of planned activities with a reasonable degree of feasibility – organ-
 From the draft of chapter 1 of Michael Quinn Patton’s forthcoming book Principles-Focused
Evaluation.
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izing a conference to re-examine the peace-related values within a faith tradition
or a workshop to train lay people in faith-based approaches to trauma healing—,
as a faith-based peacebuilder, you would naturally be inclined to depend on
some kind of inspired direction in order to assess what else to attempt faced
with a very unstable environment. Given the high degree of uncertainty facing
efforts to turn these training initiatives into significant accomplishments, you fol-
low the guidance you believe you have received. You devise a tentative plan of
action and see what is effective in generating the results you believe are consis-
tent with the guidance you received. The greater the complexity the more fre-
quently you have to take stock, seek re-direction and make decisions on what
to do next – i.e., practice spiritually inspired adaptive management.
5.2.2 Participation
In religious peacebuilding where process is as important as results, inner per-
sonal transformation is central. Thus, it is essential to have the actors involved
in religious peacebuilding provide information and insights into when, why
and how their attitudes and behaviour change. In fact, in faith-based peace-
building, attitudinal change tends to be more important than new knowledge
and skills in explaining changes in behaviour. Participatory evaluation methods
generate credible data on attitudinal change with which to assess the kinds of
value systems and dynamics typical of faith-based peacebuilding evaluation.
Participatory methodologies provide key stakeholders with a voice and an oppor-
tunity to present more of their perspective than is typically the case in conven-
tional evaluations. For example, Appreciative Inquiry, Most Significant Change
and Outcome Harvesting are approaches that can provide stakeholders with a
voice to inform an evaluation with data, analysis and interpretation and enable
evaluators to arrive at more solid evidence-based answers to evaluation ques-
tions.¹²
5.2.3 Use of Qualitative Methods
The collection of subjective data – how an individual person perceives change,
or the lack of it – is important information for the faith-based peacebuilder and
evaluator to understand the inner transformation process. Finding effective ways
 See “Approaches,” Better Evaluation (ND) for more information.
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to track such changes is important to achieving the purpose of learning and tak-
ing action to improve performance and results, and in the process demonstrating
accountability to donors. Consequently, in addition to being complexity sensitive
and participatory, appropriate approaches for faith-based peacebuilding will use
a variety of qualitative data-gathering methods: review of documents such as re-
ports, chronicles and personal and communal histories, storytelling, opinion
surveys, observations, interviews, and focus groups.
6 Design of Faith-based Peacebuilding
Evaluation Questions
In order to generate evidence of merit, worth or significance of peacebuilding and
the influence of belief in supernatural intervention, a first step in an evaluation
process is to identify appropriate questions to be answered through complexity-
aware, participative and qualitative evaluation approaches that will fulfil the pur-
pose and objectives of the evaluation. For example, this is a generic question when
the purpose is to understand the results of a religious peacebuilding project or pro-
gramme: To what extent are the outcomes achieved by our peacebuilding practice
in line with the faith tradition’s values, vision, and peace mission?
These questions guide the process of designing and implementing an eval-
uation of a religious peacebuilding initiative. In the first column of Table 2
below, we present sample evaluative questions that can be asked about five dif-
ferent categories of religious peacebuilding practice,¹³ each of which is influ-
enced by belief in the supernatural, the most distinctive factor of religious versus
secular peacebuilding.¹⁴ These evaluation questions could guide the implemen-
tation of the evaluation when its purpose is to generate understanding about the
faith-based peacebuilding process.
Those questions must not be confused, however, with the questions that will
be asked of informants when collecting the data through surveys, interviews,
questionnaires, in focus groups and so forth to generate credible data with
 These categories are the designation of one of the authors, David Steele. The publication of
his that comes the closest to capturing some of this perspective is Steele, “An Introductory Over-
view to Faith-Based Peacebuilding.”
 These are not exclusive categories. They are based on David Steele’s experience teaching and
facilitating religious peacebuilding. For an original, though somewhat different, formulation,
see Steele (2008, 22–35). Reference to this same formulation, though with less detailed, can
be found in an upcoming publication by Patton and Steele, Action Guide on Religion and Recon-
ciliation.
154 David Steele and Ricardo Wilson-Grau
which to answer the evaluation questions. In the second column are samples of
these questions that might be asked of informants who were participants in the
faith-based peacebuilding process in order to obtain data with which to answer
the evaluation questions.We emphasize that all of these questions are samples.
In fact, many of the issues covered within one category could as easily apply to
another – for example questions about whether it led to mitigation of conflict or
transformation of relationships, or what kind of impact or value was realized.
Table 2: Questions to Use in Evaluating Faith-based Peacebuilding Practice by Categories of
Religious Practice
Expressions of piety: through worship, sacrament, prayer, meditation.
Significance: Direct encounter with the supernatural, as both beneficiary and respondent – the
ultimate arena in which the interaction of human and supernatural agency is experienced.
Frequently, this is the context within which one is reminded of the ultimate, unparalleled po-
tential impact of all supernatural intervention, as well as one’s own potential role as part of the
process. Piety leads to a sense of motivation, guidance, direction or calling to which the be-
liever can respond.
Sample questions for the evaluation to
answer
Sample questions for evaluators to ask partic-
ipants to obtain the answers
. What is the purpose for which a specific
expression of piety was designed?
. What changes do participants believe
happened, in themselves or others, as a
result of participation in acts of piety?
. How effectively was the experience of piety
reflected upon and used to foster further
transformation of individuals or of rela-
tionships between disparate parties?
– In what ways did participation in (x) act of
piety change your attitude toward other
groups? Or toward specific individuals within
other groups?
– What caused such changes?
– Following participation in (x) act of piety,
what changes have you noticed in attitude or
behaviour on the part of other members of
your group toward other groups or individu-
als—if any?
Education/proclamation: through use of scripture, teaching, preaching, moral edicts, public
statements.
Significance: More than imparting of information and skills, the intent is formation and inter-
nalization of a worldview, framework of meaning, value system – derived from the faith tradi-
tion’s basic narrative found within its foundational, spiritual source material.
Sample questions for the evaluation to
answer
Sample questions for evaluators to ask partic-
ipants to obtain the answers
. How effectively has the faith tradition’s
narrative laid a foundation for participants
to internalize the peace-related values and
concomitant ethical behaviour inherent
within their spiritual tradition?
– How do you evaluate the extent to which
through this peacebuilding activity you have
understood and internalized your tradition’s
peace values and behavioural norms?
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Table : Questions to Use in Evaluating Faith-based Peacebuilding Practice by Categories of
Religious Practice (Continued)
. To what extent have participants succeed-
ed in mitigating conflict dynamics by act-
ing in accord with their tradition’s peace-
related values?
– In what specific ways did your understanding
of your faith tradition’s peace related values
motivate you to be a peacebuilder?
– What kinds of action did you attempt in an
effort to mitigate the specific conflict situa-
tion?
Did your faith tradition provide you with in-
sights that helped you to assess the peace-
building problem? How?
– Has your perception of your faith’s perspec-
tive on tolerance changed? If so how? Toward
whom?
– Has your perception of your faith’s call for
compassion or hospitality changed? If so,
how? With whom?
– Did your faith offer you any insight about
what kinds of structural change you promot-
ed in this peacebuilding activity? Or how to
approach this task?
Rituals: (rites, symbolic expression, customs, ceremonies) which can be used either to promote or
inhibit transformation: fasting, funerals, weddings, purification rites, rites of passage or mem-
bership, healing rituals, ceremonies of celebration or dedication, observance of holy holidays.
Significance: Sequence of sacred, customary activities involving gestures, words, and objects
dramatizes the human/supernatural encounter, connecting past tradition with present context
that fully engages the participant in remembrance, affirmation of belonging, catharsis, reas-
sessment of perspective, reframing of worldview and values, or formalization and celebration of
agreement.
Sample questions for the evaluation to
answer
Sample questions for evaluators to ask partic-
ipants to obtain the answers
. How effectively has the use of ritual led to
noticeable change in participants’ or
members of adversarial groups’ emotional
response to memorable events, or to pro-
posals for reconciliation or dispute reso-
lution?
– Following participation in a given ritual in the
peacebuilding initiative, has there been any
noticeable change in emotional response to
memorable events on the part of partici-
pants’ or members of adversarial groups?
Whose response (doesn’t have to be an in-
dividual, could be particular gathering, etc.)?
What happened?
– Did anyone propose reconciliation or dis-
pute resolution? Who proposed what,
when and where?
– What changes have occurred in participants’
perceptions of historical wounds or recent
losses, dysfunctional or disrupted relation-
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Table : Questions to Use in Evaluating Faith-based Peacebuilding Practice by Categories of
Religious Practice (Continued)
ships, possible alterations in their world-
view?
– What are the implications of specific values
inherent within their faith tradition?
Reconciliation Processes: Examples: TRCs (S. Africa and elsewhere), Islamic Sulha, Jewish Te-
shuva, and Buddhist mindfulness meditation.
Significance: Spiritual practices involving dialogue and mediation enable adversaries to move
toward the restoration of right relations – frequently helping parties to mourn losses, face fears,
accept “the other,” admit wrongdoing, forgive, repent (commit to change), engage in restorative
justice, and enter into joint problem solving.
Sample questions for the evaluation to
answer
Sample questions for evaluators to ask partic-
ipants to obtain the answers
. What were the most significant behavioural
transformations for participants and others
that resulted from the reconciliation proc-
esses in which they participated?
. Why do the faith-based participants be-
lieve some transformations they experi-
ence during or following reconciliation
processes are more significant than oth-
ers?
. To what extent did the reconciliation proc-
ess assist, or have the potential to assist,
conflicted parties to resolve disputes and
mitigate conflicts of values?
– In which kinds of faith-based reconciliation
processes have you participated? What mo-
tivated you to take part?
– In what context (within or outside the inter-
vention being evaluated)?
– Which kinds of processes were included?
(handling grief, admitting wrongdoing, re-
penting, forgiving, engaging in restorative
justice?)
– What benefit do you believe you received?
What about other participants?
– What parts of the experience were difficult?
Why?
– To what extent did the process cause you to
change your views or actions or those of
other participants?
– How effectively did it enable you to relinquish
any bondage to hurt and resentment?
– Do you believe this reconciliation process
has the potential to assist conflicted parties
to resolve disputes and mitigate conflicts of
values?
– Do other participants believe this? Which kinds
of conflicts? Any specific ones? How might this
process help resolve such conflicts?
Faith witness: Living out one’s faith in the world through storytelling, religious music/drama/
art, diapraxis (combination of dialogue and collaborative action), problem solving and structural
reform.
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Table : Questions to Use in Evaluating Faith-based Peacebuilding Practice by Categories of
Religious Practice (Continued)
Significance: A response to participation in a sacred presence transforms oneself, builds
community and leads to implementation of guidance or calling. Sometimes involves patient
waiting or action motivated by hope, based ultimately on a transcendent promise.¹⁵
Sample questions for the evaluation to answer Sample questions for evaluators to ask par-
ticipants to obtain the answers
. How effectively does participation in a given
act of faith witness provide a healthy sense
of belonging – bonding with one’s own
identity group and bridging the divides be-
tween groups?
. To what extent does participation motivate
the believer to engage in the kind of dia-
logue that leads to peacebuilding activity?
. What do participants consider is the value
of their faith witness?
– Has your participation in a specific act of
faith witness in the peacebuilding activity
influenced your understanding of belong-
ing to your own group? How?
– Has it influenced your understanding of
communal solidarity with members of other
groups? How?
– Has it helped you to see potential ways to
bridge the divides between groups? How?
– How did you view the waiting process be-
fore any results can be seen?
– What kept you committed?
– What did you learn?
– What did you hope to achieve?
– What do your answers to these questions
say about the potential value of your faith
witness?
The specific mix of religious practices that are used in peacebuilding depends on
the challenge and context, just as do the results they achieve. This is also true for
the evaluation questions that, in addition, must be customized to the specific
faith-based peacebuilding initiative and its context.
The questions asked in Table 2 focus on evaluating both attitudinal and be-
havioural change in relation to five of the most important practices found in reli-
gious peacebuilding that incorporate normative peace values. The primary reason
for using these questions would be to gain an understanding of the role the five
religious practices played in a specific peacebuilding process. A change in the
way a belief is understood or applied can be an important indication of significant
attitude change. Once a change in basic outlook is discerned, then what might be
 Examples: The film “Pray the Devil Back to Hell” (story of Muslim and Christian women gath-
ering to pray, sing and calling for peace in Liberia), Accompaniment of victims (Mennonite
peacemaker teams), Interfaith choirs (Pontanima Choir in Sarajevo), non-violent peaceful pro-
test (Gandhi; Martin Luther King Jr.; People Power in Philippines; Bringing down communist re-
gimes in Eastern Europe; Arab Spring.)
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called the reformed parameters of belief can play a critical role in searching for
ways to bring behaviour more in line with the revised understanding of faith.
The inherent sacred insights and moral principles, now realigned, can assist in ex-
plaining and legitimizing the new set of behaviours. Even small steps of behaviou-
ral change, taken with this degree of faith-based authenticity, have the potential of
evolving into a significant, specific peacebuilding outcome.
Throughout the process, the role of the evaluator is to collect and analyse
important data related to degrees of change in belief, attitude and behaviour.
In addition, the evaluator can assist faith-based facilitators in the interpretation
of the data and exploration of its application, in light of the particular belief and
value system of the stakeholders. Of course, the accommodations to worldview,
language, symbols and rituals must encompass all of the faith groups implicat-
ed – which adds to the complexity, especially if the different groups involved
have markedly different perspectives and interpretations. Yet, a redesigned
faith-based peacebuilding initiative, enlightened by an evaluation, would be bet-
ter positioned to enhance the attitudinal and behavioural transformation neces-
sary to build sustainable, inclusive and peaceful community.
7 Illustration of an Evaluation Process Within a
Faith-Based Context
Utilization-Focused Evaluation (U-FE)¹⁶ is one methodology that is especially
promising for evaluating faith-based peacebuilding. Michael Quinn Patton, the
principal architect of this evaluation theory, says in the fourth edition of Qualita-
tive Research & Evaluation Methods about the utilization-focus: “epistemologically,
the orientation of pragmatic qualitative inquiry is that what is useful is true.” In
other words, the purpose of the methodology is to apply evaluative thinking
and generate data to serve the principal uses of the primary intended users in
order to enhance the process and enrich the findings of the evaluation. Utiliza-
tion-Focused Evaluation focuses on obtaining “actionable answers to practical
questions to support programme improvement, guide problem-solving, enhance
decision-making, and ensure the utility and actual use of findings.”¹⁷ This ap-
 See Utilization-Focused Evaluation (ND)
 In addition to Patton’s pragmatic, utilization-focused evaluation criteria, there are others
that may be promising for evaluating peacebuilding in faith-based contexts because they priv-
ilege the experiences of the participants in an intervention. Social construction and constructi-
vist approaches take into account multiple perspectives on participants’ experiences. Artistic or
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proach can utilize the data collected from questions that relate to beliefs and per-
ception of belonging, as well as those that are focused on assessing attitudinal
and behavioural transformation as long as the role of each type of question is
clear. Not only can these evaluation questions provide useful data, the questions
regarding belief and values can play a crucially important role in the process of
interpreting and analysing the data as well as proposing lessons learned which
are consistent with the insights and moral principles of the participants’ faith tra-
ditions.
Outcome Harvesting is a utilization-focused approach that is complexity-
sensitive, participatory and qualitative.¹⁸ Here we will use it to illustrate an eval-
uation with respect to faith-based reconciliation based on a real case. The sub-
ject of the evaluation is the fictitious International Inter-Religious Reconciliation
Initiative (IIRI), an effort by secular and religious, indigenous and external
peacebuilders in a tense, faith-based context.
1. The primary intended users – the IIRI executive council – clarify that their
uses for the evaluation process and findings are to obtain evidence between
early 2011 and mid 2018 with which to take decisions to improve their recon-
ciliation efforts. In the light of that use, the users affirm that they need an-
swers to reconciliation questions 7, 8 and 9 (Table 2) above.
2. With the evaluator, the users agree what information is required to answer
the three questions:
a. The outcomes achieved
b. Their significance
c. How the users’ intervention contributed to the outcome
d. The role, if any, that belief in the supernatural played
3. Through interviews with the participants in IIRI’s reconciliation programme,
the evaluator obtains the information presented in Table 3.
4. The evaluator verifies the accuracy of the data with independent, authorita-
tive sources.
5. With credible, verified data about the religious peacebuilding process and
results, the evaluator provides evidenced-based answers to the three recon-
ciliation evaluation questions.
Here in Table 3 we exemplify the collection of data. After the table, we present
answers to the three evaluation questions informed by that data.
“connoisseurship” evaluation evokes participants’ experiences. Participatory and collaborative
evaluation modes involve participants. Critical change approaches empower participants (Patton
2015, 698).
 See the community of practice website Outcome Harvesting (ND).
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Table 3: Fictitious Outcome Harvesting Example¹⁹
Instructions: Describe the following four dimensions of faith-based peacebuilding coordinated
by the International Inter-Religious Reconciliation Initiative.
. Outcome . Significance . Contribution . Belief in the Super-
natural
What was the change
in behaviour that rep-
resents progress to-
wards reconciliation?
When did who do
what and where, as a
result of IIRI’s recon-
ciliation work?





How did IIRI influence
the outcome? When
did IIRI do what spe-
cifically that influ-
enced the change in
behaviour described
in the first column?
To what extent was
supernatural agency
present in the out-
come and the inter-
vention?
. In February ,
 exiled Sunni reli-
gious, tribal and com-
munity leaders return
to their home village
to meet with  Shia
counterparts from the
same village.
In , during one of
the peaks of Sunni-
Shia violence in Iraq,
these Sunni religious




In early , IIRI
ends a year of building
relationships with the
Sunni and Shia groups
and brings some of
the Sunnis back to the
village to participate
with their Shia coun-
terparts in an IIRI led
dialogue.
No effort is made to
assess influence of
belief in the superna-
tural.
. In the course of
–, most of
the Sunni exiles move
back to their village
from Jordan. Inter-reli-
gious committees





The Sunni residents of
this village had lived
as refugees in Jordan
for five years, afraid
for their lives if they
returned.
From early  to
early , IIRI with a




both Shia and Sunni
leaders to engage in
reconciliation dia-
logue.
In late , people
from both Sunni and
Shia communities
publicly thank Allah
for relieving them from
overwhelming, crip-
pling fear and provid-
ing a window of hope.
. In June , the
ISIS militia overruns
this village and kills or
forces into exile the
local leadership of the
The reconciliation ef-
fort not only falls





the danger of ISIS.
ISIS influenced a num-
ber of young men,
claiming that Allah had
spoken directly to the
leaders of their move-
 All references to specific entities in this illustration are fictitious with the exception of ISIS
(the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and the Shia Popular Mobilization Units.
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Table : Fictitious Outcome Harvesting Example (Continued)




Shia violence of ten
years ago.
ments, the Shia Popu-
lar Mobilization Units
and Sunni ISIS (in both
cases led by influential
clerics with hereditary




. In March  the
Iraqi army ended ISIS
control in this village.
About % of the
previous Shia popula-
tion will return. How-
ever, relations are very
tense. Suspicion is at
an even higher level
than it was in .
In early , IIRI as-
sured the Iraqi gov-
ernment that it would
return to work in the
same village if ISIS is
pushed out.
After serious self-re-
flection about the dis-
astrous end of their
reconciliation pro-
gramme, the leader-
ship of IIRI reaffirm
their belief in Allah’s
call for zakat, which
purifies the believer
who fulfils the obliga-
tion to contribute to




. In early January
, two newly ap-
pointed Sunni and
Shia mullahs decide
to each send  repre-
sentatives
( clerics and
 influential lay per-
sons) to an inter-faith
reconciliation work-
shop.
This is a breakthrough
step because there
had been a mutual
experience of exile




militias and the killing
of both former mul-





In June , IIRI sends
representatives to the




mullahs as well as
lower-level clerics and
influential lay people in
both traditions within
this village. With sup-
port from the Iraqi par-
liament and the local
facilitators, IIRI decides
to sponsor a reconcili-
ation workshop.
IIRI staff spend some
time in intercessory
prayer with Sunni and
Shia Iraqi Muslims,
together with foreign-
ers from both Muslim
traditions and a varie-
ty of Christian de-
nominations to receive
wisdom to know how
best to reply and to
plan.
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Table : Fictitious Outcome Harvesting Example (Continued)
. Outcome . Significance . Contribution . Belief in the Super-
natural
. The third week of
January , all eight
representatives of the
mullahs give glowing
reports of the work-
shop and share the
concern, embraced by
a parliamentary com-
mittee to replicate this
reconciliation process.
Despite just about ev-
eryone’s relief over
the ending of ISIS, the
general communal
perspectives of Sunni




rent success of the
reconciliation meeting
















based on the Islamic
practice of Sulha.
When all their repre-
sentatives returned
with such glowing ac-
counts of this second
reconciliation work-
shop, both Mullahs
say privately that they
believe that Allah has
begun to touch the
hearts of a few of their
people and their own
suspicion and fear
begins to turn into a
tentative conviction
that Allah may be
opening a new path-
way of hope.
. In July , the
Sunni and Shia mul-
lahs of the previously
ISIS controlled Iraqi
village commit them-
selves to meeting to
discuss an end to
intra-Muslim, Sunni-
Shia violence.
Since the end of ISIS
control of the village,
although overall vio-
lence had decreased,




and Sunnis in this vil-
lage. These incidents
had directly affected
the families of both
current mullahs.
Since the beginning of
, IIRI had offered
to host the meetings
in a neutral venue.
Both mullahs believ-




pectation, came to the
conclusion that Allah
was calling them to




the two mullahs meet
five times.
These are the first
times that these mul-
lahs have spoken with
each other about the
vengeance killings.
The IIRI had arranged
for a well-known non-










. In the first week of
March , the Shia
mullah issues a fatwa
Another vengeance
killing took place in
December , when
In the beginning of
, discussing the
results of the facilitat-
The Shia mullah cites
his spiritual leader,
the Iraqi Shia ayatol-
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Table : Fictitious Outcome Harvesting Example (Continued)





a Sunni farmer was





the two Mullahs with
the Shia mullah, the
IIRI offered to encour-
age the Sunni mullah
to respond in kind if





use of violence must
be a last resort and
the intention must al-
ways be to create a
pathway toward rec-
onciliation. This con-
vinced the Shia mul-
lah to publicly declare
that “reconciliation
with our Muslim
brothers was an inte-
gral part of Allah’s will
and vengeance killing
was a dire violation of
it.”
. In the second
week of May , the






murder of a Sunni by a
Shia shop owner, the
Sunni community is
convinced that recon-
ciliation will only work
if the aggrieved party
believes that justice
has been done.
Both the Iraqi Sunni
and Shia staff mem-
bers of IIRI meet with
the Sunni mullah
three times in March
and April  fol-
lowing the Shia mul-
lah’s fatwa. They en-
courage the Sunni
mullah to consider
what kind of fatwa he




The Sunni mullah re-
members learning that
Allah does not simply
excuse wrongdoing.
Heinous acts, such as
murder require an ac-
counting. Therefore,





the guilty party, fol-
lowed by full reconci-
liation, is Allah’s will.
Based on this outcome information, which would be duly substantiated with
knowledgeable, independent third parties, the evaluator would answer the
three questions for which they collected outcome data as shown in steps 7, 8
and 9 of Table 2:
164 David Steele and Ricardo Wilson-Grau
7. What were the most significant attitudinal and behavioural transformations
for participants and others that resulted from the reconciliation processes in
which they participated?
Following a turbulent five years (2011–2015) of Sunni return from exile, in-
cipient reconciliation with their Shia neighbours, and the violent takeover
and exile of the Shia community by ISIS, the religious leaders of this com-
munity took solid steps to renewed reconciliation and an end to intra-Mus-
lim violence. Over a year and a half (January 2017–June 2018) the Sunni and
Shia Mullahs and their representatives changed their positions on reconcili-
ation from passive resistance to active support, which took the form of two
fatwas prohibiting intra-Muslim vengeance killings and requiring believers
to engage in reconciliation.
8. Why do the faith-based participants believe some transformations they ex-
perience during or following reconciliation processes are more significant
than others?
In the first and last transformative actions taken by each Mullah, they agreed
that Allah had intervened. Although the intermediate actions were religious-
ly based – “intra-religious violence is morally wrong” and the Koran “en-
couraged reconciliation amongst Muslims” –, it was their belief that Allah
had opened the way which sparked them to issue the fatwas as “the will
of Allah”.
9. To what extent did the reconciliation process assist, or have the potential to
assist, conflicted parties to resolve disputes and mitigate conflicts of values?
Although the two Mullahs both issue a fatwa by mid-2018, these fatwas are
not identical, and they are not issued simultaneously. The Shia fatwa (out-
come #9) is issued first and prohibits vengeance killing and requires recon-
ciliation. The Sunni fatwas (outcome #10) is issued later, and, unlike the
Shia fatwa, there is a condition placed on the ban of vengeance killing.
That fatwa requires accountability to justify a non-violent reconciliation
process because, the mullah says “Allah does not simply excuse wrongdoing.
Heinous acts, such as murder, require an accounting.” The fact that the Sunni
population has experienced even greater trauma than has the Shia commu-
nity may explain why that mullah emphasized different portions of the
Koran representing a difference of values.
In sum, the IIRI staff contributed to an outcome that did not eliminate the
differences completely but allowed for the expression of difference while af-
firming the major goal of encouraging these two religious leaders to publicly
call for an end to vengeance killings.
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As seen in this Outcome Harvesting evaluation example, the ongoing attention of
IIRI staff to the facilitation of self-reflection played a major role in the choices
made. Based on belief in the supernatural by themselves and both key stake-
holders, they assisted various actors, at different points, to reassess their own
perspectives and assist others in that process. Furthermore, there is evidence
that this introspective process led, quite directly, to legitimation and explana-
tion, passed from actor to actor. Each stage in this reflection, explanation, legit-
imation process played a key role in determining the next contribution and in-
fluencing the subsequent outcomes. The final fatwas issued by the two
mullahs would likely not have been feasible without the role played by superna-
tural belief.
Naturally, the ten outcomes contain a wealth of information that can be used
to answer the other nine evaluation questions about the peacebuilding process.
This example illustrates how an evaluator of faith-based peacebuilding can gen-
erate data related to peacebuilding activities, perception of belonging and beliefs
that explain and legitimize both. It also illustrates how the data about beliefs
can help the evaluator to interpret and analyse this data in order, finally, to
draw conclusions and propose lessons learned that can provide faith-based
guidance for ongoing revision of the peacebuilding activities which will better
align with the vision of inclusive communal solidarity and sustainable peace-
building.
8 Conclusion
In sum, we are convinced that the faith in the presence of supernatural agency is
at the core of religious peacebuilding, along with a process of attitudinal change.
This peacebuilding can be evaluated by applying appropriate methods for regis-
tering and appreciating how beliefs in a supernatural presence influenced differ-
ent people to take action, or not. For this, complexity-aware, participatory and
qualitative approaches are particularly applicable to focus on activities and re-
sults, including attitude change, while taking into account what motivates reli-
gious peacebuilders within distinct value systems to pursue transformation.
The influence of religious belief on this process should be apparent in the way
the entire evaluation process is designed and implemented – how criteria are un-
derstood, theories of change viewed, indicators determined, results interpreted,
and lessons learned applied. In that manner, professional evaluation can help
assess the process and results of peacebuilding and explain what motivates re-
ligious peacebuilders within distinct value systems to pursue faith-based trans-
formation. Such learning efforts can, in turn, enable religious actors to remain
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appropriately accountable and ultimately explain the success or failure of their
interventions.
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Michelle Garred, Rebecca Herrington, and Elizabeth Hume
Linking Evaluators and Inter-Religious
Peacebuilders
The Making of an Evaluation Guide
“At a time when religious differences are often used to fan the flames of violence, the role
of faith-based initiatives in building peace can be pivotal…However, inter-religious action—
as a key approach to sustainable peace—still has not recognized its full potential as a force
for sustainable peace.”
—Melanie Greenberg, President and CEO of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2011–2018¹
With funding from the GHR Foundation, the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) and
its partners CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) and Search for Common
Ground (SFCG), in collaboration with a Global Advisory Council, led the Effective
Inter-Religious Action in Peacebuilding Program (EIAP) project between 2015
and 2017.² The project’s substantive learnings to date are captured in its primary
publication: Faith Matters: A Guide for the Designing, Monitoring & Evaluation of
Inter-Religious Action for Peace³ (hereafter referred to as the Faith Matters Guide).
This chapter complements the Faith Matters Guide by exploring the underlying
human learning processes that made the substantive learning possible. In bring-
ing together representatives of two very different stakeholder audiences, evalua-
tors and inter-religious actors, this project set in motion a mutually transfor-
mative exchange. Both groups are essential for progress, and yet previous
communication and collaboration had been minimal. Therefore this chapter
analyses what inter-religious peacebuilders and evaluators learned from each
other during EIAP, unpacking the victories, tensions and challenges they en-
countered, to help illuminate the next phase of effort. The chapter also identifies
real-world ways forward in developing evaluation approaches that both evalua-
tors and inter-religious peacebuilders can embrace.⁴
 See Alliance for Peacebuilding (2021).
 This chapter was written in mid-2017 near the end of EIAP’s initial three-year phase. It reflects
developments up to that time, unless otherwise noted.
 Woodrow et al. 2017. The guide is available at: https://www.dmeforpeace.org/wp-content/up
loads/2017/10/SEPT-26-JF-EIAP-GUIDE-FINAL-UPDATED.pdf. The guide addresses design, moni-
toring and evaluation, but the primary focus throughout most of its development process was
on evaluation.
 The authors appreciate constructive feedback from: David Steele, Nick Oatley, Peter Woodrow,
Sumaye Hamza, Khaled Ehsan, Benjamin Medam and Dilshan Annaraj.
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This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
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1 Background: The Effective Interreligious Action
in Peacebuilding Project
EIAP was driven by the belief that inter-religious action can play an important
role in both religious and secular peacebuilding. The supporting objectives in-
cluded developing a framework for learning, establishing a nascent community
of practice, developing guidance on how to evaluate inter-religious action (the
focus of this chapter), and advocating for policies that support inter-religious ac-
tion in peacebuilding. EIAP began by exploring the ‘state of play’ in the field,
including reviews of relevant literature (Schmidt et al. 2016) and current evalua-
tive practice (Vader 2015). The overarching findings indicated that, despite high
levels of activity and commitment in the inter-religious peacebuilding field, ex-
amples of good evaluation practice and customized tools for carrying it out
were exceedingly scarce. Those findings shaped the priorities for EIAP action.
1.1 EIAP Activities
Early in the project, the Global Advisory Council (GAC) was created, consisting of
religious leaders and practitioners of multiple faiths, to advise and provide intel-
lectual continuity for EIAP activities. The three lead partner organizations recog-
nized this faith-based community of practice as critical, particularly since the
lead partners themselves are all secular organizations. The community of prac-
tice was supported by SFCG’s launch of an online interface (DM&E for Peace
2015) to provide an opportunity for practitioners, evaluators, academics, and do-
nors to share resources and lessons learned.
Beginning in 2016, CDA produced an initial draft of the Faith Matters guide,
incorporating a range of tools, processes and methods for application in widely
differing contextual and organizational circumstances. The field-testing of the
guide by seven organizations became a central component of EIAP. Three testing
organizations were selected through a competitive mini-grant process: Sindh
Community Foundation (in Pakistan), the Rossing Centre for Education and Dia-
logue (in Jerusalem), and the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda. Additionally,
four larger organizations agreed to test the Faith Matters guide using their
own resources: SFCG (in Kyrgyzstan), Mercy Corps (in Myanmar), World Vision
(in Kenya and Lebanon), and a multi-regional programme at Catholic Relief Serv-
ices (CRS).
Throughout the project, AfP engaged donors and policymakers in the United
States and Europe to share principles for effective evaluation of inter-religious
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action, including how policies and donor practices can promote or inhibit inter-
religious action in peacebuilding.
1.2 Challenges Encountered
The sheer diversity of EIAP stakeholders is vast: practitioners and advisors, reli-
gious and secular, grassroots organizations and global networks, seasoned vet-
erans and new voices. Nonetheless, when viewed in overarching terms, EIAP
has two primary audiences – the largely secular evaluation community and
the inter-religious peacebuilding community. The relationship between these
two main stakeholder groups is pivotal, because both groups are necessary to
strengthen evaluation practice in the inter-religious peacebuilding field. Howev-
er, past communication between the two groups has been minimal and ham-
pered by misunderstanding. Neither audience is a monolith; there is variation
and overlap, and there are individuals who don’t fully identify with either
group. Nonetheless, EIAP’s overall trajectory represents an outreach from the
evaluation community toward the inter-religious peacebuilding community.
The rich interchange of learning between those two audiences manifested itself
consistently throughout EIAP. Looking beyond EIAP, this is a relationship that
will help shape the future of the peacebuilding field.
One of EIAP’s most ambitious objectives was to develop a utilization-focused
evidence base concerning effective inter-religious peacebuilding. The challenge
was to both compile the evidence base and help inter-religious actors apply
those learnings in the three-year timeframe of the project. In practice, it was
not possible to move so quickly from identifying evaluation best practices to im-
plementing them. A longer process is required to overcome the gaps between the
evaluation and inter-religious peacebuilding communities. A limited number of
inter-religious programmes are designed in ways conducive to traditional evalu-
ation, and evaluations are scarce (Vader 2015). Thus, the EIAP lead partners
opted to invest more time in developing best practices, recognizing that imple-
mentation will follow. Indeed, even during EIAP’s first phase, several of the
GAC and Faith Matters Guide field-testing organizations began to incorporate
EIAP learnings into their programmes. For example, Peace Catalyst Internation-
al, represented on the GAC by Dr Rick Love, made development of a monitoring
and evaluation system a key goal within its current strategic plan.⁵
 Strategic Plan 2017–2020, Peace Catalyst International.
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The demanding process of carrying out project activities revealed that inter-
religious peacebuilding is more broad, diffuse and complex than the secular
lead partners had anticipated. It proved difficult to locate inter-religious peace-
building among the network of prominent international non-governmental or-
ganizations (INGOs) with whom the lead partners typically work. Despite the in-
creasing recognition of religion’s importance, INGOs funded by the US
government are wary of the legal ‘separation of church and state,’⁶ so they
may avoid explicit inter-religious action. Additionally, many secular INGOs still
do not have experience working with religious actors. When the lead partners
began to reach beyond their usual network to engage inter-religious peacebuild-
ing specialists, their comments on the draft documents pointed out complex is-
sues that required additional time and expertise to address. Among those issues
were the nuanced diversity within each faith tradition, the importance of intra-
faith relations, and the theme of violent extremism.
The development and testing of the Faith Matters Guide itself, became a cen-
trepiece of the EIAP experience, involved additional conceptual and practical di-
lemmas. There were numerous rounds of discussion among EIAP lead partners
on the key question of who is the primary audience for the guide: evaluators
or inter-religious peacebuilders? The eventual pivotal decision was to write for
both audiences. Given the barriers that still exist between these two communi-
ties, progress requires addressing them both together. There were also debates
regarding the purposes and appropriate approaches for evaluation, since evalua-
tors and inter-religious peacebuilders tend to view those issues differently. The
question of how to make evaluation ‘faith-sensitive,’ and to acknowledge the in-
fluence of belief in the spiritual realm, also proved to be more far-reaching than
the EIAP lead partners expected, crystallizing much of the mutual learning de-
scribed in this chapter. The narrative returns to those key themes in depth
later in the chapter, after first exploring the mindsets, experiences and skills
that both evaluators and inter-religious peacebuilders bring to the collaborative
process.
 This is commonly called the ‘establishment clause’ of the First Amendment to the US Consti-
tution. See US Constitution (2010).
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2 How Evaluators Approach Inter-Religious
Action in Peacebuilding
Measuring, monitoring, and evaluating have not been common activities in inter-
religious action for peacebuilding. Those who have tried to engage in these ef-
forts have struggled with the complex nature of peacebuilding work, the difficul-
ty of understanding the influence of belief in the divine, and the challenge of
protracted conflict contexts. The donor-driven shift over the past decade towards
accountability-focused evaluation has also made inter-religious actors less in-
clined to invite those who are perceived as not understanding their work to
pass judgement on it. However, even before evaluation was professionalized,
there have always been those attempting to explain how change happens, trying
to articulate the influence and impact of their work. Evaluation, as a systematic
and technical approach for capturing and utilizing such learnings, has a lot to
contribute to the growth of inter-religious action in peacebuilding.
Evaluators are one of the two key audiences of the EIAP project, the other
being inter-religious actors. For the purpose of this chapter ‘evaluators’ refers
not only to full-time evaluators, but also to a broader spectrum of people engag-
ed in assessment or review work, including evaluative thinkers within NGOs,
donor agencies, and other implementing actors who have monitoring and eval-
uation capabilities. This includes internal evaluators and considers evaluation to
be an attainable practice, requiring some technical skills that should be consid-
ered an intertwined component to conducting work that claims social good. This
section of the chapter provides a grounding in how evaluators have been ap-
proaching the inter-religious space and considers key competencies for M&E
staff or consultants.
2.1 Why Evaluate?
There are traditionally two complementary motives for evaluation. One is evalu-
ation’s ability to ensure accountability, shining light on whether the claimed im-
pact from a particular effort has been achieved, and whether it was on time and
on budget. The other component to evaluation is learning, surfacing the how and
why of change, and helping to understand what works and does not. Both of
these components provide significant and distinct value added to inter-religious
action in peacebuilding.
Activities that claim to achieve a social good are strengthened by reviewing
the interconnections between the work they are doing and the outcomes they
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aim to achieve. Evaluators believe that activities which claim to achieve a social
good are obliged to conduct evaluation as a way to remain accountable to the
people who are supposed to benefit from that social good. This is also a core be-
lief of the EIAP convening organizations, and a key motivating factor in the pur-
suit of a stronger understanding of how evaluation is perceived and works in the
inter-religious peacebuilding community. Knowledge is power and knowing
what does or does not cause a desired social change enables those invested in
that change to adapt their efforts to be more effective. Evaluation can also facil-
itate the development of a systematic way to share the value of inter-religious
work, so that inter-religious efforts in peacebuilding will be perceived as valid
and trustworthy by other actors on the global stage.
There is an ongoing tension among donors, implementing actors, and the
evaluation community regarding the ‘correct’ balance between the accountabil-
ity and learning motivations of evaluation practice. Most evaluators, especially
those that work in sectors that require a more qualitative lens like inter-religious
action and peacebuilding, acknowledge the importance of the accountability
component, but are more heavily focused on learning. As this field emerges,
the accountability component is seen by evaluators as contributing to the broad-
er, global conversation about the effectiveness and value of inter-religious work.
The learning component is seen by this audience as paramount to understand-
ing the complexity of inter-religious action, and how change happens amidst the
innumerable variables, improving practice in an iterative fashion, and moving
towards identification of best practices for the sector.
When pursuing evaluation for learning purposes, it is important to recognize
that many evaluators want to see evaluation findings used for improving the ac-
tivities and pathways through which positive change happens, even if facilitating
utilization of findings is outside their mandate. Some evaluators have a personal
interest in improving the practice of inter-religious action for peacebuilding,
given their own experiences or identity; evaluative practice is their specific con-
tribution. These evaluative learning efforts stand to make a significant contribu-
tion to the peacebuilding field, since this programming has been traditionally
less well-documented, and learnings have yet to be broadly disseminated.
2.2 Religious or Secular Evaluators?
One important consideration frequently discussed among EIAP stakeholders is
the capabilities and experience needed for those conducting evaluation of
inter-religious processes. Whether the evaluator is a team member responsible
for monitoring and evaluation work or an external evaluator coming in for a dis-
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crete evaluation, there are competencies to look for that facilitate a nuanced and
respectful approach to evaluating inter-religious activities. Given the complexi-
ties of inter-religious action, it may be necessary to comprise a diverse team,
in order to capture the perspectives, experiences, and expertise that one evalua-
tor working alone could not provide. Involving local religious actors or stake-
holders on the evaluation team, or at the very least, in consultation regarding
the evaluation design is a particularly helpful strategy to ensure a well-rounded,
representative, and sensitive evaluation effort. There is sometimes an assump-
tion that evaluators for inter-religious action need to have a personal faith them-
selves, either directly related to the activities or not. Grounding in a personal
faith is perceived by some audiences as crucial to the understanding of the com-
plexity, nuance, and divine influence in inter-religious action. In EIAP’s view,
while personal faith is an advantage for certain types of programming and cer-
tainly changes the personal lens of the evaluator, it should not be a blanket re-
quirement. There are both pros and cons of evaluators who have their own faith-
based experiences and/or beliefs, which should be taken into consideration
when determining the best skillset match for what type of efforts are to be eval-
uated.
Evaluators who possess a personal faith can bring additional knowledge and
an understanding of the importance of faith into their interpretation of data and
generation of findings. Such evaluators are also more likely to be open to the in-
fluence of belief in the divine in achieving individual transformation and broad-
er social change. A personal faith is often a significant motivating factor for eval-
uators engaged in inter-religious peacebuilding work, fuelling their desire to see
‘proof ’ of impact that they know would be accepted by a more secular commu-
nity. Evaluators and donors often see such proof as a necessary part of the jour-
ney to legitimizing and expanding inter-religious peacebuilding activities on a
larger scale. On the other hand, the complexities of personal faith can sometimes
limit faith-inspired evaluators in their evaluation of inter-religious action. The
cultural context of an evaluator’s beliefs, how their faith intersects with other
faiths, and their own level of knowledge and openness toward other faiths
can significantly bias their evaluative efforts. This can lead to unfair interpreta-
tion of findings, biased sampling and interactions with implementers, and even
harm, if the evaluator asks questions or takes actions that reignite inter-religious
tensions.
Likewise, there are pros and cons in involving secular evaluators in inter-re-
ligious action in peacebuilding, even though secular evaluators are less likely to
see and admit the implications of their personal beliefs on their evaluation prac-
tice. Some secular evaluators perceive their secular beliefs as being ‘neutral’ and
the only way to ensure an unbiased evaluation. However, due to personal expe-
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riences and cultural influences, secular evaluators are just as likely to be biased
against religion, or against a particular religion, as religious evaluators. Secular
evaluators also might not recognize the importance of personal faith experience
in understanding inter-religious efforts, or the influence of belief in the divine.
Depending on the context, some inter-religious efforts will call for a secular eval-
uator who is experienced and willing to delve into the nuances of faith-based ef-
forts. Other evaluative efforts will call for a faith-based evaluator who can relate
to the personal experiences of individual and inter-personal transformation. Ei-
ther way, an honest conversation about the impact of the evaluator’s beliefs is
beneficial to selection of the evaluation team and conducting responsible eval-
uation.
The emerging consensus among EIAP stakeholders is that, whether or not
the evaluator(s) has a personal faith related to that of the activities being evalu-
ated, it is essential for the evaluator(s) in question to properly prepare for and
orient towards both the context and the faiths involved, taking stock of their per-
sonal perspectives, experiences, and lenses, and readily acknowledging how
that may or may not impact their work. The evaluator(s) should have ‘religious
literacy’ which enables them to understand the core concepts that inform
faith-based peacebuilding, as well as each faith community they will interact
with. Finally, it is very important that the evaluator or evaluation team all recog-
nize that each individual – including evaluators – brings their own beliefs, value
systems, and biases into the work. These attributes will help to facilitate commu-
nication and implementation of evaluative activities in ways that make sense to
the religious actors involved.⁷
2.3 Leveraging Evaluation to Look Beyond Individual
Transformation
The evaluative mindset offers another complementary perspective that is advan-
tageous for inter-religious peacebuilders. Some inter-religious work has a ten-
dency to overemphasize individual transformation of attitudes and behaviours.
Sometimes this is the end goal, and other times the activities are meant to
build collectively towards larger social transformation. In the case where the
aim is larger social transformation (Chigas and Woodrow 2009) there is a need
to capture the process of change and transfer efforts from individual transforma-
tion to socio-political impact. Evaluation activities can home in on the process of
 For more information, see Section 5.5 of the Faith Matters Guide.
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this transfer, looking at whether, how, and why it is happening. Learnings from
these evaluation activities can help to strengthen and adapt inter-religious activ-
ities to make stronger connections towards social transformation and prove the
interlinkages regarding how the work is affecting that change.
On the other hand, it is important to note that some larger INGOs have also
fallen into the trap of measuring only higher-level changes, ignoring the impact
and contextual implications of individual transformation. In the Faith Matters
guide testing process, both Mercy Corps and World Vision International discov-
ered that they had initially looked for change at the community level, to the ex-
clusion of transformation taking place among individuals. They found shifting
the unit of analysis to be beneficial in drawing out learnings regarding individual
transformation, as a building block of higher-level change. Especially in contexts
of identity-based conflict, it is crucial to leverage evaluation to look at multiple
levels of change and their interconnections. Failing to track the shorter-term
foundations of individual transformation that are necessary for longer-term
socio-political change is just a problematic as assuming that individual transfor-
mation is indicative of higher-level change in the absence of supportive evi-
dence.
2.4 How Do Donors Fit In?
Evaluation is increasingly required by most governmental and even private foun-
dation donors. Donors are interested in a return on investment, ensuring their
money is making the desired impact and effectively contributing towards the
identified, desirable social change. There are often political, economic and
other social motivations involved as well, sometimes on a geopolitical scale, de-
pending on the donor. Because of this desire to prove effective use of funds, do-
nors tend to sway the tension between accountability and learning more towards
a focus on accountability as the primary use of evaluation. However, recently,
there are some donors who are recapturing and promoting a better balance
and focus on the learning component as well.
Although not all inter-religious programming is funded by typical interna-
tional development funding mechanisms, a portion of it is, and is therefore be-
holden to new requirements for monitoring and evaluating. As inter-religious ac-
tion in peacebuilding is increasingly recognized on a global scale, there are more
funding opportunities available for this type of work through international devel-
opment mechanisms that come with monitoring and evaluation requirements.
Capturing successes from inter-religious work through evaluation can enable or-
ganizations and actors doing inter-religious work to apply for this type of fund-
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ing, leveraging larger funding pools to expand their work when they can speak
to quantitative results. Informed inter-religious actors can also help shape the re-
quests and expectations coming from donors by requesting more learning-driven
approaches and demonstrating documented programme improvements from
such efforts.
It can sometimes appear that some donors do not understand the complexity
of inter-religious action in peacebuilding, when they are overly driven by ac-
countability concerns, when their rhetoric is intentionally secular, or when
they fail to acknowledge the impact of shifting conflict dynamics on implement-
ing activities in inter-religious contexts. However, donors can serve as an impe-
tus to capture learnings, results, and build on what is already being done. There
is movement in international development towards influencing donors to work
with programmes, providing additional support, resources, and tools, previously
unavailable to the organization. Approaching donors as partners, rather than
gatekeepers, will benefit inter-religious action in the immediate and long term.
3 How Inter-Religious Peacebuilders Approach
Evaluation
As an EIAP audience, the term ‘inter-religious peacebuilders’ refers to the faith-
based people and groups that implement inter-religious action for peace. Impor-
tantly, they may or may not call their work ‘peacebuilding’ – a term which tends
to be associated with the secular peacebuilding sector. They may consider peace
to be only one among their multiple objectives. Nonetheless, the focus on peace
is intentional and often intense, just as it is for secular peacebuilders. The differ-
ences lie in their motivations and mindsets, and in the types of organizations
and networks that are engaged in the process.
3.1 Who Are ‘Inter-Religious Peacebuilders?’
Seen through EIAP’s lens, the inter-religious peacebuilding audience is broad
and diverse, with their degree of connection to secular peacebuilders ranging
from strong to non-existent. At the least connected end of the spectrum, there
are a multitude of peace-promoting communities of worship and faith-based or-
ganizations (FBOs) that may not be aware of the existence of the secular peace-
building community. Such organizations may have engaged in decades of ongo-
ing inter-religious action supported only by religious institutional budgets, or
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sometimes by no formal budget at all, because they hold a conviction that pro-
moting peace is necessary in their context and is part of their role as believers.
Their peace training may come through religious teachers and literature as part
of their own faith formation. Their size may range from small grassroots com-
munities of worship to international religious networks. Many inter-religious
peacebuilders have no awareness of the evaluation practices of the secular
peacebuilding field, though they certainly have an interest in doing their work
effectively and a desire to see positive change.
At the most connected end of the spectrum, there are faith-based organiza-
tions that figure prominently within secular-leaning fields of endeavour, as CRS
does in the humanitarian and development sectors. CRS is known not only for
excellence in integrating inter-religious peacebuilding into their work, but also
for excellence in monitoring and evaluation approaches. Occupying the middle
of the spectrum are numerous hybrids and crossovers. For example, there are
FBOs that work with external donors, such as religious or secular foundations,
and conform to their evaluation requirements. There are faith-motivated individ-
uals working seamlessly inside secular, evaluation-oriented organizations (in-
cluding the EIAP lead partner organizations). Faith-based motivations and
worldviews typically remain highly significant for faith-based actors engaged
with secular peacebuilding, though they may be less vocal, or express them-
selves differently, than peacebuilders working exclusively in the religious sector.
3.2 Global Advisory Council
Within EIAP, if the ‘evaluators’ audience is represented by the three secular lead
partner organizations, then the ‘inter-religious peacebuilders’ audience is repre-
sented by the Global Advisory Council (GAC). The GAC was composed of eleven
prominent inter-religious peacebuilding practitioners, representing Muslim,
Christian, Jewish and Buddhist traditions⁸ across ten countries of origin. In
some EIAP processes, the Council was joined by other recognized experts in
inter-religious peacebuilding.
The GAC’s formation and voice required some time to develop. The first face-
to-face GAC meeting, in Washington DC in 2015, focused on the current state of
play in inter-religious peacebuilding programming and evaluation. However, at
the second meeting in Istanbul in 2016, the faith-based influence of the GAC
began to make itself heard, fuelled by a preliminary draft outline of the guide.
 EIAP staff also tried without success to recruit a Hindu member for the Council.
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At a humorous level, GAC members noted that the name originally envisioned for
the guide – the Guide for the Assessment of Inter-Religious Action (GAIA) – rep-
resented the Greek goddess of the earth and would evoke many types of unin-
tended connotations within the audience of inter-religious peacebuilders.⁹ On
a more substantive level, GAC members also observed in Istanbul that the pre-
liminary draft outline of the guide, and the meeting agenda itself, were framed
primarily around secular evaluation concepts, such as the OECD-DAC (2012) cri-
teria for peacebuilding evaluation. Some important questions came to the fore:
This content is all interesting, but what specifically does it have to do with
inter-religious peacebuilding? What is unique about evaluating faith-based ac-
tion? How can evaluation content be made relevant and accessible to the vast
numbers of faith-based actors who work at grassroots levels? At this point, it be-
came clear to everyone involved that the need for evaluators to learn from inter-
religious peacebuilders was deeper and more extensive than the secular EIAP
lead partners had originally envisioned.
David Steele, a (Protestant) Christian pastor, professor and conflict resolu-
tion expert, gave an insightful presentation in Istanbul on faith-based reconcili-
ation processes, in which he began to identify key distinctions between faith-
based and secular action. Shortly thereafter, he teamed up with EIAP advisor Ri-
cardo Wilson-Grau to write a paper¹⁰ on the implications of these faith-based dis-
tinctions for evaluation practice. Ricardo¹¹ was a highly respected evaluator ad-
vocating the importance of religious sensitivity and literacy in evaluation. He
was, interestingly, also a non-theist. Ricardo was assertive, and he got the atten-
tion of the evaluation community in a way a faith-based peacebuilder alone
probably could not have.
3.3 Faith-Based Distinctions
The work of David and Ricardo (Section 2, 137– 168) highlighted the following
distinctions in emphasis between faith-based and secular peacebuilding:¹²
1. Value system. Faith-rooted values including peace, justice and compassion
are often what motivates inter-religious action for peace. Such values have
 The name of the guide was changed to EIAP: Guide to Program Evaluation during the pilot test-
ing phase, and finally to Faith Matters prior to publication.
 Steele and Wilson-Grau 2016.
 Ricardo Wilson-Grau passed away on 31 December 2018.
 Adapted from Steele and Wilson-Grau (2016). See also Faith Matters Guide, Section 2.1.
180 Michelle Garred, Rebecca Herrington, and Elizabeth Hume
corollaries in secular practice, yet they may differ significantly in the nuance
of their meaning and the way they are applied.
2. Motivation. Spiritual direction, guidance and calling, via scripture, medita-
tion or a mentor, can be a major factor in determining what a religious per-
son does. There may also be a strong conviction that spiritual beings or
forces can act on their own, implying a different view of causation from
that typically seen among secular actors.
3. Understanding of Success/Failure.¹³ From a religious perspective, success can
be understood from the transcendent perspective of faithfulness to a spiritu-
al calling. For secular peacebuilders, success is more likely to be defined in
ways that emphasize performance against materially measurable goals.
4. Accountability. Accountability for faith-based actors is often about long-term
faithfulness to a divine calling, or a faith community. For secular peace-
builders, accountably may revolve more around the aims of a particular proj-
ect, meaning a time-bound set of predefined objectives supported by a par-
ticular donor.
5. Faith-based transformation. Faith-based peace practitioners often emphasize
individual spiritually inspired changes in attitudes,which can lead in turn to
changes in expressions of belief and behaviour. Secular peacebuilders tend
to place less emphasis on attitudinal and more on behavioural changes, es-
pecially those that have a clear and direct impact at the socio-political level.
Of course, most of these distinctions are matters of degree or emphasis, not bi-
nary differences between faith-based and secular peacebuilders. Even so, the
overall implication is that faith-based and secular actors may have vastly differ-
ent ways of understanding the peacebuilding work that they do, and different
frames of reference when considering evaluation or evaluative ways of thinking.
For this reason, Steele and Wilson-Grau highlight the importance of certain eval-
uative practices: participatory methodologies to give religious actors a voice to
present their own perspectives, qualitative methodologies to deepen understand-
ing of the intangible aspects and processes of faith-based peacebuilding, and
awareness of complex causation, as described in Section 4 below.
It is worth noting that the different experiences and competencies of reli-
gious actors and evaluators have frequently led each group to politely question
the capacity of the other. The EIAP project design documents, crafted by evalua-
 For an additional, extended exploration of faith-based distinctions centering around the mo-
tivation for action and the understanding of success/failure, see Reina Neufeldt (Section 1,
53–76). Neufeldt posits that the impact-focused consequentialism of secularly-derived evalua-
tion criteria may be fundamentally at odds with the values of faith-rooted peacebuilding.
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tors, assert not only a need for better evidence of the effectiveness of inter-reli-
gious peacebuilding, but also a need to improve the effectiveness of inter-reli-
gious peacebuilding work itself.¹⁴ On the other hand, one of the inter-religious
peacebuilders involved in EIAP recently expressed disappointment in a similar
(but unrelated) project as follows:
…an amazing (if somewhat random) selection of religious leaders…An important…sign that
Western governments are finally waking up to the importance of religious peace building –
but I feel the conference itself could have been so much more constructive if the organizers,
let alone the participants, knew a bit more about effective interreligious peacebuilding. So
important and frustrating at the same time.¹⁵
Indeed, both evaluators and inter-religious peacebuilders recognize that coming
together is important, if occasionally frustrating. The next section describes what
happened when these two very different audiences began to work together con-
sistently over three years’ time through EIAP.
4 Tensions and Transformations
The Faith Matters Guide was outlined, drafted, pilot tested, and revised for pub-
lication between June 2016 and September 2017. Throughout these processes a
fascinating learning journey unfolded, as evaluators and inter-religious peace-
builders combined their strengths and learned from each other. The learning
was characterized by several areas of tension and transformation, which are rel-
evant far beyond EIAP, because other collaborative efforts that bring together
inter-religious peacebuilders and evaluators are likely to encounter similar dy-
namics.
4.1 Who Are We Writing For?
The distinction between EIAP’s audiences as explored in this chapter is not an
idle observation – rather it was a question actively explored during the EIAP
process. From the moment EIAP staff began drafting the outline of the Faith Mat-
ters Guide, there were many conversations and re-writes prompted by the ques-
 “…inter-religious action initiatives will improve in both quality and impact.” EIAP project
proposal, p. 9.
 Email communication to Michelle Garred, 22 May 2017.
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tion of identifying the primary intended readers. What pre-existing knowledge
and skill set would we assume that readers would bring? Were we writing this
guide for experienced inter-religious peacebuilders who need to learn how to ap-
proach evaluation? Were we writing this guide for experienced evaluators who
need to learn to adapt to inter-religious peacebuilding?
At one point, it was tentatively decided that it was impossible to write for
both audiences, so the first guide would be geared toward evaluators, and anoth-
er publication designed for inter-religious peacebuilders would come later, if
possible, in a future phase of the project. However, that decision was quickly
challenged as potentially extractive,¹⁶ and later discarded. The EIAP staff team
then decided that it was necessary to write the Faith Matters Guide for both au-
diences,¹⁷ knowing full well it would be difficult – and indeed it was. The guide
pilot testers affirmed this decision as early as their pre-testing workshop held in
Kathmandu in November 2016. They observed that mutual transformation be-
tween inter-religious peacebuilders and evaluators, as described below, is
made possible by bringing both audiences together to exchange their perspec-
tives and experiences.
4.2 What Is the Purpose of Evaluation?
As described above, there is currently a great deal of emphasis in secular peace-
building circles on evaluation for the purpose of accountability toward donors.
In contrast, some inter-religious peacebuilders do not currently work with
large external donors bearing evaluation requirements and may have little inter-
est in doing so in the future. Further, inter-religious peacebuilders tend to view
meaning and accountability in spiritual rather than material terms. Seen from
their perspective, evaluation for purposes of donor accountability may hold lim-
ited relevance. Evaluators who present evaluation primarily as a means of donor
accountability, or as a source of evidence to justify future investment, may be
seen as representing someone else’s interests and therefore not fully trustworthy.
Inter-religious peacebuilders may accommodate such evaluators when called
 ‘Extractive’ here refers to the ethically questionable practice of one partner requesting anoth-
er partner’s knowledge, and then using it to their own advantage, typically in a way that exac-
erbates power differences.
 The Faith Matters Guide later recognized a third category of readers: organizational staff
charged with developing M&E plans or commissioning evaluations. They are important readers,
but they do not represent overarching EIAP constituencies in the same way that ‘evaluators’ and
‘inter-religious peacebuilders do,’ so they are not emphasized in this chapter.
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upon to do so, even as their posture remains guarded and they decline to fully
‘own’ the evaluation process or its findings.
On the other hand, EIAP’s experience indicates that when learning is fore-
grounded, and learning and accountability are viewed as complementary, up-
take naturally increases. Inter-religious actors want to make a difference, so
most are keen to learn about the effectiveness of their efforts. When learning
was emphasized, Faith Matters guide pilot testers in the Inter-Religious Council
of Uganda reported seeing evaluation through fresh eyes. Julie Nalubwama ex-
pressed that she felt more interested and increasingly confident to engage eval-
uation on her own terms – by asserting what her organization needs to learn
from an evaluation process, and how. Joshua Kitakule articulated a newfound
appreciation for the value of collecting meaningful data, as evidence to inform
the improvement of practice.¹⁸ Further, a multi-faceted understanding of ac-
countability, which can include accountability toward host communities, pro-
gramme participants, staff, partners and ultimately to the divine, is highly com-
patible with a faith-rooted commitment to learning for purposes of ongoing
improvement.
4.3 Which Evaluation Approaches are Appropriate?
When the first draft of the Faith Matters Guide was shared with pilot testers and
other stakeholders in November 2016, it was warmly received, but it also caused
a bit of a stir among traditional evaluative thinkers due to its lack of emphasis on
‘indicators,’ which some criticized as impractical. The initial omission of indica-
tors was intentional, reflecting a belief among the early author team that certain
evaluation approaches (goal-free and indicator-light) were more appropriate
than others (results-based evaluation) for inter-religious action. Results-based
approaches, which are generally considered traditional in the Monitoring and
Evaluation field, emphasize advance planning, using measurable indicators
(such as changes in behaviour or the success rate of conflict resolution mecha-
nisms) to assess the degree to which programme results align with pre-deter-
mined goals, objectives and outcomes. Results-based approaches are prominent
in the development assistance sectors, which increasingly integrate with and in-
fluence secular peacebuilding. On the other hand, goal-free and complexity-
based approaches assume a complex operating context in which cause-and-ef-
fect relationships are not linear or predictable. A goal-free evaluation seeks to
 Workshop plenary, EIAP guide testers’ consultation, 14– 16 November 2016, Kathmandu.
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assess what outcomes have emerged and how the programme has contributed,
without reference to pre-determined goals or targets.¹⁹
There is still a debate in the field, and there was a significant debate among
the three EIAP lead partners, about these approaches. What follows is an illus-
trative sample of real-life conversation between a results-based (RB) evaluator
and a goal-free (GF) evaluator, while providing input to the Faith Matters
Guide.²⁰
‒ R-B Evaluator: In order to assess change in the work of peacebuilding, we
need a common yardstick. Without that, our conclusions become very sub-
jective, and we don’t know whether a programme is effective.
‒ G-F Evaluator: I agree on the need for a yardstick – but the yardstick does
not need to be predefined. Most peacebuilding work takes place in complex
contexts – and where that work is faith-based, the importance of intangible
factors such as spiritual practices, and the active belief in divine agency, can
add additional layers of complexity. It is impossible to specify the causal
chains in advance, in a way that informs the development of meaningful
goals, indicators, baselines and targets.
‒ R-B Evaluator: When results-based approaches are used properly, they are
not rigid! In a complex setting, one has to discern between what can and
cannot be measured as progress. In a quality programme, the people in-
volved will adapt their goals to fit the changing context, often monitoring in-
dicators for a signal of the need to adapt, rather than getting stuck in a pre-
determined way of working.
‒ G-F Evaluator: In my experience adaptation is not enough, so the pre-de-
fined results frameworks often need to be discarded. Also, many faith-
based peacebuilders do not plan time-bound projects in the same way
that secular peacebuilders do – their planning is emergent, but it’s still im-
portant and worthwhile to assess their effectiveness. That’s why I prefer to
assess what a program has actually achieved, without reference to pre-de-
fined goals.
 For more information on goal-free evaluation, see Youker and Ingraham (2014).
 EIAP internal email communications, May and June 2017. The colleague arguing for results-
based approaches comes from a strong religious tradition, while the goal-free colleague would
be considered secular – an illustration of the individual diversity within each of these identifi-
ably distinct communities.
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4.4 Methodological Balance and Inclusion
After extended reflection on the question of appropriate methodologies, the EIAP
team decided that the appropriate approach for the Faith Matters guide was bal-
ance and inclusion. Whatever one’s individual opinions, the reality is that both
results-based and emergent design approaches are currently used in inter-reli-
gious peacebuilding, and that is unlikely to change in the near future. A
broad-based guidance on evaluation should therefore be relevant to both ap-
proaches. The guide was significantly revised to speak to both approaches, in-
cluding the addition of a section (Sect. 3.6) on indicators and the pros and
cons of their use, including sample indicators tested by CRS and other organiza-
tions.²¹ Even so, the level of balance and inclusion was subject to healthy debate
right up to the time of publication.
While these debates are not easy, the benefits of balance and inclusion can
be seen in the methodological growth reported by the pilot testing organizations.
For example, Mercy Corps in Myanmar was developing the M&E strategy for their
Some Hmat community-based inter-communal peacebuilding project. They had
originally planned to focus on mostly theory-based approaches and quantitative
indicators. However, they increasingly considered the relevance of goal-free im-
pact evaluation approaches (i.e. Most Significant Change) and decided to ex-
pand that plan to include more qualitative data gathered through participatory
processes, so that project stakeholders (community leaders, government officials
and inter-faith religious leaders) could voice their own interpretations of project
experiences and results.
For Mercy Corps, the process of incorporating these changes involved adding
semi-structured interviews to elicit stories, and training staff in how to facilitate
this new form of data collection and highlight individual behavioural changes. It
also involved convening programme participants to discuss the purpose of par-
ticipatory M&E, and to collectively identify the best way to tell the story of the
project’s impact. This greatly increased religious leaders’ understanding, owner-
ship, and active participation in the evaluation process, and reduced suspicions
about the investigation of topics as sensitive as peace and religion. The Mercy
Corps team still planned to analyse the findings according to their traditional re-
sults framework, but they expected those findings to be more robust and mean-
ingful.
 In addition to the shift in positioning on indicators, this revision of the guide also included a
significantly strengthened and expanded focus on practical tools, in response to stakeholder
feedback.
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4.5 How Do We Approach ‘Violent Extremism?’
In recent years, programmes aimed at countering or preventing violent extrem-
ism (C/PVE) have become increasingly prominent in response to an increase in
civilian attacks attributed to extremist motivations, particularly those that
claim to be religiously inspired. As C/PVE programmes have become more close-
ly linked to peacebuilding, they have also become more contentious. Addressing
violent extremism in peacebuilding is not new, however the rebirth of C/PVE
work in large part through a Western and counterterrorism, and even securitized,
lens has been a cause for widespread debate, in particular among peacebuilders,
questioning its compatibility with peacebuilding given the new philosophical
underpinnings.²² There has also been a sense among peacebuilding practitioners
that it is not known ‘what works’ in C/PVE programming (Ris and Ernstorfer
2016). Nonetheless, there is now evidence for the effectiveness of community-
based approaches rather than the targeting of at-risk individuals, and for the im-
portance of meaningful youth engagement in the community (Alliance for Peace-
building 2018).
Among faith-based peacebuilders there is a widespread (though by no
means universal) chafing at the assumptions regarding the roles of religion
that are embedded in many C/PVE programs:²³ first, that religion is more a driver
of conflict than it is of peace; and second, that the most problematic religion is
specifically Islam. Not only Muslim peacebuilders object to this implicit assump-
tion. Many peacebuilders of other faiths also see the focus on Islam as a biased
interpretation of a reality in which all religions can be understood and practiced
in either peaceful or violent ways—as amply demonstrated throughout history.
For all these reasons, C/PVE was one of the most consistently difficult
themes throughout the EIAP experience. There were natural disagreements
about how much attention C/PVE should be given on a particular meeting agen-
da. For example, C/PVE was significantly less prominent in the EIAP meeting in
Vienna 2017 than it had been in the meeting the previous year in Istanbul, to the
relief of many GAC members. Further, EIAP’s preliminary literature review was
significantly delayed by the fact that many of the religious themes were more
nuanced than the lead partners originally envisioned – not least the theme of
C/PVE. However, a mutually acceptable middle ground was found for the litera-
ture review, and then carried forward into the Faith Matters Guide. C/PVE was
simply positioned as one among many common approaches to peacebuilding,
 See for example Peace Direct (2017).
 See for example Jayaweera (2018).
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giving it no more attention than the others, and acknowledging briefly the sharp-
ly differing perspectives described above. The guide also mentions the practical
priority of participant protection and conflict-sensitive practice (Sect. 3.4), be-
cause the risks of C/PVE programming to participants and communities can
be particularly high.
4.6 What is the Role of ‘Faith Sensitivity?’
The evaluation-oriented EIAP lead partners often used the term ‘faith sensitivity’
to express their ongoing effort to explain and adapt secular evaluation practices
in ways that are appropriate for use in faith-based settings. This term served the
necessary function of signalling a need to question the usual ways of doing
things, and to consider doing something different to be more relevant to one’s
colleagues. At the same time, the notion of faith sensitivity was also contested,
because the mention of faith sensitivity can appear shallow or tokenistic in the
absence of genuine mutual understanding.
In practice, the influence of faith sensitivity gradually expanded. For exam-
ple, in the early days of EIAP, it was thought that the way to make the OECD-DAC
(2012) peacebuilding evaluation criteria faith-sensitive would be to add a criteri-
on on ‘consistency with values.’ That criterion was indeed usefully added, but it
was also recognized over time that every other criterion in the OECD-DAC frame-
work could be unpacked in ways that reveal the perspectives of faith-based ac-
tors and the unique dynamics of inter-religious action. Similarly, the faith sensi-
tivity content of the Faith Matters Guide, which comprised a discrete handful of
pages in the pilot test version, had expanded to become more significant by the
time the guide was published in September 2017. This transformation of thinking
is still underway.
5 Emergent Challenges and Opportunities
The Faith Matters Guide, launched in September 2017, was richly strengthened by
the ongoing interchange between evaluators and inter-religious peacebuilders,
in both conceptual development and field testing. The AfP, SFCG and CDA are
hopeful that this new resource will add value to the field. At the same time, ev-
eryone involved is keenly aware the learning process is far from over. This section
highlights some of the challenges and opportunities that will continue to char-
acterize our learning, as evaluators and inter-religious peacebuilders work to-
gether in collaborative initiatives.
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5.1 Clarifying ‘What’s Unique’
Much of the mutual learning process that evolved between EIAP’s secular and
religious stakeholders revolved around the question of what makes inter-reli-
gious action distinct from other forms of peacebuilding. The difference was
greater than originally anticipated. Key distinctions common to faith-based
mindsets have been identified (as described above). It is also increasingly
clear that the role of religious hierarchies and networks can distinctively
shape who gets involved in peacebuilding (or not), through which points of ac-
cess and influence, and how the patterns of the peacebuilding process unfold.
However, there is not yet a comprehensive answer to the question of how
these distinctions influence the practicalities of evaluation.
For example, when assessing indications of improvement in inter-group re-
lations, evaluators involved in EIAP have understandably wondered whether
inter-religious relationships differ significantly from other relationships formed
across the lines of an identity-based conflict. Indeed, inter-religious progress
often looks very much like inter-ethnic or inter-cultural progress, at least on
the surface. Further, these different aspects of identity often overlap demographi-
cally to involve the same people—for instance in Sri Lanka where Sinhalese are
predominantly Buddhist and Tamils are predominantly Hindu.
However, many of EIAP’s faith-based stakeholders see the inter-religious as-
pects of the process as distinct, because of the spiritual processes involved. In
conservative religious contexts, the boundaries between (and within) faith
groups may be experienced as existential, such that interaction with ‘the
other’ threatens a person’s status in ways that are not only social but also spiri-
tual. This involves:
…deep-seated fears of punishments, rewards, day of judgments, and all other beliefs that
touch the core psyche of the person’s existence…For a Muslim or Christian person who has
been raised to avoid interacting with anyone outside of his or her faith group, meeting the
other can be a terrifying experience that will shake his or her core being (Garred and Abu-
Nimer 2018, 11).
The improvement of those relationships involves a spiritual process of reframing
one’s most deeply held beliefs, usually through the discovery of new theological
interpretations within one’s existing faith tradition.²⁴ This requires a lengthy
transformation process – yet an evaluation that misses the spiritual aspects of
this process could be considered incomplete. Evaluators need deepened guid-
 See for example Patel 2018.
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ance in order to better discern the uniquely spiritual aspects of an inter-religious
process – which means that inter-religious peacebuilders need to take the initia-
tive to help identify, articulate and explain those spiritual aspects.
5.2 Tuning in to Marginalized Voices
Another unique nuance of inter-religious peacebuilding evaluation is the need to
come to grips with the ways in which certain voices can be missed. Unfortunate-
ly, the marginalization of groups including women, children, youth, sexual and
gender minorities, and persons with disabilities is a widespread problem that af-
fects many expressions of peacebuilding. However, it can manifest in unique
ways in religious settings, because marginalization of particular groups may
be sanctioned (or even mandated) by certain interpretations of religious teach-
ings and reinforced by a hierarchy of religious leaders who function as de
facto ‘gatekeepers.’
In evaluation, the concern should not be simply to assess the extent to
which faith groups have practiced inclusion – a challenging task in and of itself,
given the diversity and sensitivity of the socio-religious norms involved – but
also to make the evaluation itself inclusive. Faith Matters Guide tester, Joshua Ki-
takule of the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda, described how, in his experi-
ence, the contribution of women to inter-religious peacebuilding projects is easi-
ly overlooked in an evaluation process, because gatekeepers consider it relatively
insignificant. This deprives the practitioner community of the opportunity to
learn based on what those women have accomplished, including potentially
ground-breaking innovations that differ from the male-dominated ‘mainstream.’
Evaluations that exclude women can legitimize exclusion from future program-
ming in a self-reinforcing negative cycle.²⁵ To break this cycle, evaluators need
the religious literacy and communication skills to not only identify where exclu-
sion is a problem, but to successfully negotiate inclusion of women (or other
marginalized groups) in ways that inspire rather than offend the religious gate-
keeper’.
 Workshop sharing of examples, EIAP Global Advisory Council consultation, 8–10 May 2016,
Vienna.
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5.3 When There Is No ‘Project’
One of the oft-raised issues in considering application of M&E to inter-religious
efforts is that many of these activities are run by religious organizations with lit-
tle external funding and outside the time-bound ‘project cycles’ typically used in
international development work. A great many of these organizations are small
and local. In the EIAP context, the issues surrounding non-existent ‘project cy-
cles’ were raised by the inter-religious peacebuilders within Global Advisory
Council and the guide-testing cohort, because they were concerned that tradi-
tional monitoring and evaluation approaches might not apply. However, moni-
toring and evaluation need not be confined to a project cycle as one may
think. Since one of the key purposes of M&E is learning, there are many mech-
anisms and tools through which to establish systematic learning, feedback
loops, and capture results that do not require the formalized structure of a proj-
ect cycle to be effective.
A good starting point is adaptive management.²⁶ Adaptive management is a
systematic process of reflection, results capture, adjustment of activities in re-
sponse to learnings and shifting contexts, and smaller evaluative efforts that
are intertwined with the day-to-day implementation of activities. Thus, adaptive
management is a process with a suite of tools that can enable inter-religious ac-
tion to apply forward-thinking learning without conforming to a project cycle.
The easiest way to think about adaptive management is to build in systematic
steps and look for tools that help organizations to (Ladner 2015):
1. Review what has happened, identify what changes have affected outcomes,
and document any existent but individual learnings;
2. Assess this information to determine what priority opportunities and risks
need to be addressed to strengthen the work being done;
3. Adapt, as necessary, strategies, operations, and activities based on that as-
sessment; and,
4. Document how and why the revisions were made, as well as any consequen-
ces of adaptation. Then repeat!
It is worth noting that adaptive management can be practiced nearly cost-free.
Where budgets are limited, the Reflection Exercise shared in Annex C of the
Faith Matters Guide is another possible tool with off-the-shelf usefulness for
inter-religious peacebuilders who may not have a ’project.’
 For an explanation of adaptive management see USAID Learning Lab (2018).
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If there is significant funding available for learning exercises, but still no de-
fined project, another tool worth considering is developmental evaluation (DE).²⁷
DE is a non-traditional evaluation approach that provides evaluative thinking
and timely feedback to inform ongoing adjustments, as needs, findings, and in-
sights emerge in complex, dynamic situations. DEs are also designed to help fa-
cilitate moving from looking at the question ‘what are we learning from our
work?’ to ‘how do we leverage what’s working and overcome any challenges?’,
taking stakeholders from learning to adaptation through collaborative processes.
DEs require the regular engagement of a dedicated evaluator who accompanies a
project for a defined period of time. They are not a fit for every type of work, but
are particularly useful when dealing with unknowns, such as untested theories
of change, rapidly changing contexts, complex structures and/or relationships,
and innovations. DEs are increasingly being utilized in a wider variety of con-
texts, with new guidance on implementation and lessons learned emerging
quickly.²⁸
5.4 Where and How to Build Capacity
This chapter does not assume that inter-religious peacebuilders will quickly de-
velop an international network of highly skilled evaluators within their own
ranks. EIAP does see a role for appropriate external resource people that can
lead evaluations as well as highlight entry points for enhancing internal evalu-
ation capacity within the participating organization(s). There is need to build ca-
pacity on both fronts, achieving two very different objectives.
With regard to external evaluators, one well-trained evaluator can evaluate
many inter-religious efforts in peacebuilding. If these evaluators are truly well-
qualified, religiously literate and equipped to train, they can also build the ca-
pacity of inter-religious actors along the way. In a resource-constrained environ-
ment, it may be necessary to put the burden on evaluators to orient themselves
to this sector and build the necessary skills to address the nuances and distinc-
tive nature of inter-religious action in peacebuilding. This will enhance the ca-
pacity of the sector writ large to apply more formalized evaluation efforts, espe-
cially those that speak to results and are perceived as rigorous enough to
influence the global conversation regarding religion, peacebuilding, and devel-
opment. Further, increasing the demand for evaluation experts who understand
 For more information, see Gamble (2008).
 Quinn Patton et al. 2016.
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the subtleties and complexity of inter-religious work will increase the availability
of such experts.
On the other hand, evaluation goes beyond formalized, end-of-programme
assessments, to the more iterative, learning-centric approaches and tools used
by practitioners. As such, building the internal capacity of inter-religious actors
in evaluation is also an important consideration. Individual staff who are trained
to think evaluatively and have a strong toolbox available can help integrate sys-
tematic learning into activities and contribute to stronger programming and
sharing of learnings. This strategy requires more resources, as there are more
staff to equip, so in particularly resource-constrained environments it may be
beneficial to equip leaders through a training-of-trainers approach so that they
can build capacity and institute new norms about evaluative thinking across
their own organization. Future EIAP work would consider both types of capacity
building needs, through raising awareness and building capacity among external
evaluators (e.g., working through the regional evaluation associations), and by
working with inter-religious organizations to develop their capacities for effec-
tiveness and evaluative thinking.
5.5 Looking Ahead
As noted at the outset, EIAP was launched and led in 2015–2017 by three secular
evaluation-oriented organizations: AfP, SFCG and CDA. Strong inter-religious in-
fluence came through the GAC and the faith-based organizations among the
guide testers. The result was a very dynamic interplay of learning. The changing
relationship between evaluator and inter-religious peacebuilder was not unlike
the change process of successful inter-faith dialogue, in which one small, uncer-
tain step followed by another leads over time to significant growth in mutual re-
spect and understanding.
Since the time of writing, EIAP has entered a dynamic second phase. AfP in
collaboration with SFCG now aims to improve the evidence base of effective
inter-religious action by enhancing the internal capacities of inter-religious ac-
tors for design, monitoring and evaluation. EIAP is further using evaluation proc-
esses to generate evidence of macro-level social and/or political level change, to
increase the visibility of inter-religious action in peacebuilding. Such visibility
will increase the likelihood that inter-religious actors, including those working
at local grassroots levels, can gain a seat at the global table to influence the fu-
ture of peacebuilding.
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Shana Cohen
Assessing the Impact of Interfaith
Initiatives
1 Introduction
In 2011, I began working at the Woolf Institute, which focuses on interfaith rela-
tions in the United Kingdom and is based in Cambridge. Shortly after starting the
job, the Director of the Institute and I sat down with a professor at Cambridge to
ask about pursuing a research project on inter faith dialogue. “Interfaith dia-
logue is not a field of study,” the professor retorted, “it’s a practice.” Perhaps
a year later, I attended a lecture by one of the most well-known scholars of
faith and social action in the UK, Adam Dinham. Professor Dinham labelled in-
terfaith dialogue “A pragmatic cobbling together of people who already want to
work together”. Referring to the 2007 Labour government initiative Face to Face/
Side by Side, he commented that it had disappeared under the Coalition govern-
ment “entirely without comment.” This initiative, launched by the then Secretary
of State for Communities and Local Government, Hazel Blears, was intended to
provide an “opportunity to reflect on how Government should support this [in-
terfaith relations], where and in what circumstances interfaith works best and
how we can work in partnerships with faith and non-faith-based communities
and organizations” (Blears 2007). For Dinham, government consultations like
this reflected the interests of “policymakers more than lived reality.”¹ In practice,
without committed leadership, buildings, and basic tenets, forums could only at-
tract those already deeply motivated on a personal level. They offered little for
those individuals who rejected communication with other faiths.
I often thought about Professor Dinham’s comment when listening to the
anxiety and discomfort of interfaith activists in the years following the meeting.
These activists frequently repeated an observation that dialogue had become
about ‘Bagels and Samosas’, or food and entertainment, rather than more pro-
found efforts to improve understanding. This disillusionment was echoed
amongst policymakers and in policy documents, which cited slow integration
of migrant communities and patterns of segregation between minority and ma-
jority communities as evidence of the failure of interfaith dialogue. The 2016
Casey Review, a report on ethnic and religious diversity in the UK commissioned
 From a lecture at the University of Cambridge, Westminster College, 2014.
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by the Conservative government (2016– 17) and led by Dame Louise Casey, claim-
ed that divisions continued and that “cultural and religious practices in com-
munities that are not only holding some of our citizens back but run contrary
to British values and sometimes our laws” (Casey 2016, 5). Indeed, the report la-
mented the same reduction of interfaith dialogue to ‘samosas and bagels’ and
criticized the government for its neglect of diversity as a salient political and pol-
icy issue and thus deserving of innovation and investment. The report states:
Since 2010, cohesion policy has largely been squeezed out, with Government only willing to
act exceptionally over the issue, falling well below its stated ambition to “do more than any
other government before us to promote integration” … Government’s policy consisted of a
relatively small pot of funding going towards small scale exemplar projects such as inter-
faith dialogue, training curry chefs or cross community social events such as the ‘Big
Lunch’ and ‘Our Big Gig’. This has been described to us as amounting to “saris, samosas
and steel drums” for the already well-intentioned. These are worthy and enjoyable projects
which should continue but they are not enough on their own, nor should they be a substi-
tute for tackling difficult issues (2016, 149).
I ask in this chapter if and how interfaith initiatives can be re-examined to de-
termine their value in improving relations between ethnic and religious groups.
Do the projects criticized in the Casey Review make any worthwhile contribution
to interfaith relations that can inform wider policy efforts? How do we evaluate
this contribution?
As the Casey Review and other analyses² have targeted interfaith dialogue
and related projects in general, the evaluation framework I discuss here re-
sponds in turn, looking across projects to understand the ideas that underpin
them and the activities they have inspired. Similar to the widely used evaluation
methodology Theory of Change (ToC),this approach analyses assumptions about
the expected impact of activities. According to the Center for Theory of Change,
Theory of Change dissects the assumptions underpinning a social intervention
and its expected impact. Theory of Change is “essentially a comprehensive de-
scription and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to hap-
pen in a particular context. It is focused in particular on mapping out or “filling
in” what has been described as the “missing middle” between what a pro-
gramme or change initiative does (its activities or interventions) and how
these lead to desired goals being achieved” (Center for Theory of Change
2019). On practical level, pursuing a ToC approach means “first identifying the
desired long-term goals and then works back from these to identify all the con-
 See Hussain (2014) as an example.
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ditions (outcomes) that must be in place (and how these related to one another
causally) for the goals to occur.”
Rather than focus on the argument underpinning a particular project, as is
the case with ToC, I suggest exploring the theories, rooted in theology and phi-
losophy, that have influenced at least the majority of interfaith initiatives and
asks if the practical interpretation of these theories has limited the innovation
necessary to attract new participants and have a greater impact on relations.
The ‘theory of change’ is thus applied across the field, with programme objec-
tives and expected impact linked directly to external factors like policy and as-
sumptions about how change occurs contextualized within policy debates, re-
sources, and institutional behaviour.
In pursuing this analysis, the chapter draws on some elements of field theo-
ry, developed by physicists and extended by social scientists to interpret individ-
ual and organizational behaviour. In a review of field theory (2003), John Levi
Martin writes that in general, “we may say fields emerge whenever we find a
set of institutions that individuals tend to traverse in predictable ways with min-
imal dislocation of subjectivity. In all cases, the field is something that spans and
coordinates institutions by allowing individuals to understand their past, cur-
rent, and future situations in terms of position, trajectory, and similarity or close-
ness (Turner 1974, p. 139; cf. Mohr 1994).” (2003, 42) In other words, we can un-
derstand individual, or organizational, decisions through locating their position
within the field. In other words, they make life choices and understand their own
position and that of others in relation to institutions in areas like education, em-
ployment, and religion. Martin concludes by stating that, “Field theory disap-
points us in remaining vague as to precisely how this occurs, and we hope
that it can be eventually surpassed in this regard. Yet it promises the chance
of combining rigorous analytic insight with attention to the concrete” (2003, 42).
Martin is building on the efforts of a number of social scientists (Bourdieu
1984, 1985; Meyer and Rowan 1977, Fligstein 2001) who want to understand
how individuals and organizations make decisions in relation to their context.
I am developing upon these ideas but applying them in a very practical fashion
to social action. In addition, despite Martin’s lament that causality remains
vague, I am attempting to explain how fields emerge and are reproduced, or
maintain sets of relations and power between actors, and likewise frame how
they perceive themselves and each other.
A field of social action could concern any social issue, from adult literacy to
unemployment among young people from vulnerable backgrounds to local rela-
tions between diverse ethnic and religious groups. A field is constituted by policy
– which itself is based on a particular ideological approach or theory of social
and economic order; availability and investment of financial and other resour-
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ces; and institutional behaviour. It influences 1) how and which organisations
survive, as well as their relations with each other; 2) the designs and expected
impacts of specific initiatives; and 3) capacity to innovate or establish initiatives
that conflict with predominant ideas and practical activities. Innovation would,
in turn, challenge the constitution of the field, and thus the space for differen-
tiation between initiatives is important in assessing the ability of fields to
adapt to crises and evolving social issues versus the imperative of reproduction.
For instance, interfaith initiatives have primarily utilized dialogue as their
methodology for improving communication and trust. The absence of variation
reflects a lack of research and political interest and institutional (religious) sup-
port regarding new ideas for better relations. In a 2013 interview in London, an
Anglican bishop who had been engaged with interfaith relations told me that
dialogue had declined as a priority for the Church of England, in part because
the current Archbishop, Justin Welby, was not as interested as his predecessor,
Rowan Williams, and in part because younger generations found other local
projects more appealing. He stated, “If you have two projects, one to clean up
a park and one to understand each other better, I would bet on the park.”³ He
did emphasize that interfaith relations remained an issue but lacked a frame-
work for communication about diversity. Programmes like Near Neighbours
(2011– the present),⁴ which is managed by the Church Urban Fund and financed
 In fact, parks and other outdoor spaces frequently served as platforms for interfaith cooper-
ation amongst Near Neighbours projects. For example, one project for Near Neighbours involved
cleaning up a church garden in London where a violent assault had occurred, in part because
the overgrowth shielded the attack. Austerity also provoked cooperation; an interfaith activist
in London recounted how she and other residents decided to maintain the local park after
the local authority cut funding for maintenance. She and her neighbours borrowed equipment
from the authority and maintained the part for two months and then a government contracted
service would come every third month.
 The Near Neighbours programme was established in England in 2011 in order to further co-
operation between different ethnic and religious communities. The Near Neighbours programme
targeted key locations in England known for high levels of ethnic and religious diversity, and in
some cases tensions between groups. There were two stages of Near Neighbours, the first in
2011– 13 and the second in 2014–16, with an extension to March 2017 and another in 2018.
The programme described its principal objective as bringing “people together who are near
neighbours in communities that are religiously and ethnically diverse, so that they can get to
know each other better, build relationships of trust, and collaborate together on initiatives
that improve the local community they live in.” The two ’key objectives’ were to promote greater
social interaction and social action. These objectives were achieved through small grants, rang-
ing from £500 to £5000, meant to serve as ’seed funding’.
The application process was supported by a local coordinator and local Anglican (Church of
England) clergy and deliberately avoided setting targets, encouraging instead the development
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primarily by the Department of Communities and Local Government/Housing,
Communities and Local Government, have supported grassroots interfaith initia-
tives centred on social action. Reflecting on Near Neighbours specifically, he
commented, “what is suffering are the dialogical aspects of it. You know,
about getting along better.”
In sum, because the field has depended on a narrow set of funding bodies
and institutions and benefited from only a few policy proposals, it is facing ir-
relevance without radical renovation. At the same time, because of this status,
the field of interfaith relations represents a potentially useful case study for eval-
uating a field, rather than a single project. Understanding how the field has
evolved and why it is in trouble can lead to the transformation it needs to sur-
vive. The chapter first describes the research the article relies upon and then ex-
amines common interfaith initiatives in the UK to show how individual project
evaluation cannot explain the disenchantment cited above, despite evident
need. The third section outlines a field approach, suggesting that in the case
of interfaith relations, this approach indicates both why the field has remained
limited in scale and how it can alter to generate better relations between diverse
ethnic and religious groups.
2 Analysing the Field of Interfaith Relations
2.1 Research on Interfaith Relations
My analysis of a field of interfaith relations is based on four evaluations of
Church Urban Fund programmes, including three of the Near Neighbours Grants,
and research conducted while at the Woolf Institute on trust and interfaith rela-
tions between 2013–2017. I conducted the Near Neighbours evaluations with
Kasia Narkowicz and one evaluation of their Together Grants, which support
church-based projects fighting poverty (The Woolf Institute 2016),⁵ with John
Fahy. The research on the impact of interfaith initiatives on trust between differ-
ent ethnic and religious communities was conducted largely in London while the
evaluations covered different cities in England, including Nottingham, Greater
Manchester (Bury and Prestwich), Birmingham, Luton, and East and West Lon-
of projects organic to the area, with goals suited to the particular context and status of local re-
lations between religious groups and between religious and secular residents.
 The evaluations conducted by Drs Cohen and Narkowicz occurred in five areas: East London,
Birmingham, Bradford/Oldham/Burnley area, Luton, Nottingham, Rochdale, Bury and the Black
Country. Dr Fahy helped with the Together Grant evaluation in 2015.
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don. The research involved interviews with faith leaders and with organizers of
grassroots interfaith projects, overlapping methodologically with the Near
Neighbours evaluations.
The interviewees for the evaluations and the more academic study, like Pro-
fessor Dinham, often expressed cynicism or wariness concerning the impact of
explicitly interfaith initiatives. For example, when I mentioned to a young
vicar in Tottenham, one of the most diverse areas of London and site of the
2011 riots, that I was going to see Rowan Williams, the then Archbishop of Can-
terbury, give a talk about interfaith relations, he retorted, “Why?” His view was
that interfaith relations occurred when he walked out the door of his parish
church. Another vicar categorized interfaith relations as an important academic
exercise, away from the daily experience and needs of individuals and commun-
ities. In the evaluations, project organizers occasionally observed that practical
forms of engagement contributed more to relationship-building than exchanging
knowledge about religious beliefs. The latter could come later, after gaining trust
and confidence through shared experiences that had more immediate and tangi-
ble impact. A vicar in one of the Near Neighbour areas commented that local res-
idents usually thought it was ’great’ that the church and the mosque worked to-
gether, they were not necessarily interested in joining an interfaith dialogue.
However, if the interfaith work was targeted towards meeting the practical
needs of the local community, participants expressed more enthusiasm as
they perceived greater personal and collective benefit: “I think practical action
on something like that, bringing together mosque and church and others is,
for me, a more profitable use of near Neighbours really. Because I think often
dialogues start at a practical level.” The appeal of local activism seemed partic-
ularly applicable to younger generations. Remarking on disinterest among youth
in interfaith dialogue, a Catholic activist in South London stated flatly, “I don’t
think I have had any impact on young people at all. The only event that attracts
them is the Westminster Interfaith Peace Walk (in June).” He also remarked,
“Talking is great but action is very important.”
2.2 How Did the Field Come About?
Interfaith relations as a field of practice emerged from theology and religious
studies, identifying the absence of authentic communication, or exchange of
knowledge and subsequence increasing in understanding of the Other, as the
critical problem in interfaith relations. The most important theologians for the
emerging field of interfaith relations,Wilfred Cantwell and Martin Buber, empha-
sized the necessity of listening to the ‘Other’ and taking seriously the beliefs and
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existential meaning inherent to other faiths (Buber 1937; Cantwell 1981). The ‘I
and Thou’ relationship conceived by Martin Buber particularly influenced the
format of interfaith forums. He emphasized that authentic communication,
where the participants hear what each other says, has no institutional or ideo-
logical framework. He wrote:
The relation to the Thou is direct. No system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy in-
tervene between I and Thou. The memory itself is transformed, as it plunges out of its iso-
lation into the unity of the whole. No aim, no lust, and no anticipation intervene between I
and Thou … Every means is an obstacle. Only when every means has collapsed does the
meeting come about (1937, 10–11).
In other words, pre-fixed ideas, prejudices, or the historical legacy of encounters
should not interfere in the actual, lived, immediate encounter. Diane Eck, a stu-
dent of Cantwell Smith’s and the Director of Harvard University’s Pluralism Proj-
ect, has described interfaith dialogue as having “a range of meanings, all of
which involve ways in which we handle our encounters with religious differ-
ence—dialogue in daily life, dialogue in learning, dialogue in community, and
dialogue in faith and theology” (2017, 27). ‘Dialogue’ itself signifies “a mutuality
of speaking and listening, the kind of communication that rises above, or per-
haps penetrates beneath, the chatter of words and the shrill media discussion.
It suggests a genuine openness to hearing the concerns of the other in his or
her own voice, just as we wish to be heard” (2017, 27). Dialogue surmounts the
barriers present in everyday communication by directing conversation toward ex-
change and explicitly focusing attention on the subjective perceptions of partic-
ipants regarding each other.
2.3 Evaluating Individual Initiatives
Statements like Buber’s or Eck’s have underpinned the development of practical
interfaith initiatives, which emphasize the importance of open discussion and
listening and of a neutral space that facilitates building trust in the Other. The
objectives of these initiatives can remain vague. For instance, Interfaith Week,
a national government sponsored initiative organized annually in November
by the Interfaith Network,⁶ states as its aims (1) ‘strengthening good interfaith
relations at all levels’, (2) ‘increasing awareness of the different and distinct
faith communities in the UK, in particular celebrating and building on the con-
 See the Interfaith Week Network of the United Kingdom (2021).
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tribution which their members make to their neighbourhoods and to wider soci-
ety’ and (3) ‘increasing understanding between people of religious and non-reli-
gious beliefs’. The activities bringing together members of different faith and be-
lief communities that are run during Interfaith Week, like the national Jewish
volunteering event Mitzvah Day, are assumed to be the mechanism of change.
Yet, there has been little research on how or if this change happens. Both the
impreciseness of objectives amongst existing initiatives, so necessary for evalu-
ation in other fields, and the lack of social research on the long-term implica-
tions for attitudes and behaviour of participants in interfaith initiatives have
had continued spill over effects on project design. As Renee Garfinkel puts is,
“So far there has been very little research on their [interfaith initiatives] effective-
ness. This is unfortunate, because those who design and implement interfaith
programs need feedback to determine how to maximize their efforts and resour-
ces” (2004, 9). The creator of Theory of Change (ToC), Carol Weiss, warns against
using ToC under these conditions: “Theory-based evaluation is one approach
that has a great deal of promise. But trying to use theory-based evaluation is dif-
ficult when programs do not have any explicit—or even implicit—theories, when
programs are amorphous, or when they shift significantly over time” (Horsch
1998).
Though initiatives like Interfaith Week, or for that matter, most local inter-
faith forums lack precise objectives and methodologies, over the past twenty
years, three specific kinds of initiatives have evolved that are based on explicit
theories of change. These are theological, educational, and social initiatives
that are often located in public institutions, like schools and universities, or as-
sociated with churches and religious organizations. The most prominent form of
theological interfaith dialogue is called scriptural reasoning. Founded by retired
Cambridge University professor David Ford, scriptural reasoning brings together
clergy from different faiths to read religious texts together and relate the teach-
ings to contemporary issues. According to Jeffrey Bailey, scriptural reasoning re-
fers to the following:
[G]roup study of scriptural texts from the three Abrahamic religious traditions. At any given
meeting, with roughly equal numbers of each faith represented, passages from the three
scriptures are read. A theme (say, debt relief) usually relates the texts together. A few intro-
ductory comments about a scripture passage are made by a member of that faith, and then
the entire group attempts to understand what the passage is teaching, and how it ought be
applied to today’s context (Bailey 2006, 37).
In practice, scriptural reasoning as a form of interfaith dialogue consists of four
steps: participants identify a theme based on a common concern or interest; they
select a relevant passage from each scripture (Muslim, Jewish, and Christian);
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they then read and explain the passage to the other participants; and finally,
with the help of a facilitator, participants discuss the passages and reflect on
their meaning (Rosecastle Foundation, ND). The outcomes should be greater
knowledge of other faiths, especially how the scriptures of each faith speak to
contemporary issues and more awareness of how others see one’s own faith.
The longer-term impact should be moving beyond preconceptions of the other
two faiths and the development of relationships that can lead, in turn, to ongo-
ing collaboration to address shared problems.
Whereas scriptural reasoning is often oriented toward clergy, or lay leaders
with prior knowledge of texts, dialogue within schools is obviously meant for
young people. These projects assume that exposure to the practice and beliefs
of other faiths will increase respect and knowledge. As with scriptural reasoning,
a facilitator brings together representatives of the different faiths and beliefs to
ensure the participants are at ease, or the ‘neutrality’ evoked in the original the-
orization of dialogue. In contrast to scriptural reasoning, however, educational
dialogue can also refer to culture, and not just religious tenets and texts, and
the need for social encounters across diversity.
The Faith and Belief Forum, formerly known as Three Faiths Forum, is the
most prominent British organization engaged in educational work. Their projects
include linking schools associated with different religious traditions and run-
ning workshops. The workshops can bring together a panel of speakers of differ-
ent faiths and beliefs that is led by a professional facilitator. The speakers share
their own experiences of faith and respond to the pupils’ questions. In one re-
port, the organization claims that such a workshop helps young people by in-
creasing their knowledge of religion and belief and making them more comfort-
able with individuals of different religions and beliefs than their own. The
workshop should make students appreciate diversity and to seek out relation-
ships with people of different backgrounds. Finally, students who have partici-
pated in the workshop should become defenders of religious tolerance and free-
dom and champions of diversity within British society.
In contrast to the explicitly theological focus of scriptural reasoning or inter-
faith education based in schools, the third category integrates interfaith relations
with another field, most often, social action. The Near Neighbours programme
claims two principal objectives: “Social interaction - to develop positive relation-
ships in multi-faith areas i.e. to help people from different faiths get to know and
understand each other better,” and “Social action - to encourage people of differ-
ent faiths and of no faith to come together for initiatives that improve their local
neighbourhood” [Emphasis adapted from the website] (Near Neighbours 2019).
Similarly, the vision of the national Jewish day of volunteering in the UK, Mitz-
vah Day, is “of Jews and non-Jews coming together to build more cohesive neigh-
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bourhoods and to strengthen civil society” (Mitzvah Day 2021). Sadaqa Day (Sa-
daqa Day, ND), the Muslim equivalent, is defined as “A date in the calendar
when individuals, mosques and other places of worship, schools, women’s
and community groups, scouts and guides groups can get involved.”
When first launched in 2011, the then Secretary of DCLG, Eric Pickles, ex-
plained that the purpose of the programme was to overcome the “isolation
and misunderstandings which are not healthy for local communities, when by
and large, irrespective of creed or faith most people want the same thing, for
their neighbourhoods to be better places to live” (Ministry of Housing 2011).
On a practical level, Near Neighbours required applications for funding to in-
volve at least two faith groups. Most applications exceeded that, as approximate-
ly 90% of grants awarded included at least three faith groups or those of no faith
(Near Neighbours 2017a, 2). Between September 2011 and March 2017, Near
Neighbours funded 1433 projects, of which 733 were run by faith groups and
700 by secular community groups (Near Neighbours 2017a, 2).
Overall, Near Neighbours awarded £5,329,894 to 1635 projects across Eng-
land in this six-year period (Near Neighbours 2017b, 1). The programme operated
in nine hubs: Birmingham, the Black Country, West Midlands, Luton, West Lon-
don, East London, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and Lancashire (Near
Neighbours 2019). The types of projects that Near Neighbours funded included
cooking and archery classes in Luton; exercise and Hebrew classes in Bury; pro-
vision of English language skills, a soup kitchen, and a Roma engagement proj-
ect in Nottingham; and faith tours in Tipton as well as coffee mornings organised
on a housing estate for neighbours to get to know each other better. In awarding
grants, Near Neighbours emphasized engaging people in projects who might feel
excluded from the local community; 50% of Near Neighbours projects involved
unemployed people and a third worked with refugees and asylum seekers (Near
Neighbours 2017a, 5).
The timeframe for the grants was relatively short with most grants expected
to take place within a year or less from the date of award.⁷ The distribution of
grants reflected the existing level of civil society engagement. Where grassroots
activism already was strong, such as in Nottingham and Luton, the programme
received more applications and consequently, more projects were awarded. In
Bury and Tipton the interest was significantly lower, reflecting the lack of com-
munity activism, and the grants tended to be awarded to the handful of groups
already doing work in the local area.
 In 2015, a total of 133 projects was funded by Near Neighbours in the five areas: 7 grants were
awarded in Tipton, 7 in Bury, 25 in Rochdale, 41 in Nottingham and 53 in Luton
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In the evaluations we conducted, the Near Neighbours projects that were un-
able to continue cited a lack of funding as the main barrier. There is no data on
overall project survival rates, though the evaluations indicated that when the
projects survived, it was often because organizations adapted them to accommo-
date financial constraints. For example, a project based in East London that or-
ganized a dance class for men who had tested positive for HIV/AIDS kept shifting
the location of the class and finding different instructors because of limited re-
sources. Perhaps more importantly, participants in the Near Neighbours funded
projects conveyed that the positive impact on relations remained even if the proj-
ects themselves no longer existed.⁸ According to the most recent evaluation of
Near Neighbours, which surveyed programme participants in 2018, nearly
50% of respondents indicated that “because of their involvement with a Small
Grant-funded project they have since started volunteering in other community
projects” (Bremner 2018, NP).
Yet, returning to the cynicism cited at the beginning of the chapter, if the im-
pact of Near Neighbours was to make volunteering, or implicitly social action
and not dialogue, more appealing, what does this say about the potential of dia-
logue for improving relations across diverse groups? In fact, over the four years
of conducting evaluations, projects became increasingly oriented toward social
action and not organizing intercultural events or interreligious forums. Organiz-
ers openly diminished the role of religion in their activities, preferring to concen-
trate on social relations and shared interests.
For example, in 2014, tensions in the Middle East meant that Muslim and
Jewish groups in Greater Manchester, one of the locations where Near Neigh-
bours operated, would not interact with each other, much less collaborate on
a project. A year later, however, young, religious Muslim and Jewish women
had organized an exercise class funded by Near Neighbours. They claimed
that their project had succeeded because “We are friends, there is no politics,
it is so refreshing.” Their shared religiosity facilitated cooperation, as partici-
pants understood practices like wearing the veil or marrying and having children
at a young age. But the organizers were frank in their desire not to discuss reli-
gion. Similarly, a rabbi who organized a café with local Muslim leaders in Not-
tingham described her motivation as practical. Though she had learned about
Islam through the project, she stressed the value of collaboration in a social proj-
ect for understanding, rather than directly engaging in a conversation about re-
ligious belief.
 Ibid.
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Does this wariness of prioritizing religious belief in activities mean that in-
terfaith dialogue may continue to benefit religious and lay leaders or enhance
school curricula but not evolve further than a secondary consideration of social
action? What can be done, if anything, to extend the scope, and ideally, the im-
pact, of interfaith initiatives?
3 Assessing the Field of Interfaith Initiatives
I suggest a more fruitful approach than evaluating single initiatives may be to
assess the field itself. This approach would mean, as explained above, asking
which initiatives survive and which do not and why not; how organizations re-
late to each other, specifically, if they compete for scarce resources and/or part-
ner in advocacy and projects; are there prevalent project designs and expected
impacts; and is there a space to innovate, or challenge the dominant ideas of
the field? Patterns across the field can reveal how the field is reproduced, the ef-
fect of this reproduction on kinds of impact, and the necessary changes in initia-
tives to improve impact.
3.1 How Has a Field of Interfaith Initiatives Come About?
Responding to this question entails determining how different factors – policy,
institutional behaviour, and availability of material and human resources – in-
fluence both the decision-making of organizations and their survival and the de-
sign, implementation, and impact of projects. How do these factors influence the
conception of the problem across diverse initiatives and the activities they deliv-
er? How do they lend to the dominance or, inversely, marginalization, of partic-
ular initiatives? Returning again to the doubts expressed by activists, academics,
and policymakers alike about the significance of interfaith dialogue, has the
field of interfaith relations relied too heavily on dialogue as a method and like-
wise, circumscribed capacity to proffer alternatives?
3.1.1 7/7 and the Rise of Interfaith Dialogue
In the UK, interest in interfaith dialogue peaked after the July 7, 2005 bombings
in London (7/7). Faith-based organizations had already benefited from the La-
bour government’s commissioning agenda, desire to build government-voluntary
and faith-based organization partnerships, and support for regionalism. The
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partnership efforts were consolidated under the Local Strategic Partnerships
(Communities and Local Government 2009). and the Local Area Agreements⁹
and regionalism institutionalized through the establishment of regional develop-
ment agencies (Robson, Peck and Holden 2000). Following these policy strat-
egies, the government created regional faith councils to enhance the capacity
of faith-based organizations at a local and regional level. For example, the
East of England Faiths Council identified its mission as facilitating “the major
faith traditions [to be] represented in the region in making input to relevant strat-
egy and issues, to act as a clear point of contact for public, private and voluntary
bodies; to support local inter faith and faith activity; and to promote the contri-
bution of faiths to the life and well-being of the region (ND).” In other words, the
Council should act as an intermediary, developing the capacity of FBOs and in-
terfaith initiatives to work in partnership and providing advice and guidance to
the public sector on how to engage effectively with organizations and indeed, re-
ligious identity.
Integration of faith-based initiatives into public sector investment and policy
strategies provided more funding and arguably, status, for interfaith work. More
specifically, government directives on how to engage with faith-based organiza-
tions reinforced the predominance of particular methods of intervention, namely
religious literacy and involvement of different faith groups. The Home Office’s re-
port “Working Together: Cooperation Between Government and Faith Groups”
(2004), which aimed to provide guidelines for closer cooperation between
faith communities and the local and national government, instructed govern-
ment officials to respect faith and belief and learn more about religious diversity.
The guidelines for government included ‘pursuing faith literacy,’ enrolling in
training, developing networks, and ensuring representation from different
faith groups and women, youth, and older people. The implication for interfaith
initiatives was that they were expected to deliver activities that provided knowl-
edge of different faiths and their impact was, albeit primarily informally, as-
sessed by the inclusion of representatives of diverse religious groups. The policy
agenda and availability of resources thus determined both the activities and the
 The National Audit Office described the LAAs as “a new form of contract between central and
local government and were designed to devolve greater power over public services to local com-
munities.” Indicating the ambition of these partnerships, the NAO added, “The Department for
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and the nine Government Offices for the Regions
(GOs) have worked to introduce LAAs over the past three years and by April 2007 every local
authority in England had one. The amount of public expenditure covered by the agreements
is expected to reach around £5 billion in the next three years” (Beardsley et al. 2007, 2).
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inherent assumptions about their impact, or that encounters aimed at increasing
knowledge would lead to better relations between groups.
3.1.2 Austerity and the Decline of Dialogue
The decline, even demise, of the regional faith councils, and the emerging iden-
tification of interfaith relations with social activism reflect the trajectory of policy
support and government funding since the financial crisis in 2007–2008 and the
introduction of austerity measures under the coalition government (2010– 15).
The coalition government (Conservative – Liberal Democrat) ended public sector
growth and initiated an era, still ongoing, of continuous cuts to local govern-
ment and other sources of funding (Lupton, et. al. 2015, 2–4). The government
abolished regional development agencies altogether, as well as investment in
the regional faiths councils (EEFC closed in 2013) and moved away from the sub-
stantive aim of creating public – voluntary sector partnerships in favour of pro-
moting local social action (Tizard 2012).
At the same time, the rapid rise of social problems created by the cuts and
economic insecurity, whether from changes to benefits or precarious employ-
ment or both, also meant that faith-based organizations were under pressure
to address local social demand. The new focus for religious institutions and
faith-based organizations was perhaps most noticeable in three trends: govern-
ment investment in Near Neighbours, the rise of food banks, mostly supported
through the Christian organization Trussell Trust, and the expansion of faith-
based volunteering days in the UK, which now include Mitzvah Day (Jewish,
est. 2005), Sewa Day (Hindu, est. 2010), and Sadaqa Day (Muslim, est. 2015).
Near Neighbours received £5 million for the first stage, launched in 2011, and
£4.5 million more for another stage that began in 2014 and was extended in
2016 for another year, and then, most recently, £1.5 million in 2019.
Private foundations did not elect to substitute for public investment as it di-
minished, shying away themselves from prioritizing interfaith relations. The In-
terfaith Network, a national umbrella organization, continued to receive govern-
ment funding, in addition to member fees. The other prominent national
interfaith organizations, like Three Faiths Forum (3FF/ Faith and Belief Forum,
have relied on relationships with a small number of British and foreign private
foundations and individual donors, as well as occasional support from organiza-
tions like the British Council and government departments. The Cambridge Inter-
faith Programme (CIP), which was founded by Professor David Ford, is housed at
the University of Cambridge and has received private funding as well as funding
from the American-based Coexist Foundation (Coexist Foundation 2019).
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For the majority of interfaith initiatives, the loss of government and philan-
thropic support represented more than access to material resources. It was also
politically symbolic, just as the past interest in interfaith relations gave legitima-
cy to initiatives. As a vicar based in London explained to me around 2013, “At
one point there were a lot of interfaith forums. This has diminished because of
the funding.” However, he also added, “It’s not just the funding. The previous
government was really into the notion of faith communities working together
and they thought, all the sort of spin was they could impact hard to reach com-
munities. All that was understood is that they had a bit of power. It is certainly
completely out of fashion now except for Near Neighbours.” On a practical level,
the notion inherent in interfaith forums that knowledge of other religions and
social encounters, facilitated by shared holidays and other events, would gener-
ate familiarity, trust, and cooperation, had lost the confidence of policymakers.
3.2 The Implications for Interfaith Initiatives
3.2.1 The Few Organizations that Have Survived Have Relied Primarily on
Established Private Sources of Funding and Have Offered a Consistent
Range of Activities
The organizations engaged in interfaith relations that have survived in the post-
financial crisis period, or over the past decade, have been those in existence for
over several decades, and thus relatively well established even before the spike
in government interest after the 7/7 attacks. These organizations are linked to sta-
ble sources of funding, especially private donors and universities. Significantly
for the field, they have maintained the same activities, for instance, the Cam-
bridge Interfaith Programme (est. 2002) has always centred its work on scriptural
reasoning. 3FF/Faith and Belief Forum (est. 1997) primarily concentrates on ed-
ucational activities and the Interfaith Network (est.1987), which does receive gov-
ernment funding, runs activities like Interfaith Week, which is held in November
and consists of interfaith activities around the country, and organizes meetings
between religious and lay leaders and community representatives. With the clo-
sure of regional faiths councils after the financial crisis in 2007–08, the Inter-
faith Network became the only body able to bring together members of different
communities for formal activities.
Conversely, in my research, the local interfaith forums still in existence must
rely on volunteers who often possess a long history of involvement in interfaith
relations. For example, a Catholic interfaith activist who I interviewed in 2014
had led a forum for interfaith dialogue in South London for decades. Describing
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his role, he said, “I have got a lot of people together. I have improved commu-
nications … I have very patiently built up my group at the Cathedral. I had a
meeting the other week and 30 people came up to me. I have become known.
I wanted to put on the map that the Catholic Church is very committed to inter-
faith.” The Muslim-Jewish Forum in Manchester (est. 2004) also depends on vol-
untary leadership of local Muslim and Jewish activists. Similarly, projects funded
by Near Neighbours, at least in the evaluations I conducted, struggled for other
funding unless supported by an institution or organization. For example, a
mother-toddler group run through the Salvation Army lasted past the NN funding
because the Salvation Army assumed the costs.
3.2.2 Collaboration is Beneficial in a Resource-Limited Field
The well-established organizations mentioned above, with the exception of the
Inter Faith Network, have regularly collaborated. They form a small cluster
(3FF/Faith and Belief Forum, Coexist, CIP, and Goldsmiths) able to seek out
new areas of influence through training and other activities and, in effect, affirm
each other’s position within the field. As mentioned above, CIP has partnered
with Coexist Foundation and with 3FF/Faith and Belief Forum to establish reli-
gious literacy projects in the Middle East. CIP has also collaborated with Coexist
on a number of leadership training and cultural projects (Cambridge Inter Faith
Programme 2021) and shared donors and staff members. CIP and Coexist have
partnered with Adam Dinham at Goldsmith’s University, for instance, on reli-
gious literacy training for Ernst and Young (Coexist House 2017).
3.2.3 There is Little Variance within the Field in How the ‘Problem’ of
Interfaith Relations is Conceived
The resemblance between mission statements of interfaith initiatives, regardless
of size, illustrates how dominant the conception is within the field that greater
understanding in a neutral venue can overcome tensions and lead to positive re-
lationships. For instance, the Birmingham Council of Faith’s (est.1974) website
states that they “organise events throughout the year to facilitate harmonious re-
lations between people of different faiths in the city. This includes promoting the
study of all religions so that the followers of one religion may have a better un-
derstanding of the other religions and be alert of issues, peace, justice and tol-
erance in our city (2021).” The Bedford Council of Faiths (est. 2004) lists the fol-
lowing aims: “to promote religious harmony, dispel ignorance and prejudice
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about beliefs, foster religious understanding and mutual respect and encourage
friendships across religious boundaries (Bedford Council of Faiths 2020).” Sim-
ilarly, The Inter Faith Network states that they work with “faith communities,
inter faith organisations, educators and others to increase understanding and co-
operation between people of different faiths and to widen public awareness of
the distinctive religious traditions in the UK (2021).” The Faith and Belief
Forum creates “spaces in schools, universities, workplaces and the wider com-
munity where people can engage with questions of belief and identity and
meet people different from themselves. Enabling people to learn from each
other in this way is often the most effective way to tackle ignorance and chal-
lenge stereotypes – and create understanding and trust between people
(2021).” In sum, despite differences in longevity, location, and resources, initia-
tives make the same assumptions about intervention and impact.
3.2.4 Innovation Has Been at a Grassroots Level and Primarily Unsustainable
The grassroots nature of projects funded by Near Neighbours or local interfaith
forums means that they often are time-limited, volunteer-led, and dependent on
manipulation of scarce resources. For instance, a sewing circle for migrant
women in London benefited over several years from government support and
Near Neighbours funding but still faced closure in 2017. The staff had stopped
receiving salaries to help the organization survive but it was unclear it would
last. At the same time, the initiative had succeeded in accessing highly marginal-
ized groups, including migrants, asylum seekers, and women with disabilities by
running sewing circles in a high street store. The project organizer related how a
Muslim woman came to one of the circles dressed in scant clothing. The other
women asked her why she was dressed, at least for them, inappropriately, and
she responded that she had accepted the only clothing on offer at the shelter
where she was staying. The other women responded by finding clothing for
her to wear. The story was intended to demonstrate how relationships, and
forms of social support, had emerged from the circles. Its demise would mean
that a platform for generating relationships, especially amongst these popula-
tions, would disappear.
Two other initiatives, mentioned above, brought together Muslim and Jewish
leaders in Nottingham to run a café for low-income residents and religious Mus-
lim and Jewish women seeking a single-sex exercise class where their attire and
life decisions, such as early marriage and children, would not be questioned.
Again, the initiatives relied upon volunteers and local contributions. Yet, their
impact extended beyond interfaith relations in an explicitly religious sense, as
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they encouraged interaction between two communities subject in their relation-
ship to ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
3.3 Reconceiving the Field
Reconceiving a field involves responding to external factors that are stymieing
constructive change, such as declining funding opportunities and shifting policy
priorities. Reconceiving the field also means challenging interfaith initiatives to
contemplate a new conceptualization of their work and to renew themselves as
organizations. Moving away from Buber’s emphasis on neutrality, the effort to
mobilize resources in order to help others locally could be interpreted as the ‘liv-
ing will’ that Emmanuel Levinas, a philosopher-theologian, highlights when an-
alysing the work of another Jewish theologian Franz Rosenzweig (1990). Levinas
writes that Rosenzweig wanted an alternative interpretation of the individual’s
position in history to that of philosophers like Hegel (or Marx), where “the sig-
nificance of a work is truer in terms of the will that wished it into being than
the totality into which it is inserted … the living willing of will is indispensable
to the truth and understanding of the work” (1990, 200).
Assigning the effort to help others its own value, even transcendent to the
actual ‘help’ itself, resembles Kant’s Formula for Humanity as well, where Hu-
manity is a means and an end. (Korsgaard 1986) Of course, both philosophical
considerations lack reference to religious belief, but then much of the intention
of grassroots activism is to acclimate residents to cooperation across diversity
and then encourage gaining an understanding. The point is that the prioritiza-
tion of religious belief does not hold in grassroots activism, but rather, has to
be integrated into a conceptualization of how individual action to benefit others
can alter attitudes and relationships. As a vicar working at a church in East Lon-
don said to me in 2016, the renewal of the Church of England, long in decline,
would only come about from connecting the practice of community organizing to
theorizing a different social role for the Church as an institution. He explained
that the Church was “Moving in a positive direction but largely what we are
about as the Church of England is gathering people together to serve their
kind of needs. When we talk about reaching out, what we are talking about is
growing our church. There is a lot of evidence that one of the features of growing
a church is to be socially engaged.” He argued that:
What is really required is a theology of social engagement that is…. about what we are
about as Christians. That is one of the positive things about this austerity period, churches
have gotten their hands dirty … people have not been doing stuff but have started to think
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this feels like real Christianity. This gives me the opportunity to make connections, what
society is like, how do I relate to it, how do I share love.
The ‘love’ he wants to share reflects his belief but also recognition of humanity
in everyone, regardless of their belief. In Kant’s terms, humanity is ‘uncondition-
ally good’. As Korsgaard writes, “The possession of humanity and the capacity
for good will, whether or not that capacity is realized, is enough to establish a
claim on being an unconditional end” (1986, 197). The objective of good will to-
ward others is for those individuals to realize their own capacity through the in-
teraction, in essence, acknowledging through social relations the humanity of all
participants.
Engaging theoretical ideas should not be beyond the work of practitioners
and applied research, as this engagement prevents obscuring often ideologically
driven assumptions within policy about individual behaviour, inequality, social
obligations, and so on. Thinking theoretically also allows for critiquing lan-
guage, such as ‘service user’, which again neglects the critical importance of so-
cial relations to the quality and effectiveness of intervention (Oxfam 2009; Cohen
2014).What constitutes ‘theory’ may differ by field, for instance interfaith initia-
tives are derived from theological and philosophical analysis. More importantly,
negotiating the relationship between ideas and practice diminishes the boun-
dary between the two, as the two forms of knowledge, academic and practical,
respond to the other.
Redesigning interfaith activities that go beyond neutral forums and religious
literacy could, if premised on the will and effort to help others and recognition of
a common humanity, emphasize the process of cooperation. Buber does offer
guidance for how the relationships developed within the cooperation can be
conceptualized. He notes that relations between I and Thou develop in the pre-
sent, and that the present is “continually present and enduring.” Other relations,
or not in the present, are instead characterized by “cessation, suspension, and
breaking off and cutting clear and hardening, absence of relation and of present
being” (12– 13). These terms imply closure and stagnation, rather than continued
interaction and spontaneity.¹⁰
Following this explanation of Buber’s, the process of cooperation could both
account for specific relationships within the local context and provide a ‘stand-
ardized’ framework across interfaith initiatives. Cooperation would provide a
foundation for continuous interaction, respect, and openness, with expectations
based on participation and shared will. Adopting this flexible, contextualized
 See also Vollmer (2013).
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approach to interfaith work means that some initiatives could offer religious lit-
eracy, perhaps because they are located in areas where faith communities are
segregated, and others would assume existent knowledge and thus stress
other areas of work like public institutional reform and rights. Concentrating
on cooperation as the project design would ideally increase practical impact
and elevate public awareness of the values of openness and respect the field rep-
resents. Impact assessment would continue to be based on participation rates
across diverse groups, but it would evaluate types of participation as well, com-
mitment of time and resources, the effects of cooperation on quality of life and
emotional well-being, translation into advocacy, and interreligious understand-
ing.
Reconceiving a field of social action involves responding to external con-
straints and opportunities in instigating change across initiatives and likewise,
redesigning initiatives to address problematic trends characterizing the field
and limiting impact. In the case of interfaith initiatives, effective change in atti-
tudes and behaviour may come not just through participation in collective local
activism but also by approaching faith and belief from a more complex philo-
sophical perspective. In other words, behaviour toward the Other may relate
more to ethics, and then understanding of religious difference, rather than
just understanding. More specifically, devising a response entails 1) rethinking
the theoretical and philosophical ideas that have informed design, management,
and evaluation and 2) integrating these ideas with a new approach to practice
that addresses characteristics of the field like the sustainability of a particular
type of organization or the range of diversity in service design. Finally, the re-
conception demonstrates for funding bodies and policymakers, as well as rele-
vant institutions like the Church of England, needed support.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have offered a potential direction for assessing interfaith initia-
tives by analysing the field itself, or how it has become sustainable in its current
form, the predominant conception of the problem and appropriate responses,
categorization of impact, divisions and contradictions within the field, and
trends in participation. The assessment should reveal potential for reconceiving
the field and individual project aims, designs, and impact. In brief, the paper
makes the following recommendations:
1. Conduct evaluation at the level of a ‘field’ to understand constraints and op-
portunities regarding interfaith initiatives.
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2. Focus on indicators like the diversification within the field; distribution of
resources across different-sized projects and organizations; and collabora-
tion and cooperation between organizations to analyse how a field is consti-
tuted and is sustained, as well as the kinds and depth of impact of specific
projects.
3. Likewise, connect policy, institutional behaviour, and access to material re-
sources with project implementation and delivery and the experience of par-
ticipation in order to understand the impact of a field and how it needs to
change.
4. Encourage shared information, as with collective impact and other models,
across organizations but not just to have consistent approaches to evalua-
tion, in part to influence policy, but also to rethink the field itself and the
role of policymakers, service users, staff, and other stakeholders in design-
ing future interventions.
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